

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES, TOGETHER WITH THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND TWO PROTOCOLS, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 8, 1987



JANUARY 25, 1988.—Treaty was read the first time, and together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 25, 1988.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection regarding the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members. The Treaty, together with the MOU and the two Protocols, was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. The Report of the Department of State on the Treaty is provided for the information of the Senate.

In addition, I am transmitting herewith, for the information of the Senate, the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country Agreement), which was signed at Brussels on December 11, 1987. The Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. The Report of the Department of State discusses in detail the terms of the Basing Country Agreement. Also attached for the information of the Senate are the notes exchanged between both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia and the United States. The notes acknowledge that these countries agree to the United States' conducting inspections, under the Treaty, on their territory. Identical notes also are being exchanged between the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries.

The Treaty is an unprecedented arms control agreement in several respects. It marks the first time that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to eliminate, throughout the world, an entire class of their missile systems. Significantly, the eliminations will be achieved from markedly asymmetrical starting points that favored the Soviet Union. The Treaty includes provisions for comprehensive on-site inspections, including the continuous moni-

toring of certain facilities, to aid in verifying compliance. To a much greater extent than in earlier arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, detailed information has been, and will continue to be, exchanged by the Parties in order to facilitate verification of compliance. Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on cooperative measures to enhance verification by national technical means.

The missile systems to be eliminated consist of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles having a range capability between 500 and 5500 kilometers. The launchers for such missiles and unique elements of their related support structures and support equipment also will be eliminated. The shorter-range missiles to be eliminated under this Treaty are those with a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers. They must be eliminated within 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Intermediate-range missiles, having a range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers, are to be eliminated in two phases within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. Elimination will take place at designated locations and will be subject to on-site inspection as an aid to verifying compliance.

In the MOU, the United States and the Soviet Union have provided detailed information on the location of all missiles, launchers, and related support structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty. Each Party is required to provide updated on a routine basis after the Treaty enters into force.

The Treaty provides that on-site inspections are permitted at specified locations in the United States and the Soviet Union as well as in the Basing Countries in Western and Eastern Europe where U.S. or Soviet missiles, launchers, and related support structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty are or have been located. The different types of "short-notice" on-site inspections for which the Treaty provides are designed to contribute to our ability to verify Soviet compliance, while protecting all U.S. and Allied nuclear and conventional forces not subject to the Treaty as well as other sensitive intelligence and defense facilities.

In addition to "short-notice" on-site inspections, the Treaty provides for other types of on-site inspections, including the continuous presence of U.S. inspectors at the Soviet facility at Votkinsk, at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled, and a continuous Soviet presence at the identified facility at Hercules Plant #1, located at Magna, Utah, at which stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced.

The Treaty is the culmination of six years of negotiations with the Soviet Union. To a large extent, the Treaty is the result of Allied solidarity in support of the fundamental objectives established by NATO's "dual-track" decision in 1979. Our Atlantic and our Asian and Pacific Allies have been closely involved throughout the period of negotiation, and they fully support the Treaty. The Treaty enhances our collective security by eliminating an entire class of Soviet missile systems that has been a major concern for over a decade. Our European Allies will continue to be well protected by the significant U.S. nuclear forces remaining in Europe, by the independent British and French nuclear deterrents, and by conventional forces, which include over 300,000 U.S. troops.

I believe that the Treaty is in the best interests of the United States and represents an important step in achieving arms reductions that strengthen U.S. and Allied security. Therefore, I urge the Senate's advice and consent to its ratification.

RONALD REAGAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 25, 1988.*

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection establishing procedures for the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members. The Treaty was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. I recommend that the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

In addition, accompanying this Report is the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country Agreement). The Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. Also enclosed are the Notes that were exchanged between the United States and both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia regarding inspections that will be carried out on the territory of those two countries. The Basing Country Agreement was signed at Brussels, Belgium, on December 11, 1987, and the Notes were exchanged on December 23, 1987, between the United States and the German Democratic Republic and on January 5, 1988, between the United States and Czechoslovakia. Identical notes are also being exchanged between the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries. I recommend that the Basing Country Agreement and the Notes be provided to the Senate for its information.

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty requires the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate, throughout the world, their shorter-range (500 to 1000

kilometers) and intermediate-range (1000 to 5500 kilometers) ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, along with the launchers for those missiles and unique support equipment and support structures. This marks the first time that the two principal nuclear powers have agreed to the elimination of an entire class of weapon-delivery systems.

The Treaty is the fruit of many years' labor and of this Administration's firm policy regarding the Soviet deployment of SS-20s threatening our Allies in Europe and Asia. It was negotiated in Geneva and at ministerial meetings in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva. In addition to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Intelligence Agency all played important roles in its development.

Throughout the negotiating process, we consulted extensively with our NATO and Asian allies, particularly the Western European Basing Countries in which missile systems, support structures, or other equipment subject to the Treaty are located: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Contemporaneously with the negotiation of the Treaty, the United States negotiated the Basing Country Agreement with these countries, providing for their approval and assistance in the implementation of the Treaty's inspection provisions. We also regularly advised Congress, in Washington and during the Congressional Observer Group's meeting in Geneva, on the progress of the negotiations and on the objectives of the United States in negotiating the Treaty.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Treaty had its genesis in the Soviet Deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles beginning in 1977. The SS-20 is an accurate, three-warhead, ground-mobile ballistic missile, whose deployment by the Soviet Union increased an already existing imbalance in favor of Soviet theater nuclear forces. These Soviet deployments not only directly threatened our NATO and Asian Allies, they also raised questions about the ability of the United States and its Allies, to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. In December 1979, after thorough consultations among the Allies, NATO reached what became known as the "dual-track" decision. On the one hand, NATO would proceed to deploy a limited number of U.S. Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe to maintain its deterrent capability. On the other hand, the United States would pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to establishing a balance in intermediate-range nuclear missile forces at a lower and equal level.

Under this Administration, the "dual-track" decision was reaffirmed, and on November 18, 1981, the United States proposed the "zero option" to the Soviet Union. Pursuant to this proposal, the United States would have cancelled its planned deployments to Europe of Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles if the Soviet Union would have agreed to eliminate all of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

Today, more than six years later, the U.S. "zero option" proposal constitutes the basis of the Treaty. The six years of negotiations, however, did not produce this result easily. For example, while the United States emphasized for years its preference for the "zero option," the Soviets at first insisted on retaining a residual force of intermediate-range missiles and on counting the independent British and French nuclear deterrents as though they were forces of the United States. The United States rejected that position. Moreover, the Soviets walked out of the negotiations in November 1983 when the United States began deployments of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. It was not until January 1985 that the Soviets agreed to return to the negotiations. They did not agree to the "zero option" until July 1987.

Soviet shorter-range missiles—the SS-12 and SS-23—can fulfill many of the same military missions as the Soviet intermediate-range missiles. Therefore, from the outset, the United States insisted upon concurrent constraints on shorter-range missiles in order to enhance the effectiveness of limits on intermediate-range missiles. In the Summer of 1987, after the Soviets proposed the elimination of shorter-range systems in Europe, the United States proposed that the shorter-range systems of both sides be eliminated on a global basis. In response to the U.S. proposal, the Soviets accepted the "zero option" for shorter-range missiles as well.

For much of the negotiations, the Soviet Union argued that the Treaty should focus only on missile systems located in Europe and that missiles located outside of Europe should be exempt from the Treaty or subject to less stringent restrictions. The United States, however, insisted on a "global" approach in view of the mobility and transportability of the Soviet missile systems. The Soviets eventually agreed to this approach.

During the last months of the negotiations, the Soviet Union insisted that U.S. warheads associated with the Pershing IA missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany be included in the Treaty. The United States had insisted from the beginning of the negotiations that systems belonging to third countries would not be part of, or be affected by, the Treaty. On August 26, 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would dismantle its Pershing IA missiles when the United States and the Soviet Union had eliminated all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles pursuant to the Treaty. This unilateral decision by the Federal Republic is completely separate from the Treaty. This decision represents a policy of the Federal Republic of Germany that is not legally binding upon the Parties to the Treaty. Following the Federal Republic's unilateral decision, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that they will eliminate their intermediate-range missiles by 15 days prior to the end of the three-year elimination period specified by the Treaty. At that period, the conditions established by the Federal Republic will have been met, and the existing program of cooperation will have therefore ceased. The U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with the Federal Republic's Pershing IA missiles will then be withdrawn and returned to U.S. territory. The United States will eliminate them in accordance with the Protocol on Elimination. The Treaty and its associated documents will not affect existing programs of cooperation.

THE TREATY: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

The Treaty obligates the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-launched, weapon-delivery, ballistic and cruise missiles, their launchers, and specified support structures and support equipment. The Treaty requires periodic data exchanges and gives each Party the right to carry out verification measures, including on-site inspections.

The Treaty consists of four documents, which set forth the basic obligations and the means of implementing those obligations. These are:

The Treaty Articles, which obligate the Parties to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems within three years and 18 months, respectively; not to possess such missile systems after elimination; not to produce or flight-test such missiles in the future; and to carry out provisions to facilitate effective verification of the terms of the Treaty;

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data, which contains the data, including site diagrams and photographs that are integral parts of the MOU, exchanged between the Parties prior to the signing of the Treaty regarding the locations, numbers, and characteristics of each Party's intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems as of November 1, 1987;

The Protocol on Elimination, which sets forth the detailed procedures for eliminating missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment subject to the Treaty; and

The Protocol on Inspection, which sets forth the detailed procedures for conducting on-site inspections, including "short-notice" inspections, "baseline" inspections, "close-out" inspections, "elimination" inspections, and continuous portal monitoring.

REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS

The Treaty provides that each Party must eliminate all of its intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. Intermediate-range missiles have a range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers; shorter-range missiles have a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers.

The existing types of intermediate-range shorter-range missiles are listed in Article III of the Treaty. For the United States, these are the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile, the BGM-109G intermediate-range cruise missile, and the Pershing IA shorter-range ballistic missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of missiles are the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-12 shorter-range ballistic missile, and SS-23 shorter-range ballistic missile. All intermediate-range missile systems must be eliminated within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. All shorter-range missile systems must be eliminated within 18 months. For ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles not listed in Article III as "existing types," range

capability is determined in accordance with criteria set forth in paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty.

Upon entry into force of the Treaty, neither Party may produce or flight-test any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or launchers of such missiles. The Parties are prohibited from conducting any launches of shorter-range missiles. During the first six months following entry into force of the Treaty, however, each Party may launch up to 100 intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of destroying them. Once all intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems have been eliminated, neither Party may thereafter possess any intermediate-range or shorter-range missile systems.

Also, the Treaty takes account of the fact that the first stage of the Soviet SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is not subject to the Treaty, is outwardly similar to the first stage of the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which is subject to the Treaty. The Parties are permitted to produce a ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), having a range such that it is not subject to the Treaty, that uses one stage, and only one stage, outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile that is subject to the Treaty. However, to strengthen the ban on missile production, the Parties are prohibited from producing any other stage that is similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of any existing type of intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile. In order to help verify compliance with this provision, the United States has the right to establish a portal monitoring system, including resident inspectors, to monitor continuously the portal of each facility at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled. Currently there is one such facility at Votkinsk. For its part, the Soviet Union has the right to establish a continuous portal monitoring system at a former U.S. intermediate-range GLBM production facility at Magna, Utah.

VERIFICATION OBLIGATIONS

The scope and intrusiveness of verification called for in this Treaty are unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Verification obligations fall under five basic categories:

- locational restrictions
- elimination requirements
- national technical means of verification
- data exchanges
- on-site inspections.

LOCATIONAL RESTRICTIONS

In order to facilitate verification, the Treaty imposes a number of restrictions on activities relating to intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems during the elimination periods. For example, pending elimination:

- All intermediate-range missiles and their launchers must be located in deployment areas or at support facilities, such as storage or repair facilities, or be in notified transit between them.

All such areas and facilities must be named and their locations described. An intermediate-range missile or launcher located elsewhere (and not in a notified transit) would thus be in violation of the Treaty.

- Within 90 days after the Treaty enters into force, all deployed shorter-range missiles, as well as deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles, must be moved to elimination facilities. The remaining non-deployed shorter-range missiles must be moved to elimination facilities within one year. Until their removal to elimination facilities, shorter-range missiles and their launchers must be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit.
- Transit of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles between permitted locations must be completed within 25 days and, following the completion of transit, information regarding the transit must be provided within 48 hours.

ELIMINATION REQUIREMENTS

Article X of the Treaty sets forth the basic requirements regarding the elimination of specific items and facilities and obligates the Parties to carry out the required elimination activities in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in the Treaty and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection. The locations at which elimination takes place are specified in the MOU or in subsequent updated data. The Protocol on Elimination sets forth detailed procedures for the elimination of missiles, launchers, launch canisters, shelters, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, launch stands, propellant tanks, and training items, as appropriate, for each Party. Techniques such as burning, demolition, crushing, and flattening are specified for eliminating transportable items at designated elimination facilities. Techniques for eliminating fixed structures *in situ* are specified, including dismantlement, excavation, and demolition. Provisions governing elimination of missiles through launch, static display, and loss or accidental destruction are also included.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

The Treaty recognizes the utility of national technical means of verification, such as reconnaissance satellites, and each Party agrees not to interfere with such means of verification. With a view to enhancing the utility of national technical means, concealment measures are strictly limited. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is required, up to six times a year during the period of elimination, to open on short notice the roofs of SS-25 garages in order to help U.S. national technical means ensure that SS-20s are not deployed at SS-25 strategic missile bases that are not subject to on-site inspections.

DATA EXCHANGES

The Treaty requires detailed exchanges of data and notifications. Each Party is required to notify the other each time a missile or launcher is moved and of any changes in the data base originally

set forth in the MOU. Each Party must advise the other of the scheduled date of elimination activities, the movement of items that are to be eliminated from the area specified in the MOU to elimination facilities, and the completion of elimination activities. Such notifications are required to be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. The notifications are designed to provide a continuously updated data base, which will serve as a baseline against which other observations can be measured.

ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

The Treaty provides for a wide variety of on-site inspections. The scope of the inspection measures is unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements. The on-site inspections to be carried out include:

- “baseline” inspections, between 30 and 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, to help verify the initial update of data contained in the categories set forth in the MOU;
- “close-out” inspections to verify the elimination of specified facilities;
- “elimination” inspections to observe actual elimination of missiles, launchers, and support equipment at elimination facilities;
- “elimination” inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination with respect to items lost or accidentally destroyed or placed on static display and with respect to training equipment;
- “short-notice” inspections of certain declared and formerly declared facilities, during the three-year elimination period and for a ten-year period thereafter, to aid in verifying that all Treaty-prohibited activity has ceased; and
- “continuous portal monitoring” by the United States at the designated portal and perimeter of the facility at Votkinsk, at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled, to ensure that stages of the SS-20 are not covertly manufactured as stages of the SS-25 ICBM. The Soviet Union may install continuous portal monitoring at the designated portal and perimeter of the Hercules Plant #1 located in Magna, Utah, at which stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced. If, at any time after the initial two years of the Treaty, assembly of SS-25s ceases at Votkinsk, continuous portal monitoring would continue for another 12 months and then cease along with the monitoring of the plant at Magna, Utah. The United States could reestablish continuous portal monitoring if the Soviets resumed SS-25 missile assembly at Votkinsk or anywhere else.

The specific procedures for the conduct of these inspections, including provisions governing access for on-site inspections and the infrastructure for a continuous portal monitoring system, are set forth in the Protocol on Inspection.

Inspectors and their supporting aircrews will be designated by each Party in advance by means of lists submitted to the other Party. Specific grounds on which a Party may object to a particular individual are set forth. The Annex to the Protocol on Inspection specifies the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members during the inspection process, including immunity from criminal prosecution and inviolability of their person.

The Protocol on Inspection designates certain "points of entry" for each country in which missile systems subject to the Treaty are located. A Party intending to carry out an inspection must notify the other Party, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, not less than a specified number of hours before the inspection team will reach the point of entry. Within a specified time after arrival at the point of entry, the Inspecting Party must indicate the specific site to be inspected. An inspection team must depart the point of entry for the inspection site within a specified number of hours from its arrival at the point of entry. The Inspected Party must provide transport for the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site. In the case of "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections, the Inspected Party must ensure that the inspection team arrives at the site within nine hours of its specification of the inspection site.

In general, one hour after notification of a specific inspection site has been provided, the Inspected Party may not remove any Treaty-limited item from that site prior to inspection. Except for continuous portal monitoring and "elimination" inspections, the period of time an inspection team may remain at an inspection site for a given inspection is 24 hours, with one eight hour extension if agreed to by the Inspected Party. There is a limit on the number of inspections that may be conducted simultaneously. Inspection procedures vary depending upon the specific type of inspection involved.

RATIFICATION

The Treaty will enter into force when the constitutional procedures for ratification of the United States and the Soviet Union have been satisfied and the instruments of ratification have been exchanged. The MOU, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty and upon exchange of the instruments of ratification will enter into force as party of the Treaty. The U.S.-GDR and U.S.-Czechoslovak Notes, which are included herewith for the information of the Senate, will also enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty. The Basing Country Agreement will do so as well, following completion of the constitutional procedures of each of the Parties to it and notification thereof to all other Parties.

AMENDMENTS

Amendments to the Treaty are subject to the same ratification procedures as the Treaty itself. However, some of the provisions and procedures contained in the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are highly detailed and technical. It is recognized that it may be necessary to adjust some of them to take into account un-

foreseen situations. Accordingly, the Protocols provide that the Parties may, in the Special Verification Commission established by the Treaty, agree upon measures necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocols. The Protocols provide that such measures, which would be technical in nature and would not affect the Parties' basic obligations, would not be considered to be amendments and thus would not require ratification.

NON-CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS

The Parties commit themselves not to assume any international obligation or undertaking that would conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. This provision will not in any way affect existing or future patterns of defense cooperation with U.S. Allies in other areas, including strategic forces, short-range nuclear forces (with a range capability below 500 kilometers), or conventional forces.

DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

The Treaty is of unlimited duration. As an exercise of its national sovereignty, a Party may withdraw following six months' notice to the other Party if it determines that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

THE BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT

The Basing Country Agreement is a necessary complement to the Treaty. The Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection provide for on-site inspection to verify compliance with the provisions of the Treaty not only in U.S. and Soviet territory, but also in the countries in which U.S. and Soviet missile systems are located. Many of the items that the United States must eliminate are within the territory of our Western European Allies. By means of the Basing Country Agreement, the five Allied Basing Countries, on whose territory U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are located, consent to inspections at facilities subject to the Treaty within their territory by Soviet inspectors conducted in accordance with the Treaty and its Protocols. This formal consent on the part of the Allied Basing Countries provides the legal basis for the United States to make its commitment to the Soviet Union that Soviet inspections can be carried out on the territory of the Allied Basing Countries.

EXCHANGES OF NOTES

Each Basing Country is exchanging diplomatic Notes with the Party that will conduct inspections within its territory. The Notes record the acknowledgement of each Basing Country and the Inspecting Party that the Basing Country has agreed to inspections within its territory conducted in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection, and that the Inspecting Party has obligated itself to comply with the terms of the Treaty and to respect the laws and regulations of the Basing Country during the inspections. The Notes state that they do not in any way affect the reciprocal obligations between the United States and the Soviet Union under the Treaty. The countries that base U.S.

systems subject to the Treaty are Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; the Basing Countries for Soviet systems are the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

INSPECTIONS OF SS-14 SILOS

In addition to the Treaty documents discussed above, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to an exchange of letters between Ambassadors Glitman and Obukhov, dated December 7, 1987, relating to the U.S. inspections of silo launchers for Soviet SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This agreement gives the United States the right to conduct a total of up to six on-site inspections of former silo launchers of SS-4 missiles. Organizational matters relating to such inspections will be arranged through the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the Treaty.

CONCLUSION

Accompanying this Report is an article-by-article analysis of the Treaty, including the MOU and the two Protocols. Also, attached is an article-by-article analysis of the Basing Country Agreement.

I believe this Treaty will significantly enhance the security of the United States and our Allies. It will eliminate an entire class of weapon-delivery systems in which the Soviet Union has established a clear advantage. I therefore strongly recommend that the Treaty be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE OF THE TREATY

The Treaty consists of a Preamble and 17 Articles. The associated Memorandum of Understanding on Data (the MOU), Protocol on Elimination, and Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty.

THE PREAMBLE

The Preamble identifies the United States and the Soviet Union as the Parties to the treaty and contains four paragraphs that set forth the general goals and objectives that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed are advanced by the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems.

The first paragraph recognizes that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

The second paragraph notes that the Parties are guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability.

The third paragraph states the Parties' conviction that the measures set forth in the Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security.

The fourth paragraph acknowledges the obligations of the Parties set forth in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.¹

ARTICLE I—BASIC OBLIGATIONS

Article I sets forth the basic obligations of the Parties to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in accordance with the Treaty's provisions, not to have such systems after their elimination, and to carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty. This Article also establishes that the MOU and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II—DEFINITIONS

Article II sets forth the definitions of terms used in the Treaty. Definitions are provided for the following terms: (1) ballistic missile and ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), (2) cruise missile and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), (3) GLBM launcher, (4) GLCM launcher, (5) intermediate-range missile, (6) shorter-range missile, (7) deployment area, (8) missile operating base, (9) missile

¹ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT), done at London, Moscow and Washington, July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, TIAS 6839. The United States and the Soviet Union are both parties to the NPT.

support facility, (10) transit, (11) deployed missile, (12) non-deployed missile, (13) deployed launcher, (14) non-deployed launcher, and (15) basing country.

Paragraph 1 of Article II defines a "ballistic missile" as a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. In addition, "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" is defined as a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

There are three factors that determine whether a ballistic missile is subject to the Treaty. The first factor is whether the ballistic missile is ground-launched. The second factor is whether the ballistic missile is a weapon-delivery vehicle. The counting rule set forth in paragraph 1 of Article VII specifies that all ballistic missiles of a type that has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery are considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, GLBMs are those types of ground-launched ballistic missiles that have been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery, i.e., flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof. The third factor is whether the ballistic missile has a range equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers. Paragraph 4 of Article VII sets forth the criteria for establishing the range capability of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs. The technical data for each existing type of GLBM subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 2 of Article II defines a "cruise missile" as a missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. In addition, a "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" is defined as a ground-launched missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

There are three factors that determine whether a cruise missile is subject to the Treaty. The first factor is whether the cruise missile is ground-launched. The second factor is whether the cruise missile is a weapon-delivery vehicle. The counting rule set forth in paragraph 1 of Article VII specifies that all cruise missiles of a type that has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery are considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, GLCMs are those types of ground-launched cruise missiles that have been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery, i.e., flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof. The third factor is whether the cruise missile has a range equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers. Paragraph 4 of Article VII sets forth the criteria for establishing the range capability for intermediate-range and shorter-range GLCMs. The technical data for each existing type of GLCM subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 3 of Article II defines a "GLBM launcher" as either a fixed launcher (i.e., non-mobile) or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM. Paragraph 7 of Article VII further states that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs. Paragraph 8 of Article VII specifies that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM. The technical

data for each type of GLBM launcher subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 4 of Article II defines a "GLCM launcher" as either a fixed launcher (i.e., non-mobile) or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM. Paragraph 7 of Article VII further states that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLCM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLCMs. Paragraph 8 of Article VII specifies that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLCM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLCM. The technical data for each type of GLCM launcher subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 5 of Article II defines an "intermediate-range missile" as a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers. The existing types of intermediate-range missiles are specified in paragraph 1 of Article III. Their numbers, locations, and characteristics are listed in Sections II, III, and VI, respectively, of the MOU. The criteria for determining the range capability of intermediate-range GLBMs and GLCMs that are not specified as existing types are described in paragraph 4 of Article VIII.

Paragraph 6 of Article II defines a "shorter-range missile" as a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers. The existing types of shorter-range missiles of the Parties are specified in paragraph 2 of Article III. Their numbers, locations, and characteristics are listed in Sections II, IV, and VI, respectively, of the MOU. Criteria for determining the range capability of shorter-range GLBMs and GLCMs that are not specified as existing types are described in paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty.

Paragraph 7 of Article II defines a "deployment area" as a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located. All deployment areas of intermediate-range missiles contain, by definition, at least one missile operating base. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all deployment areas be specified in the MOU and that their locations or numbers cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 of Article X. Each deployment area is described by name and boundaries in Section III of the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article II, an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area is considered to be deployed. An intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area is considered to be a non-deployed missile in accordance with paragraph 12 of Article II. As provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VIII, intermediate-range missiles and their launchers, as well as stages of such missiles, must be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. Thus, an intermediate-range missile, stage of such a missile, or launcher of such a missile in any other location would be a violation of the Treaty. There are no "deployment areas" for shorter-range missiles; rather, such missiles are deployed only at missile operating bases in order to restrict them to much smaller geographical areas and

thus further constrain their operational capability. This additional constraint works to the advantage of the United States since the Soviet Union has a monopoly on deployed shorter-range missiles.

Subparagraph 8(a) of Article II defines a "missile operating base," with respect to intermediate-range missiles, as a complex of facilities located within a deployment area: (a) at which intermediate-range missiles and their launchers normally operate, (b) in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located, and (c) in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all missile operating bases be specified in the MOU and that their locations or numbers cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 of Article X. The location of each intermediate-range missile operating base is provided, along with its center coordinates, in Section III of the MOU. A site diagram of each such missile operating base is appended to the MOU. A missile operating base contains the support structures and support equipment necessary to operate intermediate-range missiles. Definitions of the term "support equipment" and "support structure" are provided in paragraphs 10 and 11, respectively, of Section I of the MOU. In addition, since all missile operating bases for intermediate-range missiles located at missile operating bases are counted as deployed missiles in accordance with paragraph 11 of Article II.

Subparagraph 8(b) of Article II defines a "missile operating base," with respect to shorter-range missiles, as a complex of facilities located at any place: (a) at which shorter-range missiles and their launchers normally operate, and (b) in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located. The location of each shorter-range "missile operating base" is provided, along with its center coordinates, in Section IV of the MOU. A site diagram of each such missile operating base is appended to the MOU. A missile operating base contains the support equipment necessary to operate shorter-range missiles. The definition of the term "support equipment" is provided in paragraph 10 of Section I of the MOU. Since there are no deployment areas for shorter-range missiles, deployed shorter-range missiles are considered to be those shorter-range missiles located at missile operating bases. Paragraph 3 of Article VIII specifies that shorter-range missiles and their launchers may only be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit from such locations to elimination facilities. A shorter-range missile or launcher in any other location would be a violation of the Treaty.

Paragraph 9 of Article II defines a "missile support facility" as a missile production facility, a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility, a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility, a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility. These terms are defined in Section I of the MOU. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all missile support facilities be specified in the MOU and that their locations, except for elimination facilities, cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 of Article X. The location of each such facility and its center coordinates are specified in Sections III, IV, and V of the MOU. A site diagram of each

agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU. Intermediate-range missiles and their launchers, as well as shorter-range missiles and their launchers, located at these facilities are considered to be non-deployed missiles and non-deployed launchers, respectively.

Paragraph 10 of Article II defines "transit," with respect to an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile, as movement between: (a) missile support facilities, (b) a missile support facility and a deployment area, or (c) deployment areas. With respect to a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile, "transit" is defined as movement from either a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility. Thus, the only permitted movement of shorter-range missiles is to elimination facilities. Restrictions on the transit of shorter-range missiles complement the other measures that are intended to reduce as quickly as possible the Soviet advantage in the numbers of shorter-range missiles. Pursuant to paragraph 5(f) of Article IX, notifications of transits and information relating to the transit must be provided within 48 hours after the transit is completed. Such notifications will assist in determining whether there has been a violation if a missile is detected outside of deployment areas, missile operating bases, or missile support facilities. All transits must be completed within 25 days in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article VIII. Intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles in transit are counted as non-deployed missiles.

Paragraph 11 of Article II defines a "deployed missile" as an intermediate-range missile that is located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile that is located at a missile operating base. Article IV requires the reduction and elimination of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles. Article V requires the elimination of deployed and non-deployed shorter-range missiles.

Paragraph 12 of Article II defines a "non-deployed missile" as an intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside of a missile operating base. Paragraph 1 of Article VIII requires that an intermediate-range missile may only be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. Thus, an intermediate-range missile located at a missile support facility or in transit is considered to be "non-deployed." An intermediate-range missile that is neither deployed (i.e., in a deployment area) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit) would be a violation of the Treaty. As noted above, paragraph 3 of Article VIII states that, until their removal to elimination facilities, shorter-range missiles may only be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. A shorter-range missile located at a missile support facility or in transit is considered to be a non-deployed missile. A shorter-range missile that is neither deployed (i.e., at a missile operating base) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit to an elimination facility) would be a violation of the Treaty.

Paragraph 13 of Article II defines a "deployed launcher" as a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a mis-

sile operating base. Deployed intermediate-range missile launchers are subject to the numerical restrictions and elimination requirements specified in Article IV. Deployed shorter-range missile launchers are subject to the elimination requirements specified in Article V.

Paragraph 14 of Article II defines a "non-deployed launcher" as a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside of a missile operating base. Thus, "non-deployed launcher" is a term based upon the location of a launcher for intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles. Non-deployed intermediate-range missile launchers are those launchers located at missile support facilities or in transit. They are subject to the numerical restrictions and elimination requirements specified in Article IV. An intermediate-range missile launcher that is neither deployed (i.e., in a deployment area) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit) would be a violation of the Treaty. Non-deployed shorter-range missile launchers are those located at missile support facilities or in transit. They are subject to the elimination requirements specified in Article V. A shorter-range missile launcher that is neither deployed (i.e., at a missile operating base) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit to an elimination facility) would be a violation of the Treaty.

Paragraph 15 of Article II defines a "basing country" as a country, other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on whose territory U.S. or Soviet intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, or support structures associated with intermediate-range missiles or their launchers, were located at any time after November 1, 1987. For the purposes of this definition, the term "located" does not include missiles or launchers in transit. The Basing Countries in which U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are located are Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The Basing Countries in which Soviet missile systems subject to the Treaty are located are the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

ARTICLE III—EXISTING TYPES OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Paragraph 1 of Article III lists the existing types of intermediate-range missiles of both the United States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, the types of intermediate-range missiles listed as existing are the Pershing II ballistic missile and the GBM-109G cruise missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of intermediate-range missiles are the RSD-10 (SS-20) ballistic missile, the RS-12 (SS-4) ballistic missile, and the RS-14 (SS-5) ballistic missile.

Pursuant to Article IV, all intermediate-range missiles of the Parties, along with their launchers, support equipment, and support structures, must be eliminated within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. In addition, paragraph 6 of Article X stipulates that intermediate-range missiles that have been tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed and

are not listed as existing types in Article III, must be eliminated along with their launchers within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to this provision, the Soviet Union must eliminate all of its RK-55 (SSC-X-4) intermediate-range cruise missiles and associated launchers. The detailed procedures for eliminating intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, and their associated support equipment and support structures are specified in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article III lists the existing types of shorter-range missiles of both the United States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, the type of shorter-range missile described as existing is the Pershing IA ballistic missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of shorter-range missiles are the OTR-22 (SS-12) ballistic missile and the OTR-23 (SS-23) ballistic missile. Pursuant to Article V, all of the existing types of shorter-range missiles of the Parties, along with their launchers and support equipment, must be eliminated within 18 months after entry into force of the Treaty. In addition, paragraph 6 of Article X stipulates that shorter-range missiles that have been tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed and are not listed as existing types in Article III, must be eliminated along with their launchers within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to this provision, the United States must eliminate all of its Pershing IB shorter-range ballistic missiles and associated launchers. The detailed procedures for eliminating shorter-range missiles are specified in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination.

ARTICLE IV—REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES

Article IV sets forth the basic obligations for the reduction and eventual elimination of all intermediate-range missile systems.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV requires the Parties to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. The types of items to be eliminated are listed in Section I of the Protocol on Elimination, while the numbers of such items as of November 1, 1987, are listed in Sections II and III of the MOU. After the three-year elimination period, such missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment may not be possessed by either Party. The procedures by which each type of missile, launcher, support structure, and support equipment must be eliminated are set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article IV provides that both deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, must be reduced and eliminated in two phases. It also provides that such elimination will occur throughout the duration of each phase, thus ensuring that the eliminations will not take place only in the final days of each elimination phase.

Subparagraph 2(a) provides that by the end of the first phase, which will be no later than 29 months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must have completed reductions so that:

- the number of its deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the number of such launchers capable of carrying or containing missiles considered to carry a total of 171 warheads. Since this limit only applies to deployed launchers, only those intermediate-range missile launchers located in deployment areas are affected;
- the number of its deployed intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry a total of 180 warheads. Since this limit only applies to deployed intermediate-range missiles, only those missiles located in deployment areas are affected. The reason that 180 warheads on deployed missiles will be allowed, but only 171 warheads on deployed launchers, is so that a small number of extra missiles may be located in deployment areas for use as operational spares or for maintenance;
- the aggregate number of its deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the number that is considered by the Parties to carry a total of 200 warheads. This provision places an aggregate limit on the number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missile launchers that are located in deployment areas, located at missile support facilities, and in transit. Thus, since intermediate-range missile launchers must be either deployed or non-deployed, all intermediate-range missile launchers are subject to reductions in the first phase;
- the aggregate number of its deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry a total of 200 warheads. This provision limits the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles to the number of missiles that are considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads. Thus, there is a limit on the number of intermediate-range missiles that are located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities, and are in transit. Since intermediate-range missiles must be either deployed or non-deployed, all such missiles are thus subject to reductions in the first phase; and
- the ratio of the total number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMS of existing types to the total number of intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the ratio that existed on November 1, 1987. This provision is intended to ensure proportional reductions of the types of intermediate-range missile systems possessed by each Party.

Subparagraph 2(a) of Article IV requires that numerical limits for missiles and launchers be calculated using warhead numbers. To facilitate verification, the number of warheads actually deployed on each missile and launcher is not counted; rather, the number of warheads on missiles and launchers is derived by using the counting rules set forth in Article VII. For missiles, the counting rule in paragraph 6 of Article VII of the Treaty provides that the number of warheads a GLBM or GLCM of an existing type carries is the maximum number of warheads for that type specified in

Section VI of the MOU. For launchers, paragraph 9 of Article VII provides that the number of missiles that each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile is capable of carrying or containing is the number specified for launchers of missiles of that type in Section VI of the MOU.

In sum, 29 months after the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must not have more deployed intermediate-range launchers than the number considered to carry 171 warheads, not have more deployed intermediate-range missiles than the number considered to carry 180 warheads, not have more combined deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range launchers than the number considered to carry 200 warheads, and not have more combined deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles than the number considered to carry 200 warheads.

Subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV provides that, by the end of the second phase, which will be no later than three years after the entry into force of the Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, support structures, and support equipment of the categories listed in the MOU must be eliminated by the Parties.

ARTICLE V—ELIMINATION OF SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Paragraph 1 of Article V provides for the elimination of the shorter-range missiles of each Party, along with launchers of such missiles and associated support equipment, within a single period of 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Thus, there is only one phase for reductions of shorter-range missiles during which shorter-range missiles, their launchers, and associated support equipment must be eliminated. After elimination, the Parties are not permitted to possess any shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, or associated support equipment.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article V restrict the locations of shorter-range missiles and their launchers during the 18-month elimination period. Paragraph 2 requires that, within 90 days of entry into force of the Treaty, each Party move all of its deployed shorter-range missiles, as well as all of its deployed and non-deployed launchers of shorter-range missiles, to the elimination facilities specified in the MOU (or in subsequent data updates) and retain them there until they are destroyed in accordance with Section II of the Protocol on Elimination. Within 12 months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall move all of its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to the elimination facilities specified in the MOU (or in subsequent data updates) and shall retain them there until they are destroyed, in accordance with Section II of the Protocol on Elimination, during the 18-month elimination period. The requirement to move shorter-range missile systems to elimination facilities early in the elimination period is commonly referred to as the "corral" concept.

Paragraph 3 of Article V provides that shorter-range missiles and launchers of shorter-range missiles must not be located at the same elimination facility. Elimination facilities for shorter-range missiles and elimination facilities for launchers of shorter-range missiles must be separated from each other by at least 1000 kilometers.

The locational restrictions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article V, together, with those in paragraph 3 of Article VIII, are intended to ensure that shorter-range missiles and their launchers are removed from operational status as soon as possible after entry into force of the Treaty. Given the fact that the Soviet Union has a monopoly on deployed shorter-range missiles, this provision will contribute significantly to NATO's security with respect to the threat posed by shorter-range missiles during the early stages of the implementation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE VI—PRODUCTION AND FLIGHT-TEST BANS

Paragraph 1 of Article VI provides that, upon entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, neither Party may produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missile, or produce any stages or launchers of such missiles. Paragraph 1 also provides that neither Party may produce, flight-test, or launch any shorter-range missiles, or produce any stages or launchers of such missiles. The term "produce" in this context means any industrial activity involving the construction of one or more missiles, stages, or launchers subject to the provisions of the Treaty. The obligation not to produce intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their stages and launchers, prohibits the Parties from producing such items for third parties.

A flight-test ban is a natural element in any treaty that eliminates an entire class of missile systems. It serves to strengthen the production ban. Any covertly produced missile could not be adequately flight-tested without likely U.S. detection. Without realistic testing, a Party's confidence in the operational capability of any covertly-produced missile system would be degraded.

The reason launches of shorter-range missiles are prohibited, but allowed for intermediate-range missiles, is that intermediate-range missiles may be launched for the purpose of destroying them. Paragraph 5 of Article X provides that, within the first six months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party has the right to eliminate by means of such launching up to 100 of its intermediate-range missiles. This right is limited to this six-month period in order to preclude prohibited flight-testing under the guise of launching to destruction. Restrictions and conditions on eliminations by means of launching are provided for in Articles IX and XI of the Treaty and in Section III of the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article VI provides that, notwithstanding the paragraph 1 prohibition against producing stages of intermediate-range GLBMs, each Party has the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by the Treaty even if that missile uses one stage that is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage. Paragraph 2 further provides that a Party may not produce any other stage that is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. This provision takes into account the outward physical similarity between the first stage of the SS-25 ICBM and the first stage of the SS-20, which is an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. The effect of paragraph 2 is to make clear that the Treaty

does not prohibit the Soviets from continuing to produce the SS-25 ICBM, which is not limited by this Treaty, on the basis that it has a first stage outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, the first stage of the SS-20. The United States has a reciprocal right with regard to one stage of its own Pershing missile system should it choose to exercise it. Paragraph 2 prohibits the Parties from producing more than one stage that is outwardly similar to any stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

ARTICLE VII—COUNTING RULES

Article VII contains counting rules and type rules that are critical to the operation of the Treaty. Counting rules in arms control agreements provide formal and legally binding recognition by the Parties that specified items will be counted in a certain way. Type rules provide formal and legally binding recognition by the Parties that once a specified object is counted in a certain way, then all objects of that type will be counted in that same way. Such rules are important because they provide a mechanism for verifying compliance with the provisions of an agreement.

Paragraph 1 of Article VII provides that if a ballistic missile or cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, then all missiles of that type will be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. When read in conjunction with paragraph 1 of Article II, which defines a ground-launched ballistic missile in terms of a "weapon-delivery vehicle," paragraph 1 of Article VII defines a weapon-delivery vehicle in such a way as to relieve a Party from having to prove that every missile of a particular type has been tested or deployed as a weapon-delivery vehicle; rather, it is sufficient to demonstrate that merely one missile of that type has been flight-tested or deployed as a weapon-delivery vehicle in order to establish for the purpose of the Treaty that all missiles of that type are weapon-delivery vehicles.

Paragraph 2 of Article VII states that if a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, then all GLBM or GLCMs of that type will be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. Similarly, if a GLBM or a GLCM is a shorter-range missile, then all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

Paragraph 2 works in conjunction with all of the other Treaty provisions that refer to intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles; it has the effect of a type rule, making such provisions applicable to all GLBMs and GLCMs if a single GLBM or GLCM of that type is an intermediate-range or shorter-range missile. "Intermediate-range missile" and "shorter-range missile" are defined in paragraphs 5 and 6, respectively, of Article II.

Paragraph 3 of Article VII provides that if a type of GLBM is developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not on the surface of the Earth, then it will not be considered to be a GLBM subject to the Treaty. Paragraph 3 thus provides an explicit exception to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VII, and applies to such ground-launched ballistic missiles as anti-satellite missiles (ASATs), anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs), and air defense or surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

Paragraph 4 of Article VII establishes criteria for defining the range capability of GLBMs and GLCMs not specified in Article III. For purposes of the Treaty, the range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III is defined as its maximum tested range. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III is defined as the maximum distance it can cover, while flying in its standard design mode, before it runs out of fuel. Distance is calculated by projecting the flight path of the GLCM onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

Paragraph 4 also describes intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles in terms of their range capability. A shorter-range GLBM or GLCM is a missile with a range capability equal to or greater than 500 kilometer but not greater than 1000 kilometers. An intermediate-range GLBM or GLCM is defined as a missile with a range capability greater than 1000 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers.

Paragraph 5 of Article VII provides that the maximum number of warheads considered to be carried by an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile is the number of warheads specified for missiles of that type in Section VI of the MOU. The specification of the number of warheads associated with an existing type of intermediate-range missile is necessary in order to calculate compliance with the warhead limits pertaining to intermediate-range missiles provided for in Article IV.

Paragraph 6 of Article VII provides that each GLBM or GLCM will be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads for a missile of that type specified in Section VI of the MOU. Thus, when the Parties apply paragraph 2 of Article IV to determine whether they have sufficiently reduced the warheads on intermediate-range missiles to meet their obligations for the first phase of reductions, they will use the maximum number of warheads associated with that type of intermediate-range missile as specified in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 7 of Article VII provides that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs, respectively. This paragraph works in conjunction with the Treaty provisions that refer to the testing of GLBM launchers or GLCM launchers; it has the effect of a type rule, making such provisions applicable to all launchers of a given type if a single launcher of that type has been tested to launch a GLBM or a GLCM, respectively. "GLBM launcher" and "GLCM launcher" are defined in paragraphs 3 and 4, respectively, of Article II.

Paragraph 8 of Article VII provides that if a launcher has contained, or has launched, a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM, respectively. This paragraph has the effect of a type rule. Thus, if one launcher of a type has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered GLBM or GLCM launchers, respectively, and thus will be subject to the Treaty.

Paragraph 9 of Article VII provides that each launcher of an existing type of GLBM or GLCM will be considered capable of carrying or containing the number of missiles specified in Section VI of

the MOU for that type of launcher. Thus, when the Parties apply paragraph 2 of Article IV to determine whether they have sufficiently reduced the warheads associated with intermediate-range missile launchers, they will use the number of GLBMs or GLCMs that the launcher of that type is considered capable of carrying, as specified in Section VI of the MOU, and, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article VII which provides the warhead counting rule for GLBMs and GLCMs, multiply that number times the maximum number of warheads associated with that type of GLBM or GLCM, as specified in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 10 of Article VII provides counting rules for GLBMs and GLCMs. These rules define how GLBMs and GLCMs are accounted for under the terms of the Treaty. The purpose of these provisions is to facilitate verification of compliance with the Treaty by identifying those features of the missile systems most easily observable by national technical means of verification.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 10 states that, for GLBMs stored or moved in separate stages (such as the Pershing II), the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM will be counted as a complete missile. This means that each longest stage of such a GLBM will be counted as one complete missile. The Protocol on Elimination requires, however, that all stages of existing types of GLBMs be eliminated.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 10 of Article VII provides that, for GLBMs not stored or moved in separate stages (such as the SS-20), a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM will be counted as a complete missile, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that the canister does not contain such a missile. This means that such a GLBM canister will be counted as one complete GLBM. This canister counting rule serves an important verification purpose. Soviet missiles typically are kept in canisters. By virtue of this rule, if the United States detects a canister subject to the provisions of the Treaty, it will be entitled to consider that canister to contain a missile of the type associated with that canister, unless the Soviet Union can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the United States that the canister does not contain such a missile. Such a demonstration could involve on-site inspection, national technical means of verification, or cooperative measures. Absent such a Soviet demonstration, each Soviet canister counts as one missile for purposes of Treaty limitations. Also, pursuant to the Protocol on Elimination, canisters of prohibited types of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles must be eliminated along with their associated missiles. In addition, subparagraph (b) of Article 10 provides that, for GLBMs not stored or moved in separate stages, an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be considered a completed missile.

Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 10 states that, for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM will be counted as a complete missile. This means that the airframe of a GLCM will be counted as if it were a complete missile.

Paragraph 11 of Article VII provides that a ballistic missile not intended for use in a ground-based mode will not be considered to be a GLBM subject to the Treaty if: (a) it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed, land-based launcher that is used solely for test

purposes, and (b) its launcher is distinguishable from GLBM launchers subject to the Treaty. Similarly, a cruise missile not intended for use in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM subject to the Treaty if: (a) it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed, land-based launcher that is used solely for test purposes, and (b) its launcher is distinguishable from GLCM launchers subject to the Treaty. These exceptions are necessary to permit the land-based testing of items not subject to the Treaty, such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

Paragraph 12 of Article VII gives each Party the right to produce and use existing booster stages in order to create booster systems with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. This provision permits each Party to produce and use booster stages that otherwise might, because of the range to which the booster system is launched and the payload that is tested, be considered for the purposes of the Treaty to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. In this regard, if a ballistic missile or cruise missile is not a weapon-delivery vehicle, then pursuant to paragraph 1 or 2, respectively, of Article II it is not subject to the provisions of the Treaty. Paragraph 12 is essential to permit the United States to continue on-going research on advanced concepts for strategic reentry vehicles and defensive systems.

Paragraph 12 further provides that launches of such booster systems will not be considered to be flight testing of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles as long as four conditions are met. First, the stages used in such booster systems must be different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III. Second, the booster systems must be used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than themselves. Third, the total number of launchers for such booster systems must not exceed 35 at any one time for either Party. Fourth, the launchers for such booster systems must be fixed and emplaced above ground. Such launchers must be located only at research and development launch sites that are specified in Section VII of the MOU. Such research and development launch sites are not subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty. Paragraph 6 of Article IX, however, provides that each party must notify the other Party, at least ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in this paragraph. The purpose of such a notification is to enhance the verification by national technical means of such launches.

ARTICLE VIII—LOCATION AND TRANSIT

Article VIII sets forth locational restrictions both for intermediate-range missiles and their launchers and for shorter-range missiles and their launchers. In addition, Article VIII limits the movement of missiles and launchers subject to the provisions of the Treaty. The ability to verify compliance is enhanced if there are restrictions on the location and movement of Treaty-limited items during the period in which they are being eliminated.

Paragraph 1 of Article VIII provides that all intermediate-range missiles and their launchers must be: (a) located in deployment areas, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c) in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or their launchers may not be located elsewhere. The terms "deployment areas," "missile support facility," and "transit" are defined in paragraphs 7, 9, and 10, respectively, of Article II; the locations of deployment areas and missile support facilities of intermediate-range missiles are specified in Section III of the MOU, and notification of missiles and launchers in transit is required pursuant to subparagraph 5(f) of Article IX.

Paragraph 2 of Article VIII requires that stages of intermediate-range missiles must be: (a) located in deployment areas, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c) moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities, or between deployment areas and missile support facilities. Paragraph 2 complements paragraph 1 of Article VIII by placing restrictions similar to those for intermediate-range missiles on stages of such missiles. The terms "deployment area" and "missile support facility" are defined in paragraphs 7 and 9, respectively, of Article II; the locations of deployment areas and missile support facilities of intermediate-range missile systems are specified in Section III of the MOU.

Paragraph 3 of Article VIII provides that all shorter-range missiles and their launchers, until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V, must be: (a) located at missile operating bases, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c) in transit. Paragraph 10 of Article II requires that such transit can only be to elimination facilities. Shorter-range missiles or their launchers may not be located elsewhere. The terms "missile operating base," "missile support facility," and "transit" are defined in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, respectively, of Article II, and the location of such bases is specified in Section IV of the MOU.

Paragraph 4 of Article VIII provides that the transit of a missile or launcher must be completed within 25 days. To facilitate verification of compliance with this provision, paragraph 5(f) of Article IX provides for notification of such transits within 48 hours after they have been completed. Such notification must include the location of the transiting missile or launcher once every four days during that transit.

Paragraph 5 of Article VIII states that all deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities are specified either in the MOU or in subsequent updates of data provided pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a), or 5(b) of Article IX of the Treaty. Also, paragraph 5 of Article VIII provides that neither Party will increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases, or missile support facilities from those set forth in the MOU. Elimination facilities are excepted from this prohibition in order to give each Party the flexibility to determine the most appropriate elimination site(s) during the three-year elimination period. Finally, paragraph 5 provides that a missile support facility will not be considered to be part of a deployment area even if it is located within such an area. Missiles, stages, and launchers located at missile support facilities are considered to be non-deployed. If a missile support facility located within a deployment area were considered to be part of the deploy-

ment area, then any missiles, stages, or launchers located at that facility would be deployed, rather than non-deployed.

Paragraph 6 of Article VIII provides that, beginning 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, neither Party may locate: (a) intermediate-range missiles, (b) stages of intermediate-range missiles, (c) launchers of intermediate-range missiles, (d) shorter-range missiles, (e) stages of shorter-range missiles, or (f) launchers of shorter-range missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, or test ranges specified in the MOU. This means that, after the 30-day period, locating a missile, a missile stage, or a launcher at a production facility or test range would be a violation. By providing that missiles, launchers, and stages may not be located in locations at which such items would be produced or tested, paragraph 6 makes compliance with the Treaty prohibitions on production and testing easier to verify.

Paragraph 7 of Article VIII provides that neither Party may locate any intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles at training facilities. The prohibition against locating missiles at training facilities is designed to guard against covert operation of those missiles at such facilities.

Paragraph 8 of Article VIII provides that a non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile may not be carried on, or be contained within, a launcher for such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities. This provision is designed to help ensure that non-deployed missiles are not covertly operational during the elimination period.

Paragraph 9 of Article VIII provides that training missiles as well as training launchers for intermediate-range missiles and for shorter-range missiles are subject to the same locational restrictions as for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles that are provided for in paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article VIII. This means that training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range missiles must be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit, while training missiles and training launchers for shorter-range missiles must be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit to elimination facilities. Since some training systems are not readily externally distinguishable, particularly by national technical means of verification, from actual missiles and launchers, the requirement that they be located at the same facilities as operational systems helps to ensure that operational systems will not be covertly deployed under the guise of training systems.

ARTICLE IX—DATA EXCHANGES AND NOTIFICATIONS

Article IX sets forth the basic obligations for the data exchanges and notifications associated with the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. These data exchanges and notifications are of unprecedented scope and represent an important verification measure.

Paragraph 1 of Article IX states that the MOU contains categories of data relevant to the Treaty's obligations and that it lists all

of the intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Paragraph 1 requires that updates of that data and notifications required by this Article be provided according to the categories contained in the MOU. While the data is updated in each category, the MOU itself, as well as its categories, does not change.

Paragraph 2 of Article IX requires that updates of data and notifications be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. As stated above, the Centers were established pursuant to the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

Paragraph 3 of Article IX provides that, not less than 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party will provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of the entry into force of the Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the MOU. Since paragraph 1 of Article IX requires that the data in the MOU be current as of November 1, 1987, paragraph 3 provides the mechanism by which the information initially provided by the MOU is updated for the period between November 1, 1987, and the date of the entry into force of the Treaty. It is this updated data that lists the inventory of items to be eliminated under the Treaty.

Paragraph 4 of Article IX requires that, following the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must provide updated data for all categories in the MOU at six-month intervals. The updated data must be provided not later than 30 days after each six-month interval. The updates must inform the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, that have occurred during the six-month interval. The updates must also inform the other Party of the "net effect" of those changes.

Paragraph 5 of Article IX sets forth additional notification requirements imposed on each Party. These requirements will apply throughout the life of the Treaty.

Subparagraph 5(a) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base, or missile support facility. Paragraph 8 of Article X calls for the elimination of deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities. Upon elimination, former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities (except missile production facilities) will continue to be subject to "short-notice" on-site inspections, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article XI, until 13 years have elapsed after the entry into force of the Treaty.

Subparagraph 5(b) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and date of a scheduled change. Elimination facilities, being a type of missile support facility, must themselves be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X.

Subparagraph 5(c) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, stages and launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support

equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Such notifications must include the following five items:

- the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;
- the elimination site;
- the location from which intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, and support equipment will be moved to the elimination site;
- except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an "elimination" inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI; and
- the estimated time of departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility.

Launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purposes of their elimination do not require notifications in accordance with subparagraph 5(c); rather, notice of such eliminations by launching must be provided in accordance with subparagraph 5(d) below.

Subparagraph 5(d) requires notification, not less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X. Such notifications must include the following information:

- the type of intermediate-range missiles to be eliminated;
- the location of the launch. If the elimination is by a series of launches, the location and number of such launches;
- the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an "elimination" inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty; and
- the estimated time of departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility.

Subparagraph 5(e) requires notification of changes, within 48 hours after they occur, in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their launchers, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, resulting from elimination. Such notifications must include the following information:

- the number and type of items of a missile system that were eliminated; and
- the date and location of the elimination.

Subparagraph 5(f) requires notification of the transit, not more than 48 hours after it has been completed, of intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles. Such notifications must include the following information:

- the number of missiles or launchers that were moved;
- the points, dates, and times of departure and arrival;
- the transport used; and
- the locations, and time at that location, at least once every four days during the period of transit.

Paragraph 6 of Article IX requires notification, not less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in para-

graph 12 of Article VII. This provision facilitates monitoring, which helps to ensure that missile systems subject to the Treaty will not be covertly tested under the guise of research and development boosters.

ARTICLE X—ELIMINATION

Article X sets forth the basic obligations for the elimination of items or facilities whose destruction is required by the Treaty. Details concerning the elimination of specific items are provided in the Protocol on Elimination. This elimination regime helps to ensure that all elimination required by the Treaty will, in fact, be performed.

Paragraph 1 of Article X requires that each Party eliminate its intermediate-range and short-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support structures and support equipment in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article X provides that on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination must take place in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, the Protocol on Inspection, and the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 3 of Article X requires that when intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, and associated support equipment are removed from deployment areas to elimination facilities, they must be removed in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States, such organizational units are batteries of Pershing II ballistic missiles and flights of BGM-109G cruise missiles. For the Soviet Union, such organizational units are SS-20 ballistic missiles regiments composed of two or three battalions. Elimination by complete organizational units will aid in verification of the elimination process.

Paragraph 4 of Article X provides that the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment must be carried out either at the elimination facilities specified in the MOU or at new elimination facilities specified in the MOU or at new elimination facilities identified in accordance with subparagraph 5(b) of Article IX. If such items are eliminated in accordance with Section IV (i.e., elimination *in situ*) or section V (i.e., elimination through loss, accidental destruction, or static display) of the Protocol on Elimination, then they need not be eliminated at the facilities specified in the MOU or at the facilities as to which notification was made in accordance with subparagraph 5(b) of Article IX. Support structures, associated with Treaty-limited missiles or launchers, that are subject to elimination must be eliminated *in situ*.

Paragraph 5 of Article X permits each Party to eliminate, within the first six months after the entry into force of the Treaty, up to 100 intermediate-range missiles by means of launching. Section III of the Protocol on Elimination requires that such missiles must be launched from designated launch sites to existing impact areas. The purpose of the six-month time limit is to reduce any potential

conflict between this means of elimination and the flight-test ban provided for in paragraph 1 of Article VI.

Paragraph 6 of Article X requires that certain intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, must be eliminated within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty, if such missiles meet the following three criteria: (a) they were tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, (b) they were never deployed, and (c) they are not listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty. Such missiles must be eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. These missiles are, for the United States, the Pershing IB shorter-range ballistic missile, and, for the USSR, the RK-55 (SSC-X-4) intermediate-range cruise missile.

Paragraph 7 of Article X provides that elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support structures and support equipment will be considered to have occurred after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon receipt of the notification required in subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX.

Paragraph 8 of Article X requires that each Party eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities. It is important to understand that *all* deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities that are listed in the MOU or, in the case of elimination facilities, those identified by means of a subsequent data update, must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8. A Party must notify the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of article IX of the Treaty, of the date of the eliminations, but only after three conditions have been fulfilled. The conditions that must be met before notification can be given are as follows:

- all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment have been removed from such areas, bases, or facilities;
- all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located at such areas, bases, or facilities have been eliminated; and
- all activities related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage, or deployment of such missiles and launchers have ceased at such areas, bases, or facilities.

Paragraph 8 of Article X further provides that such deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities will be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI (i.e., there has been a "close-out" inspection) or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination (for which notification was provided pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of Article IX). Thus, inspection of eliminated locations is a right available to both Parties, but such inspections are not required by the Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base, or missile support facility that met the three conditions specified above prior to entry into force of the Treaty, and which was not included in the initial data exchange update made in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty, will be considered to have been eliminated. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI, any such location will be subject to an on-site "baseline"

inspection in order to determine whether, in fact, it was eliminated.

Paragraph 9 of Article X provides that if a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the MOU for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to the Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted. However, while such a missile base can be converted, such a base must nevertheless be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X above. Conversion is not a substitute for elimination under the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI—ON-SITE INSPECTION

Article XI sets forth the plan for on-site inspections the Parties will conduct to assist in the verification of compliance with the Treaty. This Article provides for several different types of inspections, including "baseline" inspections (paragraph 3), "close-out" inspections (paragraph 4), "short-notice" inspections (paragraph 5), continuous "portal monitoring" inspections (paragraph 6), and "elimination" inspections (paragraphs 7 and 8). "Elimination" inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 are the only on-site inspections that an Inspecting Party is obliged to carry out. All of the other types of inspections specified in this article are at the option of the Inspecting Party. Except for continuous portal monitoring, missile production facilities are not subject to any type of on-site inspection. This decision was made at the insistence of the United States for reasons of national security. Details concerning the procedures for each type of inspection are provided in the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 1 of Article XI provides that, for the purpose of facilitating verification of compliance with the Treaty, each Party has the right to conduct on-site inspections in accordance with this Article and the Protocols on Inspection and Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article XI provides that such inspections may take place within the territory of each Party and within the territories of the Basing Countries, i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia. The Basing Country Agreement between the United States and the five Allied Basing Countries (i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom) provides the consent of the Allied Basing Countries to have inspections conducted within their respective territories pursuant to Article XI and the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 3 of Article XI sets forth the parameters of "baseline" inspections. These inspections are for the purpose of helping to verify the updated data exchanged pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX. Beginning 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, these inspections will afford each Party an opportunity to inspect all missile operating bases and missile support facilities (other than missile production facilities) specified in the MOU, as well as an opportunity to inspect all elimination facilities listed in the updat-

ed data. These inspections must be completed within 90 days after the entry into force of the Treaty. Thus, within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties will exchange updated data and, within 90 days after entry into force, conduct inspections to help verify the updated data. The procedures for a "baseline" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 4 of Article XI provides for the "close-out" inspection of bases and facilities once they are declared to have been eliminated. It establishes the right to confirm by on-site inspection the elimination of missile operating bases and missile support facilities, except missile production facilities, for which notification of elimination was provided pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of Article IX. "Close-out" inspections must be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled elimination date in order to confirm that such elimination did in fact take place. Once such bases and facilities are eliminated, they are, as former facilities, subject to the "short-notice" inspections provided for in subparagraph 5(b) of this Article rather than those provided for under subparagraph 5(a) of this Article. If a Party conducts an inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article (i.e., a "baseline" inspection) after the scheduled date of elimination of a particular facility, then no "close-out" inspection will be permitted. The procedures for a "close-out" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 5 of Article XI provides each Party with the right to conduct two types of "short-notice" inspections for a period of 13 years after entry into force of the Treaty. Such inspections are referred to as "short-notice" because, like "baseline" and "close-out" inspections, they require that an inspection team be transported to the inspection site no later than nine hours after the inspection team specifies which particular site it wishes to inspect. The "short-notice" inspection differs from "baseline" and "close-out" inspections because it is based on a quota system and is available to the Parties for 13 years after the Treaty enters into force. The two types of "short-notice" inspections are:

(a) beginning 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party has the right to inspect missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities. The purpose of these inspections is to ascertain the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment located at the missile operating base or missile support facility that is being inspected; and

(b) each Party has the right to inspect former missile operating bases and missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of the Treaty, other than former missile production facilities. This inspection right includes former missile operating bases that, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article X, has been converted for a use not limited by the Treaty after November 1, 1987. This inspection right is extended to such converted bases because they must nevertheless be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X.

The Parties have the right to conduct a total of 20 of the inspections described in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of the Treaty, 15 such inspections per year during the subsequent five

years, and ten such inspections per year during the last five years. Thus, each Party will have an opportunity to conduct up to 185 such inspections over the course of 13 years. Neither Party may use more than half of its total number of inspections per year within the territory of any one Basing Country. The procedures for a "short-notice" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 6 of Article XI provides the Parties with certain continuous monitoring inspection rights for a period of up to 13 years after entry into force of the Treaty. These types of inspection are referred to as "portal monitoring." Each Party has the right to inspect by such portal monitoring:

(a) the portal of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of GLBMs that use missile stages, any one of which is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of solid-propellant GLBM subject to the Treaty, is accomplished. Subparagraph (a) is necessary because of the close physical similarity between the first stage of the SS-25 ICBM and the first stage of the solid-propellant SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM; or

(b) if a party has no facility of the type described in subparagraph (a) above, the portal of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced. The existing types of GLBMs are specified in Article III.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 6 must ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous portal monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of the Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) above. If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of the Treaty, a Party does not conduct the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party will have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the first Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again.

Finally, paragraph 6 specifies that, upon entry into force of the Treaty, such facilities to be monitored are: for the United States, Hercules Plant #1, at Magna, Utah (as specified in the site diagram in the MOU), and, for the Soviet Union, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Both stages of the Pershing II intermediate-range GLBM were produced at the plant at Magna, Utah, while the SS-25 ICBM and the SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM have been assembled at the plant at Votkinsk. Paragraph 6 further specifies that the plant at Magna, Utah, will be monitored in accordance with subparagraph (b) above, while the plant at Votkinsk will be monitored in accordance with subparagraph (a) above. The procedures for a "portal monitoring" inspection are set forth in Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 7 of Article XI requires the inspection of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment to be carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of

the Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Such inspections are required and include the obligation to inspect the elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching. Inspections made pursuant to this paragraph are for the purpose of determining whether the specified elimination processes have, in fact, been carried out. As stated above, the "elimination" inspections provided for in paragraph 7 are the only required on-site inspections specified in Article XI. Such "elimination" inspections are required in order to help ensure agreement between the Parties concerning the elimination of items and the status of the inventory of items subject to the Treaty. The procedures for an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 are set forth in Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 8 of Article XI establishes the right of the Parties to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of items that are eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination. Section V of the Protocol on Elimination sets forth the procedures for elimination by loss or accidental destruction as well as by static display. Paragraph 8 also establishes the right of the Parties to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers that are eliminated pursuant to Section II, IV, and V of that Protocol. The procedures for an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 are set forth in Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection.

ARTICLE XII—NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

Paragraph 1 of Article XII states that, to help ensure compliance with the treaty, each Party will use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

National technical means include a broad range of systems for collecting intelligence. Such systems include reconnaissance satellites, ships and aircraft that are used to monitor Soviet missile tests, and ground stations, such as the United States large phased-array radar on Shemya Island in Alaska.

In subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2, the Parties state their commitment not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

In subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2, the Parties are prohibited from using any concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the Treaty. This provision is broader than similar provisions in earlier U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements, which merely prohibited *deliberate* concealment measures. This prohibition does not apply to cover or concealment practices that both occur within a deployment area and are associated with normal training, maintenance, and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

Paragraph 3 of Article XII provides a unique measure to enhance observation by national technical means of verification. It establishes the right of each Party to request, and the obligation of the

other Party to carry out, certain cooperative measures to improve verification by reconnaissance satellites. This right will exist until either a strategic offensive arms reduction and limitation agreement enters into force between the Parties or three years after entry into force of the Treaty, whichever occurs first. The cooperative measures relate to deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs capable of a range in excess of 5500 kilometers (and thus not limited by the Treaty), which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X and subsequently converted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article X. The Party making a request for cooperative measures must inform the other Party of the deployment base at which such measures shall be implemented. The following measures must be carried out by the Party whose base is to be observed:

(a) not later than six hours after a request, the Party must have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, must have completely removed all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures, and must have displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party must leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until 12 hours after receipt of a request for such an observation.

Paragraph 3 further provides that each Party may make six such requests for cooperative measures per calendar year, and that only one deployment base may be subject to such cooperative measures at any one time. Paragraph 3 is designed to help verify that mobile SS-20 intermediate-range missiles are not covertly deployed at bases for mobile SS-25 ICBMs. Under the terms of the Treaty, SS-25 bases that were not formerly declared SS-20 bases are not subject to on-site inspection. SS-25 bases that were formerly declared SS-20 bases will be subject to on-site inspection. The United States currently does not have bases that would be affected by this provision.

ARTICLE XIII—SPECIAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION

Paragraph 1 of Article XIII provides that, in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties have established the Special Verification Commission. At the request of either Party, the Parties will meet, within the framework of that Commission, to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty, and (b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article XIII provides that the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers be used by the Parties to: (a) exchange data and provide notifications (as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Article IX of the Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination); (b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of the Treaty (relating to the conversion of a missile operating base); (c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection;

and (d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV—NO CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS

Article XIV records the Parties' undertaking to comply with the Treaty and not to assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. This provision thus reflects the duty of each Party under customary international law to comply with the Treaty (i.e., *pacta sunt servanda*). This provision does not impose any additional obligation on the Parties, nor does it broaden the interpretation of other obligations in the Treaty. This provision refers only to the assumption of obligations in the future, and existing agreements are therefore unaffected. Article XIV will not affect existing patterns of defense collaboration or cooperation with our Allies. Nor with this provision preclude cooperation with our Allies in modernization.

ARTICLE XV—DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

Paragraph 1 of Article XV provides that the Treaty is of unlimited duration. The Treaty is of unlimited duration because it eliminates two entire classes of weapon-delivery systems, rather than merely place limitations on them for a specified period of time.

Paragraph 2 of Article XV contains the "supreme interests" withdrawal clause that is a standard provision in most modern arms control agreements. It establishes the right of a Party to withdraw from the Treaty if it concludes that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Withdrawal under this provision requires a six-month advance notification and a statement of the extraordinary events that the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This right of withdrawal is in addition to any other rights a Party has under customary international law regarding termination or suspension of the Treaty, including its rights in the event of a material breach of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XVI—AMENDMENTS

Article XVI provides that each Party may propose amendments to the Treaty and that any agreed amendments will enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of the Treaty. In this regard, it should be noted that the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection provide that technical changes to those Protocols necessary to improve their viability and effectiveness shall not be considered amendments to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XVII—ENTRY INTO FORCE

Paragraph 1 of Article XVII provides that the Treaty, including the MOU and the two Protocols (which are integral parts of the Treaty), is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party and will enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Paragraph 2 of Article XVII states that the Treaty will be registered with the United Nations pursuant to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The final paragraph of the Treaty records that the Treaty was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DATA BASE FOR THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) consists of a Preamble and seven Sections.

The MOU provides the detailed data that are required to be exchanged between the Parties pursuant to Article IX of the Treaty. It is arranged by categories, and lists the location of deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities, as well as the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment at those locations. The MOU also lists the technical parameters of each missile system, providing information on missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment limited by the Treaty.

The data that appear in the MOU reflect the intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems of the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX of the Treaty, the initial update of this data will occur within 30 days of the entry into force of the Treaty, and will be subject to "baseline" on-site inspections provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty. Thereafter regular updates will occur at six-month intervals. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article IX of the Treaty, a variety of other notifications will be exchanged as Treaty-regulated events occur.

The data exchange in the MOU surpasses other such exchanges in previous U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. Given its scope and detail, the data exchange reflected in the MOU is itself an achievement.

THE PREAMBLE

The Preamble states that, pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data, current as of November 1, 1987, on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their launchers, as well as on support structures and support equipment associated with those missiles and launchers.

SECTION I—DEFINITIONS

Section I sets forth the definitions of certain terms used in the MOU, the Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on

Inspection. Section I provides definitions for the following terms: (1) missile production facility, (2) missile repair facility, (3) launcher production facility, (4) launcher repair facility, (5) test range, (6) training facility, (7) missile storage facility, (8) launcher storage facility, (9) elimination facility, (10) support equipment, (11) support structure, and (12) research and development launch site. Each of these terms represents a type of facility, structure, or site that is referred to in the MOU.

Paragraph 1 of Section I defines a "missile production facility" as a facility for the assembly or production of solid-propellant intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs, or existing types of GLCMs. Production of missiles subject to the Treaty is prohibited by paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII, missiles subject to the Treaty or stages of such missiles may not be located at missile production facilities 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a missile production facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Missile production facilities are not subject to inspections except—in certain cases—for continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI.

Paragraph 2 of Section I defines a "missile repair facility" as a facility at which repair or maintenance of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place, other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base. This definition is necessary because missiles undergoing repair are nevertheless subject to the limitations of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a missile repair facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Missile repair facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 3 of Section I defines a "launcher production facility" as a facility for final assembly of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. This paragraph is the corollary of paragraph 1 of this Section, except that it defines production facilities for launchers rather than for missiles. Production of launchers subject to the Treaty is prohibited by paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII, launchers may not be located at launcher production facilities 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a launcher production facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Launcher production facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 4 of Section I defines a "launcher repair facility" as a facility at which repair or maintenance of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place. The definition excludes a missile operating base in which inspection and maintenance is conducted. This paragraph is a corollary to paragraph 2 of

this Section. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a missile repair facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Launcher repair facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 5 of Section I defines a "test range" as an area at which flight-testing of an intermediate-range or shorter-range missile takes place. Flight-testing of missiles subject to the Treaty is prohibited by paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII, missiles and launchers subject to the Treaty may not be located at test ranges 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a test range is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Test ranges are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 6 of Section I defines a "training facility" as a facility, not located in a missile operating base, at which personnel are trained in the use of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles and at which launchers of such missiles are located. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II, a training facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII of the Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Training facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 7 of Section I defines a "missile storage facility" as a facility at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, or stages of such missiles, are stored. The definition excludes any such facility located at a missile operating base. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, missile storage facilities are considered to be "missile support facilities." All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Missile storage facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 8 of Section I defines a "launcher storage facility" as a facility at which launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles are stored. The definition excludes any such facility located at a missile operating base. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, launcher storage facilities are considered to be "missile support facilities." All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Launcher storage facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 9 of Section I defines an "elimination facility" as a facility at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, missile stages and launchers of such missiles, or support equipment associated with such missiles or launchers are eliminated. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, elimination facilities are considered to be "missile support facilities." Moreover, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Treaty, a Party may increase the number of, or change the location of, its elimination facilities. This is allowed to assist the Parties in the elimination of items within Treaty time frames. Notice of any such change must be given 30 days in advance, pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article IX of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Elimination facilities are subject to "baseline" and "close-out" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4, respectively, or Article XI. Also, former elimination facilities are subject to "short-notice" inspections pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI.

Paragraph 10 of Section I defines "support equipment" as unique vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment used to support a deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile. Full-scale inert training missiles, full-scale inert training missile stages, full-scale inert training launcher canisters, and training launchers not capable to launching a missile are also included in this definition. Paragraph 10 notes that a listing of such support equipment associated with each existing type of missile, and launcher thereof, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IV and paragraph 1 of Article V of the Treaty, support equipment must be eliminated during the same period as is set for the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, respectively. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article X, such equipment must be eliminated in accordance with procedures established by the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 11 of Section I defines "support structure" as a unique fixed structure used to support deployed intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles. As in paragraph 10, this paragraph notes that a listing of such support structures is contained in Section VI of the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Treaty, support structures must be eliminated during the same period as is set for the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, which is three years after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article X of the Treaty, such structures must be eliminated in accordance with procedures established by the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 12 of Section I defines a "research and development launch site" as a facility at which research and development booster systems are launched. Such booster systems are permitted by paragraph 12 of Article VII of the Treaty. Research and development launch sites are listed in Section VII of the MOU.

SECTION II—TOTAL NUMBERS OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES

Section II lists, for each Party, the total number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and the launchers of such missiles, that are subject to the Treaty. These data are required to be listed in the MOU pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IX. Paragraph 1 of Section II lists the numbers of intermediate-range missiles and launchers, while paragraph 2 lists the numbers of shorter-range missiles and launchers. Each paragraph contains the following categories: deployed missiles, non-deployed missiles, aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles, aggregate number of second stages of missiles, deployed launchers, non-deployed launchers, and aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers.

SECTION III—INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES, LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS

Section III provides the locations of the intermediate-range missiles, launchers, support equipment, and support structures that the Treaty requires to be destroyed. Because such items are required, unless in transit, to be located in deployment areas, at missile operating bases, or at missile support facilities, the data are organized by such areas, bases, and facilities. Not only have the Parties specified the precise geographical coordinates of such areas, bases, and facilities, but site diagrams of all missile operating bases and agreed missile support facilities have been appended to the MOU. Also, any missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit are listed to the MOU. Section III is, therefore, an example of the unprecedented scope of the data exchange required by the Treaty regime.

Paragraph 1 of Section III contains the numbers and locations, for each Party, of deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles, and the support equipment and support structures associated with such missiles and launchers. The data in paragraph 1 and listed by the deployment areas and missile operating bases at which such items are located. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base is appended to the MOU. The boundaries of deployment areas are indicated in the text of paragraph 1 by geographic coordinates, connected by straight lines or linear landmarks, including national boundaries, rivers, railroads, or highways.

The deployed intermediate-range missiles listed under paragraph 1 include, for the United States, the Pershing II GLBM and the BGM-109G GLCM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SS-20 GLBM and the SS-4 GLBM. In addition to the numbers and locations of deployed missiles and their bases, paragraph 1 contains information concerning: (a) the number of launch pad shelters, training stages, and operational spares for U.S. Pershing II GLBMs; (b) the number of operational spares, training missiles, and training launch canisters for U.S. BGM-109G GLCMs; (c) the number of launch canisters, missile transporter vehicles, training missiles, and fixed struc-

tures for launchers of Soviet SS-20 GLBMs; and (d) the number of missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, propellant tanks, and training missiles for Soviet SS-4 GLBMs.

Paragraph 2 of Section III provides information on all non-deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty. The information includes the number of such non-deployed intermediate-range missiles, the number of launchers of such missiles, and the number and types of support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. This information is listed for each missile support facility at which such non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and their associated equipment are located. The location of each missile support facility is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU.

The non-deployed intermediate-range missiles listed under paragraph 2 include, for the United States, the Pershing II GLBM and the BGM-109G GLCM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SS-20 GLBM, the SS-4 GLBM, and the SS-5 GLBM. The types of missile support facilities listed include missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, missile storage facilities, launcher storage facilities, missile repair facilities, launcher repair facilities, test ranges, training facilities, and elimination facilities. The types of missile support equipment and structures listed in paragraph 2 are specified for each Party. They include, as appropriate for each type of missile system, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, propellant tanks, training missiles, launch canisters, fixed structures for launchers, training launch canisters, launch pad shelters, and training missile stages. Paragraph 2 also lists any missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit.

Paragraph 3 of Section III lists, for each Party, vehicles used to train drivers of launchers of intermediate-range missiles, and stipulates that such vehicles must be considered to be training launchers for purposes of the Treaty. The number of such vehicles is 29 for the United States and 65 for the Soviet Union. The paragraph requires that such vehicles must be eliminated in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Protocol on Elimination.

SECTION IV—SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES, LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS

Section IV parallels Section III by providing comparable information with respect to deployed and non-deployed shorter-range missiles, launchers, and associated support equipment.

Paragraph 1 of Section IV provides the numbers, for each Party, of deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, of launchers of such missiles, and of the support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. This information is listed by the missile operating base at which such items are located. The location of such missile operating bases is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base is appended to the MOU. Since

the United States has no deployed shorter-range missile systems, only information pertaining to Soviet missile systems, i.e., the SS-12 and SS-23, is included in paragraph 1. Support equipment listed for the SS-12 and SS-23 includes missile transporter vehicles and training missiles.

Paragraph 2 of Section IV provides information on all non-deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty. The information includes the number of such non-deployed shorter-range missiles, the number of launchers of such missiles, and the number and types of support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. This information is listed for each missile support facility at which such non-deployed shorter-range missiles and their associated equipment are located. The location of each missile support facility is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, for each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU.

The non-deployed shorter-range missiles listed under paragraph 2 of Section IV include, for the United States, the Pershing IA GLBM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SS-12 GLBM and SS-23 GLBM. The types of missile support facilities listed include missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, missile storage facilities, launcher storage facilities, missile repair facilities, launcher repair facilities, test ranges, training facilities, and elimination facilities. The kinds of support equipment listed under paragraph 2 include training missile stages, missile transporter vehicles, and training missiles. Paragraph 2 also lists missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit.

SECTION V—MISSILE SYSTEMS TESTED BUT NEVER DEPLOYED

Section V provides information on all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles that have been tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty but never deployed and that are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty. The information includes the numbers of all such missiles and of all launchers of such missiles. This information is listed by the missile support facility at which such items are located. The location of each missile support facility is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article X, these missiles, together with their launchers, must be eliminated within six months after entry into force of the Treaty.

Such missile systems listed under Section V include, for the United States, the Pershing IB shorter-range GLBM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SSC-X-4 intermediate-range GLCM. The types of missile support facilities listed include missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, missile storage facilities, launcher storage facilities, missile repair facilities, launcher repair facilities, test ranges, training facilities, and elimination facilities. Section V also lists missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit.

SECTION VI—TECHNICAL DATA

Section VI provides the technical data for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, for their launchers, and for their associated support structures and support equipment. Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment listed in this Section are appended to the MOU.

Paragraph 1 of Section VI provides the relevant data for intermediate-range missile systems. Such missiles include the U.S. Pershing II GLBM, the U.S. BGM-109G GLCM, the Soviet SS-20 GLBM, the Soviet SS-4 GLBM, the Soviet SS-5 GLBM, and the Soviet SSC-X-4 GLCM. Missile characteristics, launcher characteristics, and the characteristics of associated support structures and support equipment are provided for each missile system. The characteristics listed for each missile include: (a) the maximum number of warheads per missile, (b) the length of the missile, (c) the length of the first and second stages of the missile, (d) the maximum diameter of the first and second stages of the missile, and (e) the weight of the missile and its stages. The characteristics listed for each launcher include: (a) its dimensions, (b) the maximum number of missiles it can carry or contain, and (c) its weight. The characteristics listed for associated support structures include: (a) the dimension of fixed structures for a launcher, and (b) the dimensions of the launch pad shelter. The characteristics listed for support equipment include the dimensions of the: (a) launch canister, (b) missile transporter vehicles, (c) missile erector, and (d) propellant tank.

Paragraph 2 of Section VI provides the relevant data for shorter-range missile systems. Such missiles include the U.S. Pershing IA GLBM, the U.S. Pershing IB GLBM, the Soviet SS-12 GLBM, and the Soviet SS-23 GLBM. Missile characteristics, launcher characteristics, and the characteristics of associated support equipment are provided for each missile system. The characteristics listed for each missile include: (a) the maximum number of warheads per missile, (b) the length of the missile, (c) the length of the first and second stages of the missile, (d) the maximum diameter of the first and second stages of the missile, and (e) the weight of the missile and its stages. The characteristics listed for each launcher include: (a) its dimensions, (b) the maximum number of missiles it can carry or contain, and (c) its weight. The characteristics listed for support equipment include the dimensions of the missile transporter vehicle.

SECTION VII—RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOOSTER SYSTEMS

Section VII provides the number and location, for each Party, of launchers of research and development booster systems. Such booster systems are permitted by paragraph 12 of Article VII of the Treaty.

FINAL PROVISIONS

In the first paragraph of the Final Provisions, each Party acknowledges that, in signing the MOU, it is responsible for the accuracy of only its own data and that signing of the MOU constitutes acceptance of the categories of data and inclusion of the data contained in them.

The second paragraph affirms that the MOU is an integral part of the Treaty and that it will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

The third paragraph records that the MOU was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ELIMINATION OF THE MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol on Elimination (the Protocol) consists of a Preamble and five Sections.

The Protocol sets forth the detailed procedures for the elimination of items subject to the Treaty as required by Articles IV, V, and X of the Treaty. The Protocol is notable in that, unlike past arms control agreements, it specifies procedures for eliminating each type of missile system item-by-item (e.g., the SS-20 GLBM), rather than establishing a single elimination procedure for an entire class of items subject to elimination (e.g., GLBMs). For example, in the case of the class of intermediate-range GLBMs, specific and separate elimination procedures are provided for the Pershing II, SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missile systems. Furthermore, in the case of the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM, for instance, specific and separate procedures are set forth for elimination of the SS-20 missile, its launch canister, its launcher, its missile transporter vehicle, and the fixed structure for its launcher. Each item is required to be eliminated in a specified manner that will help to ensure that it can never again serve the purposes for which it was originally intended.

PREAMBLE

In the Preamble, the Parties state that, pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty, they have agreed upon procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty.

SECTION I—ITEMS OF MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO ELIMINATION

Section I lists the specific items for each type of missile system that must be eliminated.

For the United States, the specific items for each missile system to be eliminated are: for the Pershing II intermediate-range GLBM: missile, launcher, and launch pad shelter; for the BGM-109G intermediate-range GLCM: missile, launch canister, and launcher; for the Pershing IA shorter-range GLBM: missile and launcher; and, for the Pershing IB shorter-range GLBM: missile.

For the Soviet Union, the specific items of each missile system to be eliminated are: for the SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM: missile, launch canister, launcher, missile transporter vehicle, and fixed structure for a launcher; for the SS-5 intermediate-range GLBM:

missile, missile transporter vehicle, missile erector, launch stand, and propellant tanks; for the SS-5 intermediate-range GLBM: missile; for the SSC-X-4 intermediate-range GLCM: missile, launch canister, and launcher; for the SS-12 shorter-range GLBM: missile, launcher, and missile transporter vehicle; and, for the SS-23 shorter-range GLBM: missile, launcher, and missile transporter vehicle.

Also, for both Parties, all training missiles, training missile stages, training launch, canisters, and training launchers, as well as all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs and all front sections of deployed intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, must be eliminated.

SECTION II—PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION AT ELIMINATION FACILITIES

This Section, which forms the bulk of the Protocol, establishes the detailed procedures to be followed in eliminating systems at elimination facilities. Subsequent Sections provide for elimination at other locations.

Paragraph 1 of Section II introduces the next several paragraphs of this Section, which establish procedures that the Parties must fulfill in order to ensure reliable determination of the type and number of items being eliminated and to preclude the possibility that such items could be restored for purposes that would violate the Treaty. These items, which are listed in Section I, include missiles, missile stages, front sections of missiles, launch canisters, launchers, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, and launch stands, as well as training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers.

Paragraph 2 of Section II provides for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures for the items listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, except for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers. Such on-site inspections must be conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. With respect to the excepted items related to training, the Parties may conduct on-site inspections to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures described in paragraph 11 of Section II. Not less than 30 days in advance of such an inspection, the Party possessing the training items must provide the other Party with the name and geographic coordinates of the elimination facility at which such an on-site inspection may be conducted and the date on which the inspection may take place.

Paragraph 3 of Section II states that before a missile arrives at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed. Nuclear warhead devices and guidance elements are not required to be eliminated because destroying them would be meaningless unless the manufacture of new such items was also prohibited. Also, since warheads are small, verifying compliance with such a prohibition would be extremely difficult. Furthermore, the retention of the fissionable material from the warheads conserves resources necessary to U.S. national security.

Paragraph 4 of Section II gives each Party the right to select the technological means to implement the elimination procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section, and to allow for on-

site inspection of those elimination procedures in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, this Protocol, and the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 5 of Section II provides that the commencement of the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Section will signal the initiation of the elimination of the items of the missile systems.

Paragraph 6 of Section II provides that immediately before the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector, from the Party receiving a notification required by subparagraph 5(c) of Article IX of the Treaty concerning scheduled eliminations, must confirm and record the numbers and the types of missile systems that are to be eliminated. This can include a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters, if the Inspecting Party deems it necessary.

Paragraph 7 of Section II requires that a missile stage that is being eliminated by burning in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section must not have instruments for data collection. An inspector must confirm this lack of instrumentation through an inspection before the elimination procedures are set in motion. Continuous observation by the inspector of such missile stages is required until the burning is completed.

Paragraph 8 of Section II requires that the completion of elimination procedures must be confirmed in writing by both the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and the inspection team leader of the other Party. Such a report must include the number and type of items of missile systems for which the procedures have been completed. However, in the case of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers, paragraph 8 stipulates that elimination will be considered completed upon completion of the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section and upon notification as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty; thus, no report is required after the elimination of such training equipment.

Paragraph 9 of Section II records the agreement of the Parties that all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, along with their associated reentry vehicles, must be eliminated not later than 15 days before the end of the overall period of elimination for all such missiles. As specified in Articles IV and V of the Treaty, all such missiles shall be eliminated by the end of three years after entry into force of the Treaty.

Paragraph 9 also requires that, during the last 15 days of the overall (i.e., three-year) elimination period, a Party must withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles that, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation, and eliminate them during the same time frame.

On August 26, 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would dismantle its Pershing IA missiles when the United States and the Soviet Union had eliminated all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles pursuant to the Treaty. This unilateral decision by the Federal Republic is completely separate from the Treaty. This decision represents a policy of the Federal Republic of Germany that is not legally binding upon the Parties to the Treaty. Following the Federal Republic's unilateral decision,

the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that they will eliminate their intermediate-range missiles by 15 days prior to the end of the three-year elimination period specified by the Treaty. At that point, the conditions established by the Federal Republic will have been met, and the existing program of cooperation will have therefore ceased. The U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with the Federal Republic's Pershing IA missiles will then be withdrawn and returned to U.S. territory. The United States will eliminate them in accordance with the Protocol on Elimination. The Treaty and its associated documents will not affect existing programs of cooperation. The important U.S. principle, that systems belonging to third countries will not be subject to bilateral arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, has thus been preserved.

Paragraph 10 of Section II sets forth the specific procedures that must be used to eliminate the items of missile systems listed in Paragraph 1 of this Section, unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve the same result. This paragraph addresses all items of missile systems except those related to training, which are addressed in paragraph 11 of this Section. The elimination procedures for specific missile systems set forth in paragraph 10 are as follows:

For the U.S. Pershing II GLBM, the elimination procedures provide for destruction of missile stages by demolition or burning. Solid fuel, rocket nozzles, and motor cases not already destroyed in that process must be eliminated by burning, crushing, flattening, or destruction by explosion. Destruction by burning includes static firing of a missile stage, which results in the burning of the fuel, followed by crushing or flattening of the remainder of the stage; this is the method most frequently used in the past by the United States to destroy missiles. The front section of the missile, without the nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, must be crushed or flattened. The procedures for elimination of the Pershing II launchers include the removal of the erector-launcher mechanism from the launcher chassis; cutting all components of erector-launcher mechanisms, at places that are not assembly joints, into two pieces of approximately equal size; removal of missile launch support equipment from the launcher chassis; and cutting the launcher chassis, at a place that is not an assembly joint, into two pieces of approximately equal size. The procedures require the cutting of certain items at places that are not assembly joints in order to make it substantially more difficult to reassemble them.

For the U.S. BGM-109G GLCM, the elimination procedures require that the missile airframe be cut longitudinally into two pieces and that the wings and tail section be severed from the airframe at locations other than assembly joints. The front section of the airframe must be crushed or flattened after removal of the nuclear warhead device and guidance elements. The BGM-109G launch canister must also be destroyed, by crushing, flattening, cutting into two pieces of approximately equal size, or explosion. Elimination procedures for the BGM-109G launcher parallel those for the Pershing II launcher described above.

The elimination procedures for the U.S. Pershing IA missile and launcher are identical to those for the Pershing II missile and launcher described above.

The elimination procedures for the U.S. Pershing IB missile are identical to those for the Pershing II missile described above.

For the Soviet SS-20 missile, the elimination procedures are similar to those described above for the U.S. Pershing II missile, with the exception that the front end of the missile, along with its reentry vehicles, must be crushed or flattened. The elimination procedures for the SS-20 launch canister require that it either be destroyed by explosive demolition along with the missile or be destroyed separately from the missile by explosion, cutting into two pieces of approximately equal size, crushing, or flattening. The elimination procedures for the SS-20 launcher do not require that the launcher chassis be cut into two approximately equal pieces (as the United States proposed for its Pershing II and GLCM launchers), but contain other procedures for rendering it inoperable as a launcher. Finally, the elimination procedures for the SS-20 missile transporter vehicle require that: (a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting be removed; (b) all mounting of such mechanisms be cut off the missile transporter vehicle chassis; (c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting be cut into equal pieces at places that are not assembly joints; (d) external instrumentation compartments be removed from the transporter vehicle chassis; (e) transporter vehicle leveling support be cut off the transporter vehicle chassis and be cut, at locations that are not assembly joints, into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (f) a portion of the SS-20 transporter vehicle chassis at least 0.78 meters in length must be cut off from behind its rear axle.

For the Soviet SS-4 missile, the elimination procedures provide for cutting off propulsion system nozzles; cutting propellant tanks into two pieces of about the same size; cutting instrumentation compartments (after the guidance elements have been removed) into two pieces of about the same size; and destroying the front section of the missile, without the warhead device, by crushing or flattening. The elimination procedures require that the SS-4 launch stand components be cut, at locations that are not assembly joints, into two pieces of approximately equal size. Regarding the SS-4 missile erector, the elimination procedures require that the missile erector jib and missile erector leveling supports be cut into two approximately equal pieces and that they, along with the missile erector mechanism, also be cut off of the missile erector at locations that are not assembly joints. Regarding the SS-4 missile transporter vehicle, the procedures require that the mounting components for a missile and a missile erector mechanism, as well as the supports for erecting a missile onto a launcher, be cut off from the missile transporter vehicle at locations that are not assembly joints.

For the Soviet SS-5 missile, the elimination procedures are similar to those described above for the SS-4 missile, except that the front end of the SS-5 missile is not required to be crushed or flattened.

For the Soviet SSC-X-4 GLCM missile, launch canister, and launcher, the elimination procedures are the same as for the U.S. BGM-109G GLCM, except that the SSC-X-4 launcher chassis must be severed at a point no more than 0.70 meters behind the rear axle, mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports must be cut off the launcher chassis, and launcher leveling supports must be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size at locations that are not assembly joints.

For the Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 missiles, launchers, and missile transporter vehicles, the elimination procedures parallel those for the SS-20, except that the front sections of the SS-12 and SS-23 missiles do not include reentry vehicles, and destruction of their front sections may be done by explosive demolition together with the missile. Also, for the SS-23, the control equipment of the mechanism associated with missile loading must be removed from the transporter vehicle.

Paragraph 11 of Section II provides specific procedures for the elimination of the training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers listed in Section I. All of these items, except for training launchers, must be eliminated by crushing, flattening, cutting into two pieces of about equal size, or destroying by explosion. The procedures require training launchers to be eliminated by cutting the chassis of the training launcher at the same location specified in paragraph 10 above for the launcher of the same type of missile.

SECTION III—ELIMINATION OF MISSILES BY LAUNCHING

Section III sets forth the procedures by which intermediate-range missiles may be eliminated by means of launching them in order to destroy them. In this regard, paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty gives each Party the right to eliminate up to 100 of its intermediate-range missiles in this manner during the first six months after entry into force of the Treaty. Note, however, that subparagraph 1(a) of Article VI of the Treaty prohibits the flight-testing of intermediate-range missiles. The purpose of Section III is to provide procedures that permit elimination by launching, while ensuring that such elimination will not be used effectively as a flight-test, which would provide the launching Party with militarily useful data. Shorter-range missiles may not be eliminated by launching.

Paragraph 1 of Section III provides that the elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching is subject to on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty (which provides for "elimination" inspections) and Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection. Paragraph 1 requires that, immediately prior to each launch conducted for the purpose of elimination, an inspector from the Inspecting Party will confirm by visual observation the type of missile to be launched.

Paragraph 2 of Section III requires that all missiles being eliminated by launching be launched from designated elimination facilities to existing impact areas for such missiles. No such missile may be used as a target for ballistic missile interceptors.

Paragraph 3 of Section III provides that missiles being eliminated by launching must be launched one at a time with at least six hours between each launch.

Paragraph 4 of Section III requires that launches must involve ignition of all missile stages. Also, neither Party is permitted to transmit or recover data from missiles being eliminated by launching, except for unencrypted data used for range safety purposes.

Paragraph 5 of Section III provides that the completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, and the type and number of missiles for which those procedures have been completed, must be confirmed in writing by the representative of the launching Party and by the inspection team leader of the Inspecting Party.

Paragraph 6 of Section III Provides that a missile is considered eliminated by launching: (1) after completion of the procedures set forth in this Section and (2) upon notification required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

SECTION IV—PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION IN SITU

Certain of the items that must be eliminated pursuant to the Treaty are structures that cannot be moved to elimination facilities, or training items that are not required to be moved to elimination facilities. Accordingly, Section IV provides procedures for the elimination, *in situ*, of support structures, propellant tanks of Soviet SS-4 missiles, and certain training items.

Paragraph 1 of Section IV provides the procedures for the elimination of support structures. Support structures are associated only with intermediate-range missile systems; shorter-range missile systems do not possess such structures. Subparagraph 8(a) of Article II provides that support structures are located at missile operating bases of intermediate-range missiles.

Subparagraph 1(a) of Section IV states that the support structures listed in Section I of this Protocol must be eliminated *in situ*, i.e., at the sites at which they are presently located.

Subparagraph 1(b) provides that the initiation of the elimination of support structures will be considered to be the commencement of the elimination procedures specified in subparagraph 1(d) below.

Subparagraph 1(c) provides that the elimination of support structures is subject to verification by on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article XI Of the Treaty. Paragraph 4 of Article XI provides for "close-out" inspections at missile operating bases in order to confirm that the elimination has, in fact, occurred. The procedures for "close-out" inspections are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Subparagraph 1(d) specifies the elimination procedures for support structures. The procedures are as follows:

- the superstructure of the fixed structure or shelter must be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation;
- the base or foundation of the fixed structure or shelter must be destroyed by excavation or by explosion; and
- the destroyed base or foundation of a fixed structure or shelter must remain visible to national technical means of verification

for six months or until completion of an on-site inspection conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty.

Upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination procedures will be considered to have been completed.

Paragraph 2 of Section IV requires that the fixed and the transportable propellant tanks of the Soviet SS-4 intermediate-range GLBM be removed from launch sites.

Paragraph 3 of Section IV specifies the procedures for the elimination, *in situ*, of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers.

Subparagraph 3(a) requires that such training equipment that was not eliminated at elimination facilities must be eliminated *in situ*.

Subparagraph 3(b) requires that such training equipment being eliminated *in situ* must be eliminated in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Section II of the Protocol.

Subparagraph 3(c) provides each Party with the right to conduct an on-site inspection to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures.

Subparagraph 3(d) requires that a Party possessing such training equipment must inform the other Party of the place-name, and coordinates of the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in subparagraph 3(c) above may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information must be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the date of the scheduled on-site inspection.

Subparagraph 3(e) provides that elimination of such training equipment will be considered accomplished upon completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and upon notification as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to subparagraph 3(d) above.

SECTION V—OTHER TYPES OF ELIMINATION

Section V provides for elimination due to loss or accidental destruction, and for elimination by placing items on static display.

Paragraph 1 of Section V provides procedures in the case of elimination resulting from loss or accidental destruction of an item listed in Section I of the Protocol. Notice of such elimination must be given by the possessing Party within 48 hours as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty. Such notice must include a statement of the relevant circumstances surrounding the loss or accident, including its approximate or assumed location and the name or type of item that was eliminated by such loss or accidental destruction. In order to provide confidence that the elimination actually occurred, the other Party has a right to conduct an inspection at the specific site of the accident.

Paragraph 2 of Section V provides the Parties with the right to eliminate certain items that are listed in Section I of the Protocol by placing them on static display. The items that may be eliminated by this procedure are missiles, launch canisters, launchers, training missiles, training launch canisters, and training launchers. Each Party may eliminate a total of 15 missiles, 15 launch can-

isters, and 15 launchers by placing them on static display. The totals for each of the three categories include both operational and training items. The procedures require that, before being placed on static display, the items be rendered unusable for any purpose inconsistent with the Treaty. Missile propellant must be removed, and erector-launcher mechanisms must be made inoperative. For purposes of verification, the other Party has the right to conduct an on-site inspection of the item or items to be placed on static display within 60 days of receipt of notification by the possessing Party. Such notification is required by paragraph 2, and this notification must include: (a) the place-name and coordinates of the location at which the missile, launch canister, or launcher is to be on static display, and (b) the location at which the on-site inspection may take place. After all of the above procedures have been completed and notification has been given as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty, elimination of a missile, launcher, launch canister, training missile, training launch canister, or training launcher by placing it on static display will be deemed to be completed.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The penultimate paragraph of the Protocol specifies that the Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty, that it will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and that it will remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. The paragraph also provides that the Parties may agree upon measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol, through the Special Verification Commission established pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty. Such measures will not be deemed to be amendments to the Treaty. Thus, while substantive obligations cannot be changed absent an agreed amendment to the Treaty, minor matters relating to the detailed elimination procedures may be altered through agreement of the Parties in order to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty regime.

The final paragraph records that the Protocol was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL REGARDING INSPECTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol on Inspection (the Protocol) consists of a Preamble, 11 Sections, and an Annex on privileges and immunities of inspectors and aircrew members.

The Protocol provides the detailed procedures to implement the Treaty's on-site inspection regime, as required by Article XI of the Treaty. These on-site inspection procedures, unprecedented in scope and detail, will work with our national technical means of verification and with the data exchanges required by Article IX of the

Treaty to help provide effective verification of Soviet compliance with the Treaty limitations.

PREAMBLE

The Preamble states that, pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty, the Parties have agreed upon procedures governing the conduct of inspections provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

SECTION I—DEFINITIONS

Section I sets forth the definitions of certain terms used in the Protocol, the Treaty, the MOU, and the Protocol on Elimination. Definitions are provided for the following terms: (1) Inspected Party, (2) Inspecting Party, (3) inspector, (4) inspection team, (5) inspection site, (6) period of inspection, (7) point of entry, (8) in-country period, (9) in-country escort, and (10) aircrew member.

Paragraph 1 of Section I defines the "Inspected Party" as the Party to the Treaty whose sites are subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty. Note that this refers to a "Party," meaning either the United States or the Soviet Union. When an inspection takes place on the territory of a Basing Country, as defined in paragraph 15 of Article II of the Treaty, either the United States or the Soviet Union, as appropriate, will be the "Inspected Party."

Paragraph 2 of Section I defines the "Inspecting Party" as the Party carrying out the inspection. As in the case of paragraph 1, the "Inspecting Party" will be either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 3 of Section I defines an "inspector" as an individual who is designated by a Party to carry out inspections and who is included on the Party's list of inspectors, prepared in accordance with the provisions of Section III of the Protocol. Section III sets forth the detailed procedures for designation and acceptance of inspectors. Inspectors are granted privileges and immunities pursuant to the Annex to the Protocol.

Paragraph 4 of Section I defines an "inspection team" as a group of inspectors assigned to carry out a particular inspection. Each person on an "inspection team" is an "inspector." Paragraph 15 of Section VI establishes the number of inspectors per team.

Paragraph 5 of Section I defines an "inspection site" as the area, location, or facility at which an inspection takes place. Site diagrams of missile operating bases and agreed missile support facilities are appended to the MOU.

Paragraph 6 of Section I defines an "period of inspection" as the time from the arrival of the team at the site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of any pre-inspection and post-inspection procedures. Paragraph 14 of Section VI establishes the time limits for certain types of inspections as well as for pre-inspection and post-inspection procedures.

Paragraph 7 of Section I designates the "points of entry": for the United States as Washington, D.C. or San Francisco, California; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Moscow or Irkutsk; for the Kingdom of Belgium as Brussels (National Airport); for the Federal Republic of Germany as Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase);

for the Republic of Italy as Rome (Ciampino); for the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Schiphol; for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as RAF Greenham Common; for the German Democratic Republic as Schkeuditz Airport; and for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as International Airport Ruzyně. Paragraph 5 of Section IV establishes procedures to be followed if these points of entry are to be changed.

Paragraph 8 of Section I defines "in-country period" as the period of time that the inspection team is in the country from the arrival at the point of entry until departure from the country through the point of entry.

Paragraph 9 of Section I defines an "in-country escort" as individuals specified by the Inspected Party to accompany and assist inspection team and aircrew members throughout the in-country period. Paragraph I of Section V and paragraph 5 of Section VI provide detailed procedures concerning the in-country escort. When an inspection takes place in a Basing Country, that country will have the right to representation in the in-country escort.

Paragraph 10 of Section I defines an "aircrew member" as an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on a Party's list of aircrew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of the Protocol. Aircrew members are granted privileges and immunities pursuant to the Annex to the Protocol.

SECTION II—GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

This section sets forth the basic obligation to facilitate inspections conducted pursuant to the Protocol on Inspection and the Treaty. It also notes that there are other agreements (e.g., the Basing Country Agreement between the United States and the five Allied Basing Countries) pertinent to the conduct of these inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Section II obliges each Party to help ensure verification of compliance with the obligations of the Treaty by facilitating inspections.

Paragraph 2 of Section II states that each Party takes note of the assurances received from the other party regarding understandings reached between the other Party and the Basing Countries to the effect that the Basing Countries have agreed to the conduct of inspections pursuant to the Protocol on their respective territories. The Basing Country agreement provides the legal basis for these assurances by the United States. The five Allied Basing Countries are the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands. The German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia are the two Basing Countries in which Soviet missile systems subject to the Treaty are located.

SECTION III—PRE-INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

This section sets forth the actions that must take place before inspections may be conducted. Inasmuch as these actions are required within specified periods of time, a Party would be in violation of the Treaty if the Party delayed an inspection by not completing pre-inspection requirements.

Paragraph 1 of Section III provides that inspections are to be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section III.

Paragraph 2 of Section III provides that, within one day after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party will provide the other Party with a list of aircrew members, a list of inspectors to carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of Article XI; and a list of proposed inspectors to carry out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. No list may include more than 200 individuals.

Paragraph 3 of Section III requires each Party to review the other Party's lists of aircrew members and inspectors; inspectors must be citizens of the Party on whose list they appear. If an inspector proposed for conducting inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty is unacceptable to a Party, that Party has 20 days from the time it receives the proposed list to object to the inclusion of that person on the list, in which case the individual must be deleted from the list. Each Party must inform the other Party of its agreement to the lists of aircrew members and inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty within 20 days of such receipt. While there is no initial right of refusal for aircrew members, or for inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, paragraph 7 of Section III enables a Party to remove under certain conditions, an inspector or aircrew member from the other Party's list before that person ever engages in inspection activities.

Paragraph 4 of Section III provides that each Party has the right to amend its list of inspectors and aircrew members in the same manner as the initial designation. The other Party must respond to the amendments in the same manner as provided for with respect to initial designations in paragraph 3 of Section III.

Paragraph 5 of Section III provides that, within 30 days of receipt of the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members, or of subsequent changes to such lists, the Party receiving such information must provide or ensure the provision of visas and other documents necessary to enable each inspector and aircrew member to enter and remain in the territory of the Party or Basing Country where an inspection site is located for the in-country period. Thus, the United States or the Soviet Union, as appropriate, will ensure that visas and other necessary documents will be provided for inspections in Basing Countries. Visas and documents will be valid for at least 24 months.

Paragraph 6 of Section III provides that inspectors and aircrew members will be accorded privileges and immunities in the country of the inspection site, throughout the in-country period, as set forth in the Annex on privileges and immunities. Thus, these privileges and immunities will apply to all inspections, including those in the Basing Countries.

Paragraph 7 of Section III provides that inspectors and aircrew members must respect the laws and regulations of the State on whose territory the inspection is carried out and must not interfere

in the internal affairs of the State. It further provides that, if the Inspected Party determines that an inspector or aircrew member has violated the conditions governing inspection activities, has ever committed a criminal offense on the territory of the Inspected Party or a Basing Country, or has ever been expelled by an Inspected Party or a Basing Country, the Inspected Party making such a determination will notify the Inspecting Party, who must immediately delete the individual's name from the list of inspectors or aircrew members and at the same time remove that individual from the territory of the Inspected Party or Basing Country, if such individual is there at that time.

Paragraph 8 of Section III provides that each Party will, within 30 days of entry into force of the Treaty, inform the other Party of the standing diplomatic clearance number for the airplanes of the Party transporting inspectors and equipment into and out of the territory of the Party or Basing Country in which an inspection site is located. Aircraft routings are to be long established international airways agreed upon by the Parties.

SECTION IV—NOTIFICATIONS

Section IV contains detailed provisions concerning the notification that must be given prior to arrival at the inspection site and the specification of the type of inspection that the inspecting Party is planning to conduct.

Paragraph 1 of Section IV provides that notification of an intention to conduct an inspection will be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and that receipt of such a notification will be acknowledged through those centers by the Inspected Party within one hour of its receipt. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers were established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, dated September 15, 1987. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., a "baseline," "Close-out," or "short-notice" inspection, respectively), such notification will be made no less than 16 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, and shall include: the point of entry, date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; date and time when specification of the inspection site will be provided; and the names of inspectors and aircrew members. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., an "elimination" inspection), such notification will be made no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and will include: the point of entry, date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; the site to be inspected and the type of inspection; and the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

Paragraph 2 of Section IV states that the date and time of the specification of the inspection site for "close-out" and "short-notice" inspections will be neither less than four hours nor more than 24 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry. In the case of the "baseline" inspections, the date

and time of the specification of the inspection site shall be neither less than four nor more than 48 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry.

Paragraph 3 of Section IV provides for the transmittal by the Inspecting Party to the Inspected Party, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, of a flight plan from the last departure airfield outside the country in which the inspection site is located to the point of entry. The plan must be provided not less than six hours before scheduled departure from the last departure airfield, must contain specified information, and must be filed in accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) procedures applicable to civil aircraft.

Paragraph 4 of Section IV provides for approval of the flight plan described in paragraph 3 not less than three hours prior to the scheduled departure from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection is to take place. This is necessary to ensure that the inspection team arrives on time at the point of entry.

Paragraph 5 of Section IV allows the Parties to change the points of entry set forth in Section II of the Protocol for the countries in which their deployment areas, missile operating bases, or missile support facilities are located by notifying the other Party. Such changes become effective five months after receipt of such notice.

SECTION V—ACTIVITIES BEGINNING UPON ARRIVAL AT THE POINT OF ENTRY

Section V contains detailed provisions regulating activities at the point of entry to facilitate the entry of inspectors and their equipment into the country where the inspection will take place.

Paragraph 1 of Section V provides that the in-country escort and a diplomatic aircrew escort will meet the inspection team and aircrew members at the point of entry on arrival. The number of aircrew members for each airplane may not exceed ten. The in-country escort will expedite the entry of the inspection team and aircrew members, as well as the entry of their baggage, equipment, and supplies, into the country in which the inspection is to take place. The diplomatic aircrew escort will have the right to accompany and assist aircrew members throughout the in-country period. In-country escorts in a Basing Country may include representatives of that Basing Country.

Paragraph 2 of Section V provides that an inspector will be considered to have begun his duties at the point of entry and to have ended his duties when he has left the territory of the Inspected Party or Basing Country. Pursuant to the Annex on privileges and immunities, the inspector's privileges and immunities apply during this entire period, and thereafter with respect to acts performed in the exercise of his official functions during that period.

Paragraph 3 of Section V requires each Party to ensure that the equipment and supplies necessary for inspection are exempt from all customs duties. However, such equipment will be subject to examination pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section V.

Paragraph 4 of Section V provides that the equipment and supplies the Inspecting Party brings into the country in which the inspection site is located are subject to examination at the point of entry each time they are brought in. This examination will be conducted by the in-country escort in the presence of the inspection team members before departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site. It shall be for the purpose of ascertaining that any such equipment or supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. Equipment or supplies found unacceptable to the Inspected Party will be impounded at the point of entry until departure of the inspection team. Storage of the Inspecting Party's equipment and supplies at each point of entry will be within tamper-proof containers in a "dual-key" secure facility.

Paragraph 5 of Section V requires the Inspected Party to furnish inspection teams and aircrews with meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and necessary medical care during the in-country period. While the Inspected Party furnishes or provides for such services for inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, all costs connected with their stay will be borne by the Inspecting Party.

Paragraph 6 of Section V requires the Inspected Party to provide, at the point of entry, parking, security protection, servicing, and fuel for the aircraft of the Inspecting Party. The fuel and servicing shall be at the Inspecting Party's expense.

Paragraph 7 of Section V states that, for inspections on the territory of a Party, the point of entry used must be that which is closest to the inspection site. The inspection team leader for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty will inform the in-country escort at the point of entry of the type of inspection and the inspection site no later than the time specified according to subparagraph 1(a) of Section IV of the Protocol.

SECTION VI—GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS

The general rules governing the conduct of inspections are set forth in Section VI. These rules are diverse, governing what inspectors may and may not do, what may be brought into a country where an inspection is to take place, and include safety procedures and procedures for the completion of an inspection.

Paragraph 1 of Section VI states that inspectors will discharge their functions in accordance with the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 of Section VI forbids inspectors to disclose information they receive during an inspection except as authorized by the Inspecting Party. It also states that this obligation applies even after their assignment as inspectors has ended.

Paragraph 3 of Section VI requires inspectors not to interfere directly with any ongoing activities at the inspection site and to avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of the facility or taking actions affecting its safety. While inspectors may, as required to conduct the inspection, request their escorts to undertake actions that would interfere with normal activities at a

site, this provision is designed to prevent inspectors from undertaking such actions themselves.

Paragraph 4 of Section VI requires that inspections be conducted in accordance with the objectives set forth in Article XI of the Treaty as applicable for the type of inspection specified. Thus, if a Party specifies that it is going to conduct a particular type of inspection (e.g., a "close-out" inspection), it must then conduct the inspection in accordance with the objectives specified in Article XI for that type of inspection.

Paragraph 5 of Section VI states that the in-country escort has the right to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members during the in-country period. Movement and travel of inspectors and aircrew members will be at the discretion of the in-country escort, except as otherwise provided in the Protocol.

Paragraph 6 of Section VI states that inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty may, with permission of the in-country escort, undertake local leisure travel within 50 kilometers of the inspection site. The distance of 50 kilometers is calculated on the basis of a 50 kilometer radius extending from the inspection site. At the discretion of the Inspected Party, such inspectors undertaking local leisure travel may be accompanied by the in-country escort.

Paragraph 7 of Section VI ensures the right of inspectors to be in communication by telephone with their embassy within the territory of the country in which the inspection site is located, using the telephone communications provided by the Inspected Party.

Paragraph 8 of Section VI states that representatives of the inspected facility will be included among the in-country escort at the inspection site.

Paragraph 9 of Section VI provides that inspectors may bring to the inspection site documents, linear measurement devices, cameras, portable weighing devices, radiation detection devices, and other equipment that has been agreed upon. The characteristics and method of use of this equipment will be agreed upon within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5(a), 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors may use any of the above listed equipment, other than cameras which will be operated only by the Inspected Party upon the request of the Inspecting Party. Upon the request of inspectors, the in-country escort will take duplicate, instant development photographs of inspected facilities with the Inspecting Party's cameras. Each Party will then receive one copy of every photograph. Thus, for all inspections, cameras will be operated only by the Inspected Party. During inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, all measurements, including photographs, will be made by the Inspected Party at the Inspecting Party's request.

Paragraph 10 of Section VI provides that, for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors will permit the in-country escort to observe the equipment used during the inspection.

Paragraph 11 of Section VI provides that the measurements recorded during inspections must be certified by a member of the in-

spection team and a member of the in-country escort at the time of measurement. Such certified data will be included in the inspection report. Thus, measurements taken by either Party shall be observed by the other Party in order to certify the accuracy of that information.

Paragraph 12 of Section VI provides that inspectors may request (through the in-country escort) clarifications of ambiguities arising during an inspection. The in-country escort will provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with such clarification as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity. In the event questions about buildings or objects remain, the Inspected Party will photograph the object or building as requested by the Inspecting Party. If questions still remain, a description of them, any clarification provided, and a copy of any photographs taken will be included in the inspection report. Unresolved issues may be discussed within the framework of the Special Verification Commission established by Article XIII of the Treaty.

Paragraph 13 of Section VI requires inspectors to observe safety regulations established at the inspection site, including regulations relating to the protection of controlled environments within a facility and regulations relating to personal safety. The Inspected Party is required to provide any protective gear that is needed.

Paragraph 14 of Section VI provides that, for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, all pre-inspection procedures must be completed within one hour of arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site. Thus, this provision applies to all inspections except for continuous portal monitoring activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. Inspections are to begin immediately upon completion of pre-inspection procedures and may not exceed 24 hours, except for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 6, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The 24-hour limit may be extended for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, with the agreement of the in-country escort, by no more than eight hours. Post-inspection procedures, including completion of the inspection report, are to be completed at the site within four hours after completion of the inspection.

Paragraph 15 of Section VI limits the number of inspectors on inspection teams. Inspection teams may include no more than ten inspectors, except for an inspection team carrying out an "elimination" inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, which may include no more than 20 inspectors, and except for inspection teams conducting inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, which may include no more than 30 inspectors. At least two inspectors on each team must speak the language of the Inspected Party. An inspection team will operate under the direction of a team leader and a deputy team leader. At the inspection site, the inspection team may divide itself into subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each, and only one inspection team will be allowed at a particular site at any one time.

Paragraph 16 of Section VI provides that, except in the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, an inspection team will, upon completion of

post-inspection procedures, return promptly to the point of entry from which it commenced inspection activities, and then leave the territory of the country in which the inspection site is located within 24 hours. A party may conduct sequential "baseline," "close-out," and "elimination" inspections with the same inspection team. In the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, if the inspection team intends to conduct another inspection it will notify the Inspected Party of its intent either upon return to the point of entry (using the procedures specified in paragraph 7 of Section V and paragraph 1 and 2 of Section VII of the Protocol) or upon completion of post-inspection procedures at the previous inspection site. The Inspecting Party will be transported to the new inspection site by the Inspected Party, without unjustified delay, by means and routes chosen by the Inspected Party.

SECTION VII—INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 3, 4,
OR 5 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section VII set forth the detailed procedures for "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI of the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Section VII provides for the Inspected Party to implement pre-inspection movement restrictions at the inspection site within one hour of specification of the inspection site by the Inspecting Party. During this period of restrictions, no missile, stage of a missile, launcher, or support equipment subject to the Treaty may be removed from the site.

Paragraph 2 of Section VII provides that the Inspected Party will transport the inspection team from the point of entry so as to ensure the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site within nine hours of specification of the site to be inspected.

Paragraph 3 of Section VII provides that, for inspections in Basing Countries, the aircrew of the Inspected Party may include representatives of the Basing Country.

Paragraph 4 of Section VII provides that neither Party may conduct more than one "short-notice" inspection pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, more than one "short-notice" inspection pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, or more than ten "baseline" inspections pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time.

Paragraph 5 of Section VII provides that the boundaries of inspection sites will be the boundaries set forth in the MOU.

Paragraph 6 of Section VII provides that, in the case of a "baseline" inspection or "short-notice" inspection of a declared facility, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site the in-country escort will inform the inspection team leader of the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment subject to the Treaty at the inspection site and provide a diagram of the inspection site indicating the location of such items.

Paragraph 7 of Section VII provides that the inspection team may, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8 through 14 of Sec-

tion VII, inspect the entire inspection site, including the interior of structures, containers, and vehicles with dimensions equal to or greater than the dimensions specified in Section VI of the MOU for the missiles, missile stages, launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party.

Paragraph 8 of Section VII sets forth the procedures for physical on-site inspections: (i) external visual observation only (including measurement of dimensions) of missiles, stages of such missiles, or launchers subject to the Treaty, and of containers that the Inspected Party declares to contain a missile or stage of such missile of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty and that are not large enough to contain more than one such missile or missile stage of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty; (ii) inspection only by weighing or visual observation of a container's interior, for containers large enough to contain missiles or stages of such missiles subject to the Treaty that the Inspected Party declares do not contain a missile or missile stage of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty (except as provided in subparagraph (iii) below, or during "short-notice" inspections of formerly declared facilities); (iii) external inspection only (including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation, and linear measurements of the dimensions of the canister) of launch canisters associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty and declared by the Inspected Party to contain such a missile.

Paragraph 9 of Section VII provides that structures or containers not large enough to contain a missile, stage of such missile, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty are subject to external visual inspection only (including measurement of dimensions) to confirm that they are not large enough to contain a missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty.

Paragraph 10 of Section VII states that if the Inspected Party satisfies an inspection team that an interior space within a structure is not accessible by the smallest missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty, that space may not be inspected further. Moreover, if an inspector can ascertain by means of visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrances that the space does not contain any missiles, missile stages, or launchers of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty, that space may not be inspected further.

Paragraph 11 of Section VII provides that an inspection team may patrol the perimeter of the inspection site and may station inspectors at the exits for the duration of the inspection.

Paragraph 12 of Section VII provides that the inspection team may, during inspections, inspect any vehicles capable of carrying missiles, missile stages, launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty and that no such vehicle will leave the site during the inspection until it has been inspected.

Paragraph 13 of Section VII provides that, prior to inspection of a building, the inspection team may station subgroups at the exits that are large enough to permit passage of missiles, missile stages, launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty. During the period of the building inspection, no vehicles or objects capable of containing missiles, missile stages,

launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty may leave the building until inspected.

Paragraph 14 of Section VII provides that during a "short-notice" inspection of a formerly declared facility conducted pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, it will be the responsibility of the Inspected Party to demonstrate that a shrouded or environmentally protected item that is equal to or larger in size than the smallest missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty is not, in fact, such an item. This may be accomplished by partial removal of a shroud or environmental protection cover, by measuring or weighing the covered item, or by other methods. There may be no further inspection of the object if the Inspected Party satisfies the inspection team that the object is not a missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty. If the container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty (and so declared by the Inspected Party), it is subject to external inspection only (including the use of radiation detection devices, visual observation, and linear measurement).

SECTION VIII—INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 7 OR 8 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section VIII provides detailed procedures for inspections of elimination of missiles, launchers, and support equipment subject to the Treaty. The precise actions that must be undertaken in order to accomplish such elimination are set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. As required by paragraph 7 of Article XI, inspectors are required to be present during the process of elimination.

Paragraph 1 of Section VIII states that inspections of the elimination process carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty will be conducted according to procedures in this paragraph and the Protocol on Elimination.

Subparagraph 1(a) states that inspectors will be provided with a schedule of elimination activities upon arrival at the elimination facility.

Subparagraph 1(b) provides that inspectors will compare the data provided by the Inspected Party, in its notification of elimination required in subparagraphs 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty, with the actual number and types of missile systems to be eliminated at the elimination site, prior to the initiation of elimination.

Subparagraph 1(c) states that (subject to paragraphs 3 and 11 of Section VI of the Protocol) inspectors will observe the execution of elimination procedures as provided for in the Protocol on Elimination and will have the right to call to the attention of the in-country escort the need for strict compliance with such procedures. The completion of such procedures will be confirmed in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 8 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination.

Subparagraph 1(d) states that inspectors may ascertain visually that a missile to be eliminated by launching is a missile of a type subject to elimination and may observe such a missile (from a safe location specified by the Inspected Party) until completion of its launch. During the inspection of a series of launches, the Inspected

Party will determine the means and route for the transportation of the inspection team between inspection sites. Paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty stipulates that each Party may eliminate up to 100 of its intermediate-range missiles by launching, provided that it does so within the first six months after entry into force of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Section VIII states that inspections of the elimination of items carried out pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., elimination *in situ*, by loss or accidental destruction, for training items, or by static display) will be conducted in accordance with the appropriate procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise agreed by the Parties.

SECTION IX—INSPECTION MONITORING CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO
PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section IX contains the procedures to be followed by the Parties for the establishment and operation of continuous portal monitoring systems on each other's territory. Upon entry into force, such systems shall be established in the Soviet Union at the SS-25 final assembly facility in Votkinsk, and in the United States at those parts of the Hercules Plant Number 1 in Magna, Utah, as specified in the MOU.

Paragraph 1 of Section IX provides that the Inspected Party will maintain an agreed upon perimeter around the periphery of an inspection site and will designate one portal for each site through which not more than one rail line and one road will pass, and through which all vehicles that can contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM must exit. Note that only this single exit from a facility is referred to as a "portal."

Paragraph 2 of Section IX states that, for the purposes of this Section, the provisions of paragraph 10 of Article VII of the Treaty will be applied to intermediate-range GLBMs of the Inspected Party and to the longest stage of such GLBMs. Subparagraph 10(a) of Article VII stipulates that, for GLBMs that are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range missile will be counted as a complete missile. Subparagraph 10(b) provides that, for GLBMs that are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used to launch an intermediate-range GLBM will be counted as a complete GLBM, unless the Inspected Party proves otherwise to the satisfaction of the Inspecting Party. Thus, throughout Section IX, wherever the phrase "intermediate-range GLBMs of the Inspected Party and the longest stage of such GLBMs" appears, the last part of that phrase applies to GLBMs that are stored and moved in separate stages, and the first part applies to other GLBMs.

Paragraph 3 of Section IX states that inspection site exits other than the portal designated pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section IX will be monitored by appropriate sensors and that there will be no more than two such exits at each site. The perimeter and the inspection site exits may be monitored in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VII of the Protocol. Thus, all exits may be monitored with sensors and with inspectors.

Paragraph 4 of Section IX provides that the Inspecting Party may establish continuous portal monitoring systems at the portal specified in paragraph 1 above, and may establish appropriate sensors at the exits specified in paragraph 3 above. It may also carry out necessary engineering surveys, construction, repair, and replacement of monitoring systems.

Paragraph 5 of Section IX states that, with respect to the monitoring systems, the Inspected Party will provide, upon the request and at the expense of the Inspecting Party: all necessary utilities for their construction and operation; basic construction materials; site preparation; transportation of necessary installation tools, materials, and equipment from the point of entry; and telephone lines and high frequency radio equipment for in-country communication with the embassy of the Inspecting Party. Thus, although the Inspecting Party pays the costs, the Inspected Party is required to provide necessary support for the monitoring systems.

Paragraph 6 of Section IX states that the Inspecting Party may, outside of the inspection site perimeter, construct up to three buildings of a specified size for a data center and inspection team headquarters and one additional building for supply and equipment storage; install systems to monitor exits (including sensors and measuring equipment); install measuring equipment at the portal; install non-damaging image producing equipment at the portal; install power sources; and use agreed-upon data authentication devices.

Paragraph 7 of Section IX provides that, during installation or operation of monitoring systems, the Inspecting Party will not deny the Inspected Party access to any existing structures or security systems or take any other actions with respect to such structures without the consent of the Inspected Party. The Inspecting Party will compensate the Inspected Party for any agreed upon rebuilding or demolition of such structures.

Paragraph 8 of Section IX provides that the Inspected Party will not interfere with the installed equipment or restrict inspecting team access thereto.

Paragraph 9 of Section IX states that, subject to the Inspected Party's radio power and frequency restrictions, the Inspecting Party may use its own radio systems for communications between inspectors and data collection centers.

Paragraph 10 of Section IX states that aircraft may not land within the perimeter of a monitored site except for emergencies and with prior notification to the inspection team.

Paragraph 11 of Section IX provides that the Inspected Party must make a declaration with respect to any shipment large and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or the longest stage of such a GLBM of the Inspected Party. Such shipments must pass through the portal specified in paragraph 1 above. The declaration will specify whether the shipment contains a missile or missile stage as large or larger than, and as heavy or heavier than, an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM. The declaration will be made prior to the arrival of the shipment at the portal.

Paragraph 12 of Section IX provides that an inspection team may weigh and measure the dimensions of any vehicle, including

railcars, exiting the site. If such a vehicle is not large or heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or the longest stage of such a GLBM, then that vehicle will not be subject to further inspection.

Paragraph 13 of Section IX provides that vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 above that are large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM, but are declared by the Inspected Party not to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM, will be subject to inspection. The Inspecting Party will have the right to inspect the interior of all such vehicles. If the vehicle has no container or shrouded object large enough to be or contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM, there will be no further inspection; if the vehicle does contain such a container or object, the Inspected Party must demonstrate that the container or object is not and does not contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM.

Paragraph 14 of Section IX states that vehicles, exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 above, that are declared to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than, and as heavy or heavier than, an intermediate-range GLBM or the longest stage of such a GLBM are subject to the following inspection procedures:

(i) the integrity of the inspected missile or stage shall be preserved by the Inspecting Party;

(ii) measurements will be made by the Inspecting Party using approved equipment, which will be placed only outside the launch canister or shipping container, and the measurements will be observed and certified by the in-country escort;

(iii) launch canisters and shipping containers declared to contain such a missile or missile stage may be weighed and measured, and their contents imaged by the Inspecting Party in the presence of the in-country escort. The Inspecting Party may view the interior of launch canisters or shipping containers brought out from the inspection site eight times per calendar year. During such viewing, the front end of the launch canister or the cover of the shipping container will be opened, the missile or missile stage will not be removed from its canister or container, and the length and diameter of the stages of the missile will be measured in accordance with agreed methods so as to ascertain that the missile or missile stage is not an intermediate-range GLBM, or the longest stage of such a GLBM, and that the missile has no more than one stage that is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM; and (iv) the Inspecting Party may inspect any other containers or shrouded objects inside a vehicle containing such a missile or missile stage pursuant to paragraph 13 above.

SECTION X—CANCELLATION OF INSPECTIONS

Section X provides that inspections shall be cancelled if they cannot be carried out by reason of *force majeure* (i.e., a "superior or

irresistible force" outside the control of the Parties that could not be avoided by the exercise of due care). In addition, if the inspection team performing a "baseline," "close-out," or "short-notice" inspection pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, or 5, respectively, of Article XI of the Treaty is delayed and fails to arrive by the specified time, the inspection may be cancelled or carried out at the Inspecting Party's option. Inspections cancelled by reason of *force majeure* or delay will not reduce the number of inspections to which the Inspecting Party is entitled. Thus, this provision gives only the Inspecting Party the option to cancel or carry out an inspection.

SECTION XI—INSPECTION REPORT

Section XI specifies the procedures the Parties will follow in filing reports concerning inspections made pursuant to the Treaty. These reports will provide a written record of the inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Section XI states that, with respect to inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., all types of inspections except inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring), the inspection team leader will provide the in-country escort with a copy of the inspection report no later than two hours after an inspection is completed. The report will include the type of inspection; the inspection site; the number of missiles, missile stages, launchers, and support equipment observed during the inspection; and any measurements recorded during inspections. All photographs taken during the inspection and the inspection site diagram will be attached to the report, and the report will be written in both English and Russian.

Paragraph 2 of Section XI states that, with respect to inspections carried out pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring), a report similar to that called for in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be provided within three days of the end of each month.

Paragraph 3 of Section XI provides that the Inspected Party may make written comments with respect to inspection reports required by this Section.

Paragraph 4 of Section XI states that the Parties will resolve, to the extent possible, ambiguities regarding factual information in inspection reports, and record any relevant clarifications in the report. Reports are to be signed by the inspection team leader and by one in-country escort. Each Party will retain a copy of the report.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The penultimate paragraph of the Protocol specifies that the Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty, that it will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and that it will remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. The paragraph also provides that the Parties may agree upon measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol, through the Special Verification Commission established pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty. Such measures will not be deemed to be amendments to the Treaty. Thus, while substantive obligations cannot be changed absent an agreed amendment to the Treaty, minor mat-

ters relating to the detailed inspection procedures may be altered through agreement of the Parties in order to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty regime.

The final paragraph records that the Protocol was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian language, both texts being equally authentic.

ANNEX ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INSPECTORS AND AIRCREW MEMBERS

Much as diplomats everywhere are generally granted diplomatic privileges and immunities in order that they can carry out their duties without interference, the Parties have agreed in this Annex that inspectors and aircrew members acting pursuant to the Treaty shall also be entitled to appropriate privileges and immunities. The privileges and immunities set forth in the Annex apply to inspectors and aircrew members during the in-country period, and thereafter with respect to acts performed during the course of their official functions as inspectors or aircrew members. The Annex draws upon the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961² (the Vienna Convention), which is the primary international agreement governing such privileges and immunities.

Paragraph 1 of the Annex provides that inspectors and aircrew members will enjoy the inviolability accorded diplomatic agents under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention. Article 29 of the Vienna Convention provides: "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity."

Paragraph 2 of the Annex provides that the living quarters and office premises of inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty will be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the premises of diplomatic agents under Article 30 of the Vienna Convention. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention provides, in pertinent part: "1. The private residence of a diplomatic agency shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission."

Paragraph 3 of the Annex provides that the papers and correspondence of inspectors and aircrew members will enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, and that the aircraft of the inspection team will be inviolable. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention provides, in pertinent part: "2. His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 31, his property, shall likewise enjoy inviolability."

Paragraph 4 of the Annex provides that inspectors and aircrew members will be accorded the immunities of diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, but that these immunities may be waived by the Inspecting

² Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna on April 18, 1961, 23 UST 3227, 500 UNTS 95. The United States and the Soviet Union are both parties to the Vienna Convention.

Party if that Party believes that immunity would impede the course of justice and if it believes that the waiver would not prejudice implementation of the Treaty. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provide:

1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:

(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;

(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;

(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.

2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.

3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic agent except in the cases coming under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article, and provided that the measures concerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence.

Paragraph 5 of the Annex provides that inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty will have the same exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention provides that:

A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional or municipal, except:

(a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in the price of goods or services;

(b) dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;

(c) estate, succession or inheritance duties levied by the receiving State, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 39 [of the Vienna Convention];

(d) dues and taxes on private income having its source in the receiving State and capital taxes on investments made in commercial undertakings in the receiving State;

(e) charges levied for specific services rendered;

(f) registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues and stamp duty, with respect to immovable property, subject to the provisions of Article 23 [of the Vienna Convention].

Paragraph 6 of the Annex states that inspectors and aircrew members may import, without payment of customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, except for articles that are prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

Paragraph 7 of the Annex states that inspectors and aircrew members may not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the Inspected Party or that of a Basing Country.

Paragraph 8 of the Annex states that the Parties will consult in the event that the Inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of the privileges and immunities specified in the Annex.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND REGARDING INSPECTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT

The Basing Country Agreement (the Agreement) consists of seven Articles and an Annex on the privileges and immunities of inspectors and aircrew members.

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles confers the right to conduct inspections not only in the United States and the Soviet Union, but also within the territory of other countries within which U.S. and Soviet missile systems subject to the Treaty are located. In order for the United States to guarantee Soviet access to the territory of its Western European Allies for the purpose of conducting inspections, the authorization of the Allies had to be obtained. In the Basing Country Agreement, the Basing Countries agree to permit inspections on their territory and to facilitate on their territory the implementation by the United States of its obligations under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. The undertakings of the Basing Countries in the Basing Country Agreement correspond to the underlying undertakings of the United States in the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection.

ARTICLE I—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article I sets forth the general provisions of the Agreement, including authorization of Soviet inspections in the Basing Countries, facilitation by the Basing Countries of U.S. obligations under the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection, various reservations of rights by the Basing Countries, and the undertaking by the United States to remain responsible for its obligations and to protect and preserve the rights of the Basing Countries under the Agreement.

Paragraph 1 of Article I constitutes the basic agreement of the Basing Countries that the inspection activities provided for in Article XI of the Treaty may take place on their territories. Paragraph 1 also stipulates that such inspections must be carried out in accordance with the requirements, procedures, and arrangements set

forth in the Protocol on Inspection. Article XI of the Treaty describes the various types of inspections which each Party may conduct, including "baseline" initial inspections to verify the updated data provided immediately following entry into force of the Treaty (paragraph 3), "close-out" inspections to verify the elimination of specified facilities (paragraph 4), "short-notice" inspections of specified facilities (paragraph 5), inspection of the process of elimination (paragraph 7), and inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination (paragraph 8). The protocol on Inspection specifies the procedures that govern the conduct of each type of inspection.

Paragraph 2 of Article I constitutes the Basing Countries' undertaking to facilities implementation by the United States of its obligations under the Treaty with respect to inspection activities taking place on their territories.

Paragraph 3 of Article I confirms the principle that, except as otherwise agreed, the Basing Countries reserve their sovereign authority to enforce their laws and regulations with respect to persons entering, and activities taking place within, their jurisdiction.

Paragraph 4 of Article I sets forth the understanding that the Basing Countries assume no obligations and grant no rights deriving from the Treaty or the Protocol on Inspection other than those expressly undertaken or granted in the Agreement.

Paragraph 5 of Article I confirms that the United States remains fully responsible to the Soviet Union for the fulfillment of its obligations under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection with respect to U.S. facilities located in the Basing Countries. Paragraph 5 also sets forth the commitment of the United States to the Basing Countries to take such action, in exercising its rights under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection, as may be required to protect the rights and the Basing Countries under the Agreement.

ARTICLE II—DEFINITIONS

Article II sets forth the definitions of the terms used in the Agreement. Definitions are provided for the following terms: (1) Treaty, (2) Inspection Protocol, (3) Inspected Party, (4) Inspecting Party, (5) Inspection team (6) inspector, (7) diplomatic aircrew escort, (8) inspection site, (9) period of inspection, (10) point of entry, (ii) in-country period, (12) in-country escort, and (13) aircrew member.

Paragraph 1 of Article II defines "Treaty" as the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Paragraph 2 of Article II defines "Inspection Protocol" as the Protocol Regarding Inspection Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Paragraph 3 of Article II defines "Inspected Party" as the United States.

Paragraph 4 of Article II defines "Inspecting Party" as the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 5 of Article II defines "inspection team" as those inspectors designated by the Inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection activity.

Paragraph 6 of Article II defines "inspector" as an individual who is proposed by the Soviet Union to carry out inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty, and who is included on its list of inspectors in accordance with section III of the Protocol on Inspection. Section III of the Protocol provides for the naming of proposed inspectors and aircrew members by each Party to the Treaty and specifies the grounds on which the other Party may object to an individual.

Paragraph 7 of Article II defines "diplomatic aircrew escort" as that individual who is accredited to the government of the Basing Country in which the inspection site is located and who is designated by the Inspecting Party to assist the aircrew of the Inspecting Party.

Paragraph 8 of Article II defines "inspection site" as the area, facility, or location in a Basing Country at which an inspection provided for in Article XI of the Treaty is carried out.

Paragraph 9 of Article II defines "period of inspection" as the period from initiation of the inspection at the inspection site until completion of the inspection at the inspection site, exclusive of the time spent on any pre-inspection and post-inspection procedures.

Paragraph 10 of Article II defines "point of entry" as: Brussels (National) for Belgium; Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase) for the Federal Republic of Germany; Rome (Ciampino) for the Republic of Italy; Schiphol for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and RAF Greenham Common for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Paragraph 11 of Article II defines "in-country period" as the period from the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry until departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to depart the country.

Paragraph 12 of Article II defines "in-country escort" as the official or officials specified by the Inspected Party, one or more of whom may be nominated by the Basing Country within whose territory the inspection site is located, who shall accompany an inspection team throughout the in-country period and provide appropriate assistance to an inspection team in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection, throughout the in-country period.

Paragraph 13 of Article II defines "aircrew member" as an individual, other than members of an inspection team, diplomatic aircrew escort, and in-country escort, on the aircraft of the Inspecting Party. The paragraph also stipulates that the number of aircrew members per aircraft shall not exceed ten.

ARTICLE III—NOTIFICATIONS

Article III sets forth the commitment of the United States to provide each Basing Country with advance notice of any inspections to be conducted by the Soviet Union in that Basing Country. The notifications to be provided by the United States to the Basing Coun-

tries will replicate the relevant information which the Soviet Union must provide to the United States under the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Article III provides that, upon entry into force of the Agreement, the United States and the Basing Countries will establish a method of communication (described as "channels") to receive and acknowledge receipt of notifications on an around-the-clock basis.

Paragraph 2 of Article III provides that the United States will notify the Basing Country concerned, immediately upon receipt of notice from the Soviet Union, of a pending Soviet inspection in that Basing Country, including the date and estimated time for the Soviet inspection team's arrival at the point of entry, the date and estimated time of its departure to the inspection site, the names of aircrew and inspection team members, the flight plan filed by the Soviet Union, and any other relevant information provided by the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 3 of Article III establishes that the United States will inform the Basing Country concerned of the precise location of the inspection site not less than one hour prior to the estimated departure time of the Soviet inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site (or, in the case of successive inspections, from one inspection site to another inspection site).

ARTICLE IV—PRE-INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS

Article IV sets forth various pre-inspection arrangements, including mechanisms for the Basing Countries to object to Soviet inspectors or aircrew members, the provision of visas and other documentation to Soviet inspectors and aircrew members, and the furnishing by the Basing Countries of standing diplomatic clearance numbers and established routes for Soviet aircraft conveying inspection teams. Article IV also addresses the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members, the waiver of customs duties, expedited customs processing, the provision of food and lodging for inspectors and aircrew members, an examination of equipment used in conducting inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV provides that upon receipt of the initial list of proposed Soviet inspectors and aircrew members (or subsequent changes thereto) the United States will provide the lists to each of the Basing Countries, which must in turn notify the United States, within 15 days, of any objection to a person on the list based upon that person's having previously committed, or having been sentenced for committing, a criminal offense in, or having been expelled from, the United States or the Basing Country making the objection. If such an objection is made by a Basing Country, the United States is committed to exercise its right under the Protocol on Inspection to prevent such a person from serving as an inspector or aircrew member.

Paragraph 2 of Article IV sets forth the Basing Countries' commitment to furnish all necessary visas and related documents, within 25 days of receiving the initial list of inspectors and aircrew members (or subsequent changes thereto), to enable such personnel to carry out their inspections. Visas and documentation are to be valid for at least 24 months. The United States will immediately

notify the Basing Countries of the removal of an individual's name from the list of inspectors and aircrew members, whereupon the Basing Countries may cancel such individual's visas and related documentation.

Paragraph 3 of Article IV provides that each Basing Country will notify the United States, within 25 days of entry into force of the Agreement, of the standing diplomatic clearance numbers and established international airways for the Soviet aircraft that will be transporting inspectors and equipment into its territory.

Paragraph 4 of Article IV sets forth the Basing Countries' commitment to extend to Soviet inspectors and aircrew members the privileges and immunities set forth in the Annex on privileges and immunities to the Basing Country Agreement. The Basing Countries may withdraw such extension of privileges and immunities in the event the Soviet Union fails to remove, in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection, any inspector or aircrew member who violates the conditions governing inspections. Paragraph 7 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection states that inspectors and aircrew members are obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the country on whose territory an inspection is carried out and not to interfere in that country's internal affairs. It specifies the circumstances under which they may be removed from the lists of inspectors and aircrew members.

Paragraph 5 of Article IV provides that the Basing Countries will waive customs duties and will expedite customs processing for inspection equipment at the point of entry.

Paragraph 6 of Article IV constitutes the Basing Countries' agreement to provide, upon request, food and lodging for inspectors and aircrew at the point of entry.

Paragraph 7 of Article IV provides that the Basing Country concerned and the United States have the right to examine jointly each item of Soviet equipment to confirm that it cannot be used to perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. Any equipment unconnected with such inspection requirements will be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the Basing Country concerned.

ARTICLE V—CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS

Article V describes the role of the Basing Countries in the conduct of inspections on their territories including facilitation of movement, granting of clearances, establishment of communication capability, and the furnishing of aircraft servicing as well as housing, food, and services for inspectors and aircrew members. It also discusses extensions of inspection periods.

Paragraph 1 of Article V sets forth the Basing Countries' agreement to grant approval to the United States for Soviet aircraft to fly to the point of entry via the filed routing (or, if necessary, an amended routing) within 90 minutes of receipt of notice from the United States that a flight plan conforming to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requirements has been filed for the pending Soviet inspection.

Paragraph 2 of Article V states that the Basing Country concerned will facilitate entry into its territory and expedite customs

processing for Soviet inspectors and aircrew members and their baggage and equipment.

Paragraph 3 of Article V provides that upon notification by the United States of the inspection site, the Basing Country concerned will expedite Soviet travel to the inspection site for arrival within nine hours of Soviet notification to the United States of the site to be inspected. The Basing Country and the United States will consult on the appropriate mode of transportation to the site, and the Basing country may designate the routing to the site.

Paragraph 4 of Article V provides that each Basing Country will assist the United States in establishing two-way voice communication capability for a Soviet inspection team between the inspection site and the Soviet Embassy within its territory.

Paragraph 5 of Article V provides that the Basing Country concerned will consult with the United States on aircraft servicing and on meals, lodging, and services at the point of entry and at the inspection site for Soviet inspectors and aircrew members, and that the United States will pay the costs of any such services it requests.

Paragraph 6 of Article V states that the United States will immediately notify the Basing Country concerned of any extension of the original 24-hour period of inspection, said extension not to exceed eight hours.

ARTICLE VI—CONSULTATIONS

Article VI describes means of consultation between the United States and the Basing Countries on implementation of inspection activities and other matters. It also describes disqualifications of inspectors and aircrew members, changes in points of entry, required notification and briefing of Basing Countries by the United States upon completion of inspections, and the requirement for the Basing Countries' assent to certain amendments to Article XI of the Treaty and to the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 1 of Article VI provides that the United States and the Basing Countries will meet within five days of entry into force of the Basing Country Agreement to coordinate implementation of inspection activities.

Paragraph 2 of Article VI states that a meeting between the United States and any Basing Country to discuss implementation of the Basing Country Agreement will be held within five days of a request therefor by the United States or a Basing Country.

Paragraph 3 of Article VI establishes that a Basing Country may, if it deems it necessary, contact directly the U.S. inspection notification authority on urgent questions. The United States will immediately acknowledge receipt of any such inquiry or question and will give the question or problem its urgent attention.

Paragraph 4 of Article VI provides that if a Basing Country determines that a Soviet inspector or aircrew member has violated the conditions governing inspection within its territory, it may so notify the United States, and the United States will then notify the Soviet Union of the disqualification of such an inspector or aircrew member and require the individual's removal from the list of inspectors or aircrew members.

Paragraph 5 of Article VI provides that a Basing Country may change its point of entry upon six-months' prior notice to the United States.

Paragraph 6 of Article VI states that the United States will advise the Basing Country concerned upon completion of an inspection and will, upon request, brief the Basing Country on the inspection.

Paragraph 7 of Article VI establishes that the United States will not propose or accept an amendment to Article XI of the Treaty or to the Protocol on Inspection that directly affects the Basing Countries without the prior consent of the Basing Countries.

ARTICLE VII—DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT

Article VII provides that the Agreement is subject to approval by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. Upon required notification by each Party to each of the other Parties of such approval, the Agreement will enter into force simultaneously with the entry into force of the Treaty. The Agreement will remain in force for 13 years.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The penultimate paragraph of the Basing Country Agreement records that a single original of the Agreement was signed at Brussels, Belgium, on December 11, 1987. The paragraph also provides that the single original will be deposited in the archives of the United States Government and that the United States will transmit a duly certified copy of the Agreement to the other signatory Governments (i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).

[NOTE.—The Agreement has an Annex entitled "Provisions on Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and Aircrew Members," which is substantively the same as the identically titled Annex to the Protocol on Inspection, discussed at pages 108-111 of the Report, with conforming changes to reflect its status as part of the Basing Country Agreement rather than the Protocol on Inspection.]

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an

integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.

ARTICLE II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

4. The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.

7. The term "deployment area" means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located.

8. The term "missile operating base" means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

9. The term "missile support facility," as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. The term "transit" means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-

range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility.

11. The term "deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

12. The term "non-deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

13. The term "deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

14. The term "non-deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

15. The term "basing country" means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be "located."

ARTICLE III

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and sup-

port equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented into two phases so that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this Treaty:

(i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads;

(ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;

(iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads;

(iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and

(v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.

ARTICLE V

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after

entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1000 kilometers.

ARTICLE VI

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

ARTICLE VII

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum dis-

tance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

5. The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.

8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:

(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;

(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguished from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers.

12. Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launchers of such booster systems

shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that:

(a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty;

(b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;

(c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and

(d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty.

ARTICLE VIII

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.

3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days.

5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. Neither Party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities.

8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

9. Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article.

ARTICLE IX

1. The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notification required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes.

5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

(a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility;

(b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change;

(c) notification, except with respect to launchers of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including:

(i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;

(ii) the elimination site;

(iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and

(iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including:

(i) the type of missiles to be eliminated;

(ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series;

(iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this treaty; and

(iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including:

(i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and

(ii) the date and location of such elimination; and

(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:

(i) the number of missiles or launchers;

(ii) the points, dates and times of departure and arrival;

(iii) the mode of transport; and

(iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launches in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missiles systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection.

3. When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions.

4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Section IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated *in situ*.

5. Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A Party shall notify the

other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;

(b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and

(c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

9. If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

ARTICLE XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no

longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall use more than half of its total number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct:

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility for the other Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance

with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed.

8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination.

ARTICLE XII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) no later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launch-

ers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) the Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

ARTICLE XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to:

(a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination;

(b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty;

(c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and

(d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV

The Parties shall comply with the Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

ARTICLE XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardizing its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVI

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the proce-

dures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XVII

1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:



President of the United States
of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:



General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DATA BASE FOR THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of November 1, 1987, on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers.

I. DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding, the Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection:

1. The term "missile production facility" means a facility for the assembly or production of solid-propellant intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs, or existing types of GLCMs.

2. The term "missile repair facility" means a facility at which repair or maintenance of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base.

3. The term "launcher production facility" means a facility for final assembly of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles.

4. The term "launcher repair facility" means a facility at which repair or maintenance of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base.

5. The term "test range" means an area at which flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place.

6. The term "training facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which personnel are trained in the use of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles and at which launchers of such missiles are located.

7. The term "missile storage facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or stages of such missiles are stored.

8. The term "launcher storage facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles are stored.

9. The term "elimination facility" means a facility at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, missile stages and launchers of such missiles or support equipment associated with such missiles or launchers are eliminated.

10. The term "support equipment" means unique vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment that support a deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile. Support equipment shall include full-scale inert training missiles, full-scale inert training missile stages, full-scale inert training launch canisters, and training launchers not capable of launching a missile. A listing of such support equipment associated with each existing type of missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding.

11. The term "support structure" means a unique fixed structure used to support deployed intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles. A listing of such support structures associated with each existing type of missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding.

12. The term "research and development launch site" means a facility at which research and development booster systems are launched.

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II. Total Numbers of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and Launchers of Such Missiles Subject to the Treaty

1. The numbers of intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each Party are as follow:

	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Deployed missiles	429	470
Non-deployed missiles	260	356
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles	689	826
Aggregate number of second stages	236	650
Deployed launchers	214	484
Non-deployed launchers	68	124
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers	282	608

2. The numbers of shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each Party are as follow:

	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Deployed missiles	0	387
Non-deployed missiles	170	539
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles	170	926
Aggregate number of second stages	175	726
Deployed launchers	0	197
Non-deployed launchers	1	40
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers	1	237

III. Intermediate-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles and Support Structures and Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers

1. Deployed

The following are the deployment areas, missile operating bases, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and the support structures and support equipment associated with such

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missiles and launchers. Site diagrams, to include boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. The boundaries of deployment areas are indicated by specifying geographic coordinates, connected by straight lines or linear landmarks, to include national boundaries, rivers, railroads or highways.

	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(i) Pershing II

Deployment Area One

The Federal Republic of Germany

Boundaries:

The territory of The Federal Republic of Germany bounded on the north by 51 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the east by 012 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds east longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and within the national boundaries of The Federal Republic of Germany.

Missile Operating Bases

Schwaebisch-Gmuend	40 (includes 4 spares)	36	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 24
48 48 54 N	009 48 29 E		
Neu Ulm	40 (includes 4 spares)	43 (includes 7 spares)	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 24
48 22 40 N	010 00 45 E		
Waldheide-Neckarsulm	40 (includes 4 spares)	36	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 24
49 07 45 N	009 16 31 E		

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
(ii) <u>BGM-109G</u>			

Deployment Area One

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Boundaries:

The territory of The United Kingdom bounded on the north by 52 degrees 40 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the west by 003 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; on the south by the English Channel; and on the east by the English Channel and the North Sea.

Missile Operating Base

Greenham Common	101 with launch canister (includes 5 spares)	29 (includes 5 spares)	Training Missile - 0 Training Launch Canister - 7
51 22 35 N 001 18 12 W			

Deployment Area Two

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Boundaries:

The territory of The United Kingdom bounded on the north by 53 degrees 45 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the west by 002 degrees 45 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; on the south by 51 degrees 05 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and on the east by the English Channel and the North Sea.

Missile Operating Base

Molesworth	18* with launch canister	6*	Training Missile - 0 Training Launch Canister - 7
52 23 00 N 000 25 35 W			

*In preparation for operational status.

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Deployment Area

The Republic of Italy

Boundaries:

The territory of The Republic of Italy within the boundaries of the Island of Sicily.

Missile Operating Base

Comiso

108	31
with launch	(includes
canister	7 spares)
(includes	
12 spares)	

Training	
Missile	- 0
Training	
Launch	
Canister	- 7

36 59 44 N 014 36 34 E

Deployment Area

The Kingdom of Belgium

Boundaries:

The territory of The Kingdom of Belgium.

Missile Operating Base

Florennes

20	12
with launch	(includes
canister	8 spares)
(includes	
4 spares)	

Training	
Missile	- 0
Training	
Launch	
Canister	- 7

50 13 35 N 004 39 00 E

- 7 -

	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Deployment Area Two

The Federal Republic of Germany

Boundaries:

The territory of The Federal Republic of Germany bounded on the north by 51 degrees 25 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the east by 009 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds east longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 43 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and on the west by the national boundaries of The Federal Republic of Germany.

Missile Operating Base

Wueschheim	62 with launch canister (includes 14 spares)	31 (includes 9 spares)	Training Missile - 1 Training Launch Canister - 10
50 02 33 N 007 25 06 E			

Deployment Area

The Kingdom of the Netherlands

Boundaries:

The territory of The Kingdom of the Netherlands bounded on the north by 52 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds north latitude and within the national boundaries of The Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Missile Operating Base

Woensdrecht	0 with launch canister	0	Training Missile - 0 Training Launch Canister - 0
51 26 12 N 004 21 15 E			

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(i) SS-20Deployment Area

Postavy

55 12 13 N	027 00 00 E
54 52 47	026 41 18
54 43 58	026 04 07
55 01 13	026 03 43

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Missile Operating Base

Postavy	9	9	Launch
55 09 47 N 026 54 21 E			Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

Deployment Area

Vetrino

55 28 44 N 028 42 29 E
 55 01 03 028 15 03
 55 01 16 027 48 46
 55 16 22 027 49 05

Missile Operating Base

Vetrino	9	9	Launch
55 24 19 N 028 33 29 E			Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

Deployment Area

Polotsk

55 37 36 N 028 23 49 E
 55 28 07 029 20 25
 54 32 15 029 09 47
 54 39 32 028 10 40

Missile Operating Base

Polotsk	9	9	Launch
55 22 34 N 028 44 17 E			Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Deployment Area

Smorgon'

54 37 43 N	026 52 34 E
54 22 37	026 52 37
54 37 18	025 41 58
54 45 21	026 15 13

Missile Operating Base

Smorgon'

9

9

Launch
 Canister - 9
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 9
 Training
 Missile - 0

Deployment Area

Smorgon'

54 29 01 N	026 26 40 E
54 05 04	025 53 59
54 24 14	025 31 18
54 35 27	026 19 10

Missile Operating Base

Smorgon'

9

9

Launch
 Canister - 9
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 9
 Training
 Missile - 0

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MissilesLaunchersSupport
Structures
and EquipmentDeployment Area

Lida

53 45 24 N 025 29 02 E
 53 34 00 024 49 35
 53 42 25 024 38 15
 53 58 05 025 10 17

Missile Operating Base

Lida

9

9

53 47 39 N 025 20 27 E

Launch

Canister - 9
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 9
 Training
 Missile - 0

Deployment Area

Gezgaly

53 38 53 N 025 25 38 E
 53 23 48 025 26 12
 53 12 46 025 08 38
 53 22 57 024 35 43

Missile Operating Base

Gezgaly

6

6

53 32 50 N 025 16 48 E

Launch

Canister - 6
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 6
 Training
 Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Slonim			
52 58 15 N	025 55 42 E		
52 45 02	025 31 08		
53 04 08	025 09 00		
53 08 45	025 30 20		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Slonim	9	9	Launch
52 55 54 N	025 21 59 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Ruzhany			
52 55 21 N	024 58 40 E		
52 46 32	024 48 25		
52 45 52	024 16 26		
53 07 34	024 22 14		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Ruzhany	6	6	Launch
52 49 29 N	024 45 45 E		Canister - 6
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 6
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Deployment Area

Zasimovichi

52 37 55 N	024 48 50 E
52 22 00	024 10 52
52 32 36	023 56 54
52 45 52	024 16 26

Missile Operating Base

Zasimovichi

6

6

52 30 38 N 024 08 43 E

Launch
 Canister - 6
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 6
 Training
 Missile - 0

Deployment Area

Mozyr'

52 05 31 N	029 13 04 E
51 39 05	029 39 31
51 42 00	029 01 30
51 52 57	028 51 32

Missile Operating Base

Mozyr'

9

9

52 02 27 N 029 11 15 E

Launch
 Canister - 9
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 9
 Training
 Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Petrikov			
52 16 29 N	029 03 04 E		
52 08 06	028 48 40		
52 08 33	028 13 37		
52 27 47	028 28 17		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Petrikov	6	6	Launch
52 10 29 N	028 34 52 E		Canister - 6
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 6
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Zhirkovich			
52 23 40 N	028 10 31 E		
52 08 35	028 10 07		
52 08 55	027 14 01		
52 24 01	027 14 06		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Zhirkovich	6	6	Launch
52 11 36 N	027 48 07 E		Canister - 6
1			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 6
			Training
			Missile - 0

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<u>Deployment Area</u>	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Rechitsa</u>			
52 26 34 N	030 21 10 E		
52 05 27	030 43 26		
51 47 47	030 23 27		
52 13 08	030 00 53		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Rechitsa	6	6	Launch
52 11 58 N	030 07 11 E		Canister - 6
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 6
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
<u>Slutsk</u>			
53 28 29 N	027 57 50 E		
53 02 31	028 07 59		
53 13 35	027 25 09		
53 28 40	027 28 55		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Slutsk	9	9	Launch
53 14 20 N	027 42 15 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Lutsk			
51 08 14 N	025 54 51 E		
50 50 45	025 34 49		
51 16 24	025 16 49		
51 20 51	025 26 59		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Lutsk	9	9	Launch
50 56 07 N	025 36 26 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Lutsk			
51 10 05 N	025 27 21 E		
50 43 54	025 07 49		
50 47 35	024 33 38		
51 11 22	024 35 49		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Lutsk	9	9	Launch
50 50 06 N	025 04 02 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

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MissilesLaunchersSupport
Structures
and EquipmentDeployment Area

Brody

50 14 00 N 025 29 11 E
 50 00 46 025 09 30
 50 17 32 024 41 55
 50 22 10 024 58 33

Missile Operating Base

Brody

9

9

50 06 09 N 025 12 14 E

Launch
 Canister - 9
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 9
 Training
 Missile - 0

Deployment Area

Chervonograd

50 41 07 N 024 33 58 E
 50 13 10 024 38 45
 50 19 02 024 11 30
 50 36 26 024 17 15

Missile Operating Base

Chervonograd

9

9

50 22 45 N 024 18 16 E

Launch
 Canister - 9
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 9
 Training
 Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Slavuta			
50 18 55 N	027 03 22 E		
50 08 07	027 03 21		
50 07 59	026 16 22		
50 29 38	026 29 34		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Slavuta	9	9	Launch
50 17 05 N	026 41 31 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Belokorovichi			
51 10 19 N	028 12 04 E		
50 51 05	027 51 07		
51 21 28	027 01 43		
51 21 22	027 37 54		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Belokorovichi	9	9	Launch
51 10 45 N	028 03 20 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Lipniki			
51 11 38 N	029 10 28 E		
50 52 28	028 55 56		
51 05 53	028 22 14		
51 20 57	028 26 07		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Lipniki	9	9	Launch
			Canister - 9
51 12 22 N	028 26 37 E		Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Vysokaya Pech'			
50 29 13 N	028 21 10 E		
50 09 49	028 20 37		
50 10 10	027 40 19		
50 29 33	027 43 58		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Vysokaya Pech'	6	6	Launch
			Canister - 6
50 10 11 N	028 16 22 E		Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 6
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Deployment Area

Vysokaya Pech'

50 13 33 N	029 01 05 E
49 56 07	029 10 23
49 52 42	028 06 47
50 07 39	028 20 33

Missile Operating Base

Vysokaya Pech'

6

6

50 05 43 N 028 22 09 E

Launch
 Canister - 6
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 6
 Training
 Missile - 0

Deployment Area

Korosten'

50 54 31 N	029 02 51 E
50 41 34	029 02 16
50 42 05	028 28 20
50 55 01	028 28 44

Missile Operating Base

Korosten'

6

6

50 52 22 N 028 31 17 E

Launch
 Canister - 6
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 6
 Training
 Missile - 0

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Support
Structures
and Equipment

Missiles

Launchers

Deployment Area

Lebedin

50 35 26 N	034 41 41 E
50 12 10	034 00 31
50 14 25	033 50 28
50 35 42	034 21 21

Missile Operating Base

Lebedin

9

9

50 33 06 N	034 26 02 E
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Launch

Canister - 9
Missile Transporter
Vehicle - 0
Fixed Structure
for Launcher - 9
Training
Missile - 0

Deployment Area

Glukhov

52 02 16 N	033 52 28 E
51 36 21	033 55 26
51 34 22	033 27 42
52 02 21	033 38 28

Missile Operating Base

Glukhov

9

9

51 41 00 N	033 30 56 E
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Launch

Canister - 9
Missile Transporter
Vehicle - 0
Fixed Structure
for Launcher - 9
Training
Missile - 0

- 21 -

	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Glukhov			
51 42 59 N	033 27 47 E		
51 23 31	033 37 56		
51 23 37	032 56 33		
51 43 02	033 10 25		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Glukhov	9	9	Launch
51 36 44 N	033 29 17 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Akhtyrka			
50 17 58 N	034 54 32 E		
49 49 59	034 50 05		
50 10 03	033 57 06		
50 18 24	034 24 13		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Akhtyrka	9	9	Launch
50 16 01 N	034 49 53 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Akhtyrka			
50 10 43 N	035 34 34 E		
49 54 08	035 00 16		
50 18 24	034 24 13		
50 26 42	034 48 07		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Akhtyrka	9	9	Launch
			Canister - 9
50 21 59 N	034 57 03 E		Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
 <u>Deployment Area</u>			
Novosibirsk			
55 51 09 N	083 52 28 E		
55 14 33	083 49 49		
55 21 52	083 08 41		
55 30 29	083 09 09		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Novosibirsk	9	9	Launch
			Canister - 9
55 22 05 N	083 13 52 E		Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Novosibirsk			
55 06 17 N	083 34 11 E		
54 57 40	083 33 38		
55 04 53	082 52 45		
55 24 16	082 53 40		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Novosibirsk	9	9	Launch
55 22 57 N	082 55 16 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Novosibirsk			
55 31 47 N	084 08 57 E		
55 13 26	082 56 55		
55 20 01	082 49 41		
55 40 13	084 00 42		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Novosibirsk	9	9	Launch
55 19 32 N	082 56 18 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Novosibirsk			
55 08 01 N	083 53 07 E		
54 52 56	083 52 02		
55 11 17	082 56 49		
55 22 00	083 01 07		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Novosibirsk	9	9	Launch
55 18 44 N	083 01 38 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Novosibirsk			
55 03 58 N	084 18 27 E		
54 53 12	084 19 10		
55 04 49	082 56 30		
55 22 00	083 01 07		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Novosibirsk	9	9	Launch
55 19 07 N	083 09 59 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Deployment Area

Drovyanaya

51 44 02 N	113 08 33 E
51 22 28	113 07 32
51 22 49	112 46 52
51 44 16	112 54 39

Missile Operating Base

Drovyanaya

9

9

Launch
Canister - 9
Missile Transporter
Vehicle - 0
Fixed Structure
for Launcher - 9
Training
Missile - 0

51 27 20 N 113 03 42 E

Deployment Area

Drovyanaya

51 37 34 N	113 08 14 E
51 22 28	113 07 32
51 18 39	112 36 23
51 27 14	112 40 08

Missile Operating Base

Drovyanaya

9

9

Launch
Canister - 9
Missile Transporter
Vehicle - 0
Fixed Structure
for Launcher - 9
Training
Missile - 0

51 26 10 N 113 02 43 E

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Drovyanaya			
51 24 52 N	112 53 51 E		
51 20 36	112 50 13		
51 18 54	112 15 44		
51 23 13	112 15 51		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Drovyanaya	9	9	Launch
			Canister - 9
51 22 59 N	112 49 55 E		Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Drovyanaya			
51 26 54 N	113 00 50 E		
51 18 13	113 03 54		
51 18 47	112 26 03		
51 29 39	112 19 29		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Drovyanaya	9	9	Launch
			Canister - 9
51 20 18 N	113 00 54 E		Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Drovyanaya			
51 33 19 N	113 04 35 E		
51 22 32	113 04 05		
51 22 49	112 46 52		
51 33 36	112 47 17		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Drovyanaya	9	9	Launch
			Canister - 9
51 23 49 N	112 52 13 E		Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Barnaul			
53 54 32 N	084 01 02 E		
53 43 46	084 01 48		
53 35 30	083 43 07		
53 44 16	083 36 24		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Barnaul	9	9	Launch
			Canister - 9
53 46 08 N	083 57 11 E		Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Deployment Area

Barnaul

53 29 21 N	084 31 45 E
52 58 43	083 47 57
53 13 47	083 48 56
53 29 02	084 17 18

Missile Operating Base

Barnaul

9

9

53 18 21 N 084 08 47 E

Launch
 Canister - 9
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 9
 Training
 Missile - 0

Deployment Area

Barnaul

53 16 38 N	084 43 16 E
52 59 32	084 51 20
52 55 09	084 47 58
53 16 02	084 14 31

Missile Operating Base

Barnaul

9

9

53 13 29 N 084 40 10 E

Launch
 Canister - 9
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 9
 Training
 Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Barnaul			
53 27 33 N	084 49 55 E		
53 16 42	084 46 52		
53 16 02	084 14 31		
53 26 58	084 21 02		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Barnaul	9	9	Launch
53 18 47 N	084 30 27 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Kansk			
56 32 14 N	096 12 14 E		
56 15 16	095 34 54		
56 28 30	095 20 13		
56 34 39	095 36 13		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Kansk	9	9	Launch
56 22 31 N	095 28 35 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0

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MissilesLaunchersSupport
Structures
and EquipmentDeployment Area

Kansk

56 30 47 N	095 12 33 E
56 19 53	095 19 41
56 13 45	094 59 58
56 31 03	094 56 58

Missile Operating Base

Kansk

9

9

56 20 09 N 095 16 34 E

Launch

Canister - 9
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 9
 Training
 Missile - 0

Deployment Area

Kansk

56 19 29 N	096 20 56 E
56 08 43	096 21 41
56 08 17	096 02 24
56 19 14	095 50 42

Missile Operating Base

Kansk

9

9

56 11 19 N 096 03 13 E

Launch

Canister - 9
 Missile Transporter
 Vehicle - 0
 Fixed Structure
 for Launcher - 9
 Training
 Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Kansk			
56 14 50 N	096 05 46 E		
55 59 57	096 14 35		
55 59 41	096 03 03		
56 15 00	095 46 30		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Kansk	9	9	Launch
56 02 19 N	096 04 58 E		Canister - 9
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 9
			Training
			Missile - 0
(ii) <u>SS-4</u>			
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Sovetsk			
55 05 33 N	021 52 38 E		
55 03 22	021 56 20		
54 57 04	021 29 58		
55 01 23	021 26 16		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Sovetsk	5	6	Missile
54 59 07 N	021 36 36 E	(Launch Stand)	Transporter
			Vehicle - 11
			Missile
			Erector - 7
			Propellant
			Tank - 52
			Training
			Missile - 6

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Gusev			
54 46 02 N	022 07 07 E		
54 24 14	022 28 42		
54 20 01	022 21 10		
54 43 58	021 55 53		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Gusev	5	7	Missile
54 43 59 N	022 03 27 E	(Launch Stand)	Transporter Vehicle - 12
			Missile Erector - 7
			Propellant Tank - 52
			Training Missile - 7
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Malorita			
51 53 50 N	024 05 39 E		
51 43 09	024 09 49		
51 42 59	023 57 07		
51 53 45	023 57 50		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Malorita	5	6	Missile
51 51 47 N	024 01 55 E	(Launch Stand)	Transporter Vehicle - 14
			Missile Erector - 7
			Propellant Tank - 48
			Training Missile - 5

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Pinsk			
52 15 03 N	025 49 43 E		
52 04 09	025 39 30		
52 03 56	025 22 00		
52 14 54	025 35 40		

Missile Operating Base

Pinsk	5	5	Missile
		(Launch	Transporter
52 10 56 N	025 41 27 E	Stand)	Vehicle - 13
			Missile
			Erector - 6
			Propellant
			Tank - 47
			Training
			Missile - 6

Deployment Area

Vyrú

57 49 33 N	027 00 00 E
57 43 05	027 00 00
57 43 04	026 43 54
57 49 32	026 43 51

Missile Operating Base

Vyrú	5	6	Missile
		(Launch	Transporter
57 45 47 N	026 47 13 E	Stand)	Vehicle - 11
			Missile
			Erector - 5
			Propellant
			Tank - 51
			Training
			Missile - 6

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Aluksne			
57 25 51 N	026 56 00 E		
57 21 32	026 56 01		
57 17 12	026 40 06		
57 25 49	026 40 01		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Aluksne	5	6	Missile
57 25 04 N	026 49 46 E	(Launch Stand)	Transporter Vehicle - 12
			Missile
			Erector - 6
			Propellant
			Tank - 45
			Training
			Missile - 6
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Ostrov			
57 38 21 N	028 20 22 E		
57 21 04	028 23 43		
57 21 14	028 07 47		
57 38 28	028 08 19		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Ostrov	5	8	Missile
57 31 53 N	028 12 19 E	(Launch Stand)	Transporter Vehicle - 12
			Missile
			Erector - 7
			Propellant
			Tank - 48
			Training
			Missile - 6

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Deployment Area

Karmelava

55 06 12 N	024 22 04 E
54 57 49	024 33 51
54 55 00	024 04 05
55 01 28	024 03 36

Missile Operating Base

Karmelava

5

5
(Launch
Stand)

55 00 51 N 024 14 16 E

Missile
Transporter
Vehicle - 13
Missile
Erector - 6
Propellant
Tank - 47
Training
Missile - 6

Deployment Area

Ukmerge

55 17 41 N	024 59 06 E
55 04 25	024 40 58
55 08 35	024 33 12
55 19 43	024 51 26

Missile Operating Base

Ukmerge

5

6
(Launch
Stand)

55 07 51 N 024 38 36 E

Missile
Transporter
Vehicle - 14
Missile
Erector - 7
Propellant
Tank - 50
Training
Missile - 6

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Taurage			
55 18 07 N	022 30 42 E		
55 09 30	022 30 22		
55 03 10	022 18 52		
55 13 35	022 21 01		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Taurage	5	5	Missile
55 04 58 N	022 19 38 E	(Launch Stand)	Transporter Vehicle - 12
			Missile
			Erector - 6
			Propellant
			Tank - 47
			Training
			Missile - 6
<u>Deployment Area</u>			
Kolomyia			
48 45 01 N	024 55 59 E		
48 36 23	024 56 20		
48 36 04	024 40 04		
48 44 42	024 39 40		
<u>Missile Operating Base</u>			
Kolomyia	5	6	Missile
48 39 32 N	024 48 04 E	(Launch Stand)	Transporter Vehicle - 12
			Missile
			Erector - 6
			Propellant
			Tank - 46
			Training
			Missile - 7

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<u>Deployment Area</u>	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Stryy</u>			
49 19 59 N	023 58 46 E		
49 11 22	023 58 29		
49 21 09	023 31 57		
49 29 46	023 32 24		

Missile Operating Base

Stryy	5	7	Missile
49 25 23 N	023 34 56 E	(Launch Stand)	Transporter Vehicle - 12
			Missile
			Erector - 7
			Propellant
			Tank - 49
			Training
			Missile - 7

Deployment AreaSkala-Podol'skaya

48 54 37 N	026 17 26 E
48 48 09	026 17 32
48 48 02	026 01 12
48 54 30	026 01 04

Missile Operating Base

Skala-Podol'skaya	5	6	Missile
48 51 02 N	026 08 36 E	(Launch Stand)	Transporter Vehicle - 12
			Missile
			Erector - 6
			Propellant
			Tank - 46
			Training
			Missile - 5

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2. Non-Deployed

The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all non-deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA			
(i) <u>Pershing II</u>			
<u>Missile Production</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
Hercules Plant #1	0	0	Launch Pad
Magna, Utah			Shelter - 0
40 39 40 N 112 03 14 W			Training
			Missile
			Stage - 0
<u>Launcher Production</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
Martin Marietta	0	0	Launch Pad
Middle River, Maryland			Shelter - 0
39 35 N 076 24 W			Training
			Missile
			Stage - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Missile Storage Facilities:</u>			
Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W	111	0	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 4
Redstone Arsenal Huntsville, Alabama 34 36 N 086 38 W	1	0	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 20
Weilerbach Federal Republic of Germany 49 27 N 007 38 E	12	0	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 0
<u>Launcher Storage Facilities:</u>			
Redstone Arsenal Huntsville, Alabama 34 35 N 086 37 W	0	1	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 0
<u>Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile Repair Facilities:</u>			
Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 18 N 104 19 W	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Launcher Repair
Facilities:

EMC Hausen Frankfurt, Federal Republic of Germany 50 08 N 008 38 E	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 0
Redstone Arsenal Huntsville, Alabama 34 37 N 086 38 W	0	10	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 0
Ft. Sill Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 34 40 N 098 24 W	0	2	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 0
Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 0

Missile/Launcher Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Test Ranges:

Complex 16 Cape Canaveral, Florida 28 29 N 080 34 W	3	0	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 0
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Training Facilities:

Ft. Sill Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 34 41 N 098 34 W	0	39	Launch Pad Shelter - 0 Training Missile Stage - 78
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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Elimination Facilities:

(Not determined)

Missiles, Launchers,
and Support Equipment
in Transit:

0

0

Training
Missile
Stage - 4

(ii) BGM-109GMissile Production
Facilities:

McDonnell-Douglas
Titusville, Florida

52
with launch
canister

0

Training
Missile - 0
Training
Launch
Canister - 0

28 32 N 080 40 W

General Dynamics
Kearney Mesa,
California

48
with launch
canister

0

Training
Missile - 0
Training
Launch
Canister - 0

32 50 N 117 08 W

Launcher Production
Facilities:

Air Force Plant 19
San Diego,
California

2
with launch
canister

4

Training
Missile - 0
Training
Launch
Canister - 0

32 45 N 117 12 W

Missile Storage
Facilities:

NONE

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Launcher Storage Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile Repair Facilities:</u>			
SABCA Gosselies, Belgium	16 with launch canister	0	Training Missile - 0
50 27 N 004 27 E			Training Launch Canister - 0
<u>Launcher Repair Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Test Ranges:</u>			
Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah	0 with launch canister	0	Training Missile - 0
40 22 N 113 04 W			Training Launch Canister - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Training Facilities:</u>			
Davis-Monthan AFB Tucson, Arizona	0 with launch canister	7	Training Missile - 2 Training Launch Canister - 27
32 11 N 110 53 W			
Ft. Huachuca Ft. Huachuca, Arizona	0 with launch canister	6	Training Missile - 0 Training Launch Canister - 8
31 29 N 110 19 W			
<u>Elimination Facilities:</u>			
(Not determined)			
<u>Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:</u>	15 with launch canister	0	Training Missile - 0 Training Launch Canister - 2
(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS			
(i) <u>SS-20</u>			
<u>Missile Production Facilities:</u>			
Votkinsk Machine Building Plant Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR	36*	0	Launch Canister - 36 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 0
57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E			
*In various stages of manufacture.			

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Launcher Production Facilities:</u>			
Barrikady Plant Volgograd 48 44 N 044 32 E	0	1	Launch Canister - 0 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 0
<u>Missile Storage Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Launcher Storage Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:</u>			
Postavy 55 10 N 026 55 E	2	3	Launch Canister - 3 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 10 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 1

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
Gezgary 53 36 N 025 28 E	2	2	Launch Canister - 6 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 10 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 4
Mozyr' 52 03 N 029 11 E	2	2	Launch Canister - 4 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 10 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 2
Lutsk 50 53 N 025 30 E	1	1	Launch Canister - 3 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 10 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 2
Belokorovichi 51 09 N 028 00 E	2	2	Launch Canister - 3 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 10 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 1
Lebedin 50 36 N 034 25 E	2	1	Launch Canister - 5 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 10 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 3

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
Novosibirsk 55 16 N 083 02 E	1	1	Launch Canister - 3 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 10 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 2
Drovyanaya 51 30 N 113 03 E	2	2	Launch Canister - 4 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 10 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 2
Kansk 56 16 N 095 39 E	1	1	Launch Canister - 2 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 1 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 1
Barnaul 53 34 N 083 48 E	1	1	Launch Canister - 1 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 3 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 0
Kolosovo 53 31 N 026 55 E	144	0	Launch Canister - 144 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
Zherebkovo	20	0	Launch Canister - 21
47 51 N 029 54 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle - 2
			Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0
			Training Missile - 1
<u>Missile Repair Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Launcher Repair Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:</u>			
Bataysk	0	11	Launch Canister - 2
47 08 N 039 47 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle - 4
			Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0
			Training Missile - 2
<u>Test Ranges:</u>			
Kapustin Yar	0	8	Launch Canister - 0
48 37 N 046 18 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle - 3
			Fixed Structure for Launcher - 1
			Training Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Training Facilities:</u>			
Serpukhov 54 54 N 037 28 E	0	6	Launch Canister - 4 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 1 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 4
Krasnodar 45 03 N 038 58 E	0	1	Launch Canister - 2 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 1 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 2
Training Center at Test Range Kapustin Yar 48 38 N 046 10 E	0	7	Launch Canister - 12 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 1 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 3 Training Missile - 12
<u>Elimination Facilities:</u>			
Sarny 51 21 N 026 35 E	29	68	Launch Canister - 32 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 35 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 3
Aral'sk 46 50 N 61 18 E	0	0	Launch Canister - 0 Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0 Fixed Structure for Launcher - 0 Training Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
Chita	0	0	Launch
52 22 N 113 17 E			Canister - 0
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 0
			Training
			Missile - 0
Kansk	0	0	Launch
56 20 N 095 06 E			Canister - 0
			Missile Transporter
			Vehicle - 0
			Fixed Structure
			for Launcher - 0
			Training
			Missile - 0

Missiles, Launchers,
and Support Equipment
in Transit:

NONE

(ii) SS-4

Missile Production
Facilities:

NONE

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
<u>Launcher Production Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile Storage Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Launcher Storage Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:</u>			
Kolosovo	35	1	Missile
53 31 N 026 55 E		(Launch Stand)	Transporter Vehicle - 9
			Missile Erector - 10
			Propellant Tank - 59
			Training Missile - 31
Zherebkovo	56	3	Missile
47 51 N 029 54 E		(Launch Stand)	Transporter Vehicle - 5
			Missile Erector - 4
			Propellant Tank - 11
			Training Missile - 30
<u>Missile Repair Facilities:</u>			
Bataysk	0	0	Missile
47 08 N 039 47 E		(Launch Stand)	Transporter Vehicle - 0
			Missile Erector - 0
			Propellant Tank - 0
			Training Missile - 6

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Support
Structures
and Equipment

Missiles

Launchers

Launcher Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Missile/Launcher
Repair Facilities:

NONE

Test Ranges:

Kapustin Yar

14

2

48 35 N 046 18 E

(Launch
Stand)

Missile
Transporter
Vehicle - 4
Missile
Erector - 2
Propellant
Tank - 4
Training
Missile - 1

Training Facilities:

NONE

Elimination Facilities:

Lesnaya

0

0

52 59 N 025 46 E

(Launch
Stand)

Missile
Transporter
Vehicle - 0
Missile
Erector - 0
Propellant
Tank - 0
Training
Missile - 0

Missiles, Launchers,
and Support Equipment
in Transit:

NONE

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
(iii) <u>SS-5</u>			
<u>Missile Production</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Launcher Production</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile Storage</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
Kolosovo	6	0	
53 31 N 026 55 E			
<u>Launcher Storage</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile/Launcher Storage</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile Repair</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
NONE			

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Structures and Equipment</u>
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Launcher Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Missile/Launcher Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Test Ranges:

NONE

Training Facilities:

NONE

Elimination Facilities:

Lesnaya	0	0
52 59 N 025 46 E		

Missiles, Launchers,
and Support Equipment
in Transit:

NONE

3. Training Launchers

In addition to the support equipment listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section, the Parties possess vehicles, used to train drivers of launchers of intermediate-range missiles, which shall be considered for purposes of this Treaty to be training launchers. The number of such vehicles for each Party is:

(a) for the United States of America - 29; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - 65.

Elimination of such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

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IV. Shorter-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles and Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers

1. Deployed

The following are the missile operating bases, their locations and the numbers, for each Party, of all deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, and the support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams, to include boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA			
(i) <u>Pershing IA</u>			
<u>Missile Operating Base:</u>			
NONE			
(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS			
(i) <u>SS-12</u>			
<u>Missile Operating Bases:</u>			
Koenigsbrueck, German Democratic Republic	19	11	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 9 Training Missile - 10
51 16 40 N 013 53 20 E			
Bischofswerda, German Democratic Republic	8	5	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0 Training Missile - 4
51 08 33 N 014 12 18 E			
Waren, German Democratic Republic	22	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 9 Training Missile - 7
53 32 40 N 012 37 30 E			
Wokuhl, German Democratic Republic	5	6	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0 Training Missile - 7
53 16 20 N 013 15 50 E			

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
Hranice, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 49 33 00 N 017 45 00 E	39	24	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 15 Training Missile - 13
Pashino 55 16 37 N 082 59 42 E	0	4	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 1 Training Missile - 5
Gornyy 51 33 10 N 113 01 30 E	36	14	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 4 Training Missile - 10
Lapichi 53 25 30 N 028 30 00 E	9	5	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 1 Training Missile - 10
Kattakurgan 39 38 18 N 065 58 40 E	9	5	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 1 Training Missile - 6
Saryozek 44 31 58 N 077 46 20 E	36	15	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 3 Training Missile - 16
Novosysoyevka 44 11 58 N 133 26 05 E	37	14	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 5 Training Missile - 17

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
(ii) <u>SS-23</u>			
<u>Missile Operating Bases:</u>			
Weissenfels, German Democratic Republic 51 11 50 N 011 59 50 E	6	4	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 3 Training Missile - 18
Jena-Forst, German Democratic Republic 50 54 55 N 011 32 40 E	47	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 8 Training Missile - 3
Stan'kovo 53 38 30 N 027 13 20 E	40	18	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 18 Training Missile - 10
Tsel' 53 23 38 N 028 28 06 E	26	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 11 Training Missile - 9
Slobudka 52 30 30 N 024 31 30 E	26	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 12 Training Missile - 10
Bayram-Ali 37 36 18 N 062 10 40 E	0	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 12 Training Missile - 0
Semipalatinsk 50 23 00 N 080 09 30 E	22	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 12 Training Missile - 4

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2. Non-Deployed

The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all non-deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
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(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(i) Pershing IAMissile Production Facilities:

Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant Marshall, Texas 32 39 N 094 08 W	0	0	Training Missile Stage - 0
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Launcher Production Facilities:

Martin Marietta Middle River, Maryland 39 35 N 076 24 W	0	0	Training Missile Stage - 0
---	---	---	----------------------------------

Missile Storage Facilities:

Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W	169	0	Training Missile Stage - 53
---	-----	---	-----------------------------------

Launcher Storage Facilities:

NONE

Missile/Launcher Storage
Facilities:

NONE

Missile Repair Facilities:

NONE

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
<u>Launcher Repair Facilities:</u>			
Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado	0	1	Training Missile Stage - 0
38 19 N 104 20 W			

Missile/Launcher Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Test Ranges:

NONE

Training Facilities:

NONE

Elimination Facilities:

(Not determined)

<u>Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:</u>	1	0	Training Missile Stage - 0
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(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(i) SS-12Missile Production
Facilities:

Votkinsk Machine Building Plant Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0 Training Missile - 0
57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E			

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MissilesLaunchersSupport
EquipmentLauncher Production
Facilities:Barrikady Plant
Volgograd

48 44 N 044 32 E

0

0

Missile
Transporter
Vehicle - 0
Training
Missile - 0Missile Storage
Facilities:

Lozovaya

48 55 N 036 22 E

126

0

Missile
Transporter
Vehicle - 0
Training
Missile - 12

Ladushkin

54 35 N 020 12 E

72

0

Missile
Transporter
Vehicle - 0
Training
Missile - 18

Bronnaya Gora

52 37 N 025 04 E

170

0

Missile
Transporter
Vehicle - 0
Training
Missile - 3

Balkhash

46 50 N 075 36 E

138

0

Missile
Transporter
Vehicle - 0
Training
Missile - 47Launcher Storage Facilities:

Berezovka

50 20 N 028 26 E

0

15

Missile
Transporter
Vehicle - 10
Training
Missile - 0Missile/Launcher Storage
Facilities:

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
<u>Missile Repair Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Launcher Repair Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Test Ranges:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Training Facilities:</u>			
Saratov	- 0	3	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 2 Training Missile - 0
51 34 N 046 01 E			
Kazan'	0	2	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 2 Training Missile - 0
55 58 N 049 11 E			
Kamenka	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0 Training Missile - 0
53 11 N 044 04 E			
<u>Elimination Facilities:</u>			
Saryozek (Missiles)	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0 Training Missile - 0
44 32 N 077 46 E			

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
Stan'kovo (Launchers and Missile Transporter Vehicles)	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0
53 38 N 027 13 E			Training Missile - 0

Missiles, Launchers,
and Support Equipment
in Transit:

NONE

(ii) SS-23

Missile Production Facilities:

Votkinsk Machine Building Plant Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0
57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E			Training Missile - 0

Launcher Production Facilities:

V.I. Lenin Petropavlovsk Heavy Machine Building Plant Petropavlovsk	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0
54 51 N 069 09 E			Training Missile - 0

Missile Storage Facilities:

Ladushkin	33	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle - 0
54 35 N 020 12 E			Training Missile - 42

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
<u>Launcher Storage Facilities:</u>			
Berezovka	0	13	Missile
50 20 N 028 26 E			Transporter
			Vehicle - 5
			Training
			Missile - 0

Missile/Launcher
Storage Facilities:

NONE

Missile Repair Facilities:

NONE

Launcher Repair Facilities:

NONE

Missile/Launcher
Repair Facilities:

NONE

Test Ranges:

NONE

Training Facilities:

Saratov	0	3	Missile
51 34 N 046 01 E			Transporter
			Vehicle - 2
			Training
			Missile - 0
Kazan'	0	3	Missile
55 58 N 049 11 E			Transporter
			Vehicle - 2
			Training
			Missile - 0

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
Kamenka	0	1	Missile
53 11 N 044 04 E			Transporter Vehicle - 1 Training Missile - 0
<u>Elimination Facilities:</u>			
Saryozek (Missiles)	0	0	Missile
44 32 N 077 46 E			Transporter Vehicle - 0 Training Missile - 0
Stan'kovo (Launchers and Missile Transporter Vehicles)	0	0	Missile
53 38 N 027 13 E			Transporter Vehicle - 0 Training Missile - 0

Missiles, Launchers,
and Support Equipment
in Transit:

NONE

V. Missile Systems Tested, But Not Deployed, Prior to Entry into
Force of the Treaty

The following are the missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, which were tested prior to entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA			
(i) <u>Pershing IB</u>			
<u>Missile Production Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Launcher Production Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile Storage Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Launcher Storage Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile Repair Facilities:</u>			
NONE			

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
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Launcher Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Missile/Launcher Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Test Ranges:

NONE

Training Facilities:

NONE

Elimination Facilities:

NONE

Missiles, Launchers,
and Support Equipment
in Transit:

NONE

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(i) SSC-X-4

Missile Production
Facilities:

NONE

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
<u>Launcher Production</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
Experimental Plant of the Amalgamated Production Works "M. I. Kalinin Machine Building Plant," Sverdlovsk	0 with launch canister	0	
56 47 24 N 060 47 03 E			
<u>Missile Storage</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Launcher Storage</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile/Launcher Storage</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
Jelgava	84 with launch canister	6	
56 40 N 024 06 E			
<u>Missile Repair</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Launcher Repair</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Missile/Launcher Repair</u>			
<u>Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Test Ranges:</u>			
NONE			

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	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Support Equipment</u>
<u>Training Facilities:</u>			
NONE			
<u>Elimination Facilities:</u>			
Jelgava	0	0	
56 40 N 024 06 E	with launch canister		
<u>Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:</u>			
NONE			

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VI. Technical Data

Following are agreed categories of technical data for missiles and launchers subject to the Treaty, support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers and the relevant data for each of these categories. Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment listed below are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

1. Intermediate-Range Missiles

	<u>P-II</u>	<u>BGM-109G</u>	<u>SS-20</u>	<u>SS-4</u>	<u>SS-5</u>	<u>SSC-X-4</u>
(a) <u>Missile Characteristics:</u>						
(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile	1	1	3	1	1	1
(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters)	10.61	6.40	16.49	22.77	24.30	8.09
(iii) Length of						
1st stage	3.68	-	8.58	18.60	21.62	-
2nd stage (meters)	2.47	-	4.60	-	-	-
(iv) Maximum diameter of	-	0.53	-	1.65	2.40	0.51
1st stage	1.02	-	1.79	-	-	-
2nd stage (meters)	1.02	-	1.47	-	-	-
(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front section; for liquid-fueled missiles, empty weight)	6.78	-	-	3.35	4.99	-
1st stage	4.15	-	26.63	-	-	-
2nd stage	2.63	-	8.63	-	-	-
Missile in canister	-	-	42.70	-	-	-
(vi) Weight of assembled GLCM, in metric tons (with fuel)						
In canister	-	1.71	-	-	-	2.44
Without canister	-	1.47	-	-	-	1.70

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	<u>P-II</u>	<u>BGM-109G</u>	<u>SS-20</u>	<u>SS-4</u>	<u>SS-5</u>	<u>SSC-X-4</u>
(b) <u>Launcher Characteristics:</u>						
(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in meters)	9.60 2.49 2.86	10.64 2.44 2.64	16.81 3.20 2.94	3.02 3.02 3.27	- - -	12.80 3.05 3.80
(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is capable of carrying or containing at one time	1	4	1	1	-	6
(iii) Weight (in metric tons)	12.04	14.30	40.25	6.90	-	29.10

(c) Characteristics of Support Structures Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers

Dimensions of support structures are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):

(i) Fixed structure for a launcher	-	-	27.70 9.07 6.82	-	-	-
(ii) Launch pad shelter	74.00 14.60 10.00	-	-	-	-	-

(d) Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers

Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):

(i) Launch canister (Diameter)	-	6.94 0.53	19.32 2.14	-	-	8.39 0.65
(ii) Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles per vehicle)	-	-	17.33 3.20 2.90 (1)	22.85 2.72 2.50 (1)	-	-
(iii) Missile erector	-	-	-	15.62 3.15 3.76	-	-
(iv) Propellant tank (Transportable)						
Fuel	-	-	-	11.38 2.63 2.96	-	-
Oxidizer	-	-	-	10.70 2.63 3.35	-	-

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	<u>Pershing IA</u>	<u>Pershing IB</u>	<u>SS-12</u>	<u>SS-23</u>
2. Shorter-Range Missiles				
(a) <u>Missile Characteristics:</u>				
(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile	1	1	1	1
(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters)	10.55	8.13	12.38	7.52
(iii) Length of				
1st stage	2.83	3.68	4.38	5.17
2nd stage (meters)	2.67	-	5.37	-
(iv) Maximum diameter of				
1st stage	1.02	1.02	1.01	0.97
2nd stage (meters)	1.02	-	1.01	-
(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front section)	4.09	4.15	8.80	3.99
1st stage	2.45	-	4.16	-
2nd stage	1.64	-	4.64	-
(b) <u>Launcher Characteristics:</u>				
(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in meters)	9.98 2.44 3.35	9.60 2.49 2.86	13.26 3.10 3.45	11.76 3.13 3.00
(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is capable of carrying or containing at one time	1	1	1	1
(iii) Weight (in metric tons)	8.53	12.04	30.80	24.07
(c) <u>Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers:</u>				
Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):				
Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles per vehicle)	-	-	13.15 3.10 3.50 (1)	11.80 3.13 3.00 (1)

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VII. Research and Development Booster Systems

Following are the numbers and locations for each Party of launchers of research and development booster systems.

Number of
Launchers

1. Research and Development Launch Sites

(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Eastern Test Range, Florida	1
28 27 N 080 42 W	
Eglin AFB, Florida	5
30 36 N 086 48 W	
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico	4
32 30 N 106 30 W	
Green River, Utah	2
38 00 N 109 30 W	
Poker Flats Research Range, Alaska	6
65 07 N 147 29 W	
Roi Namur, Kwajalein	3
09 25 N 167 28	
Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii	4
22 06 N 159 47 W	
Western Test Range, California	1
34 37 N 120 37 W	

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
	<u>Number of Launchers</u>
Cape Cod, Massachusetts	1
42 01 N 070 07 W	
Wake Island	2
19 18 N 166 37 E	
Wallops Island, Virginia	1
37 51 N 075 28 W	
(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	
Plesetskaya	3
62 53 N 040 52 E	
Kapustin Yar	2
48 32 N 046 18 E	

Each Party, in signing this Memorandum of Understanding, acknowledges it is responsible for the accuracy of only its own data. Signature of this Memorandum of Understanding constitutes acceptance of the categories of data and inclusion of the data contained herein.

This Memorandum of Understanding is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.


Done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:



President of the United States
of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:



General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ELIMINATION OF THE MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty.

I. ITEMS OF MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO ELIMINATION

The specific items for each type of missile system to be eliminated are:

1. For the United States of America:
 - Pershing-II*: Missile, launcher and launch pad shelter;
 - BGM-109G*: Missile, launch canister and launcher;
 - Pershing IA*: Missile and launcher; and
 - Pershing IB*: Missile.
2. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
 - SS-20*: Missile, launch canister, launcher, missile transporter vehicle and fixed structure for a launcher;
 - SS-4*: Missile, missile transporter vehicle, missile erector, launch stand and propellant tanks;
 - SS-5*: Missile;
 - SSC-X-4*: Missile, launch canister and launcher;
 - SS-12*: Missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle; and
 - SS-23*: Missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle.

3. For both Parties, all training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers shall be subject to elimination.

4. For both Parties, all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs shall be subject to elimination.

5. For both Parties, all front sections of deployed intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles shall be subject to elimination.

II. PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION AT ELIMINATION FACILITIES

1. In order to ensure the reliable determination of the type and number of missiles, missile stages, front sections, launch canisters, launchers, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors and launch stands, as well as training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, indicated in Section I of this protocol, being eliminated at elimination facilities, and to preclude the possibility of restoration of such items for purposes inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties shall fulfill the requirements below.

2. The conduct of the elimination procedures for the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, except for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. The Parties shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers. The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the name and coordinates of the elimination facility at which the on-site inspection may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of that date.

3. Prior to a missile's arrival at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed.

4. Each Party shall select the particular technological means necessary to implement the procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section and to allow for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 10 of this Section in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, this Protocol and the Protocol on Inspection.

5. The initiation of the elimination of the items of missile systems subject to this Section shall be considered to be the commencement of the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Section.

6. Immediately prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the Party receiving the pertinent notification required by paragraph 5(c) of Article IX of the Treaty shall confirm and record the type and number of items of missile systems, listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, which are to be eliminated. If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, this shall include a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters.

7. A missile stage being eliminated by burning in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section shall not be instrumented for data collection. Prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm that such missile stages are not instrumented for data collection. Those missile stages shall be subject to continuous observation by such an inspector from the time of that inspection until the burning is completed.

8. The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, except those for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, along with the type and number of items of missile systems for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and by the inspection team leader of the other Party. The elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section and notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section.

9. The Parties agree that all United States and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their associated reentry vehicles shall be eliminated within an agreed overall period of elimination. It is further agreed that all such missiles shall, in fact, be eliminated fifteen days prior to the end of the overall period of elimination. During the last fifteen days, a Party shall withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles which, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation and eliminate them during the same timeframe in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Section.

10. The specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows, unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve the same result as the procedures identified in this paragraph:

For the Pershing II:

Missile:

- (a) Missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;
- (b) Solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and
- (c) Front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

- (a) Erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (b) All components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) Launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the BGM-109G:

Missile:

(a) Missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces;

(b) Wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joints; and

(c) Front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister:

Launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Launcher:

(a) Erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) All components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) Launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the Pershing IA:

Missile:

(a) Missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

(b) Solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) Front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

(a) Erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) All components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) Launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the Pershing IB:

Missile:

(a) Missile stage shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

(b) Solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) Front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

For the SS-20:

Missile:

(a) Missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition of the missile in its launch canister or by burning missile stages;

(b) Solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) Front section, including reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister:

Launch canister shall be destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile, or shall be destroyed separately by explosion, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, crushed or flattened.

Launcher:

(a) Erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) All components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(d) Mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;

(e) Launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) A portion of the launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

(a) All mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;

(b) All mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis;

(c) All components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(d) External instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;

(e) Transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are

not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) A portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

For the SS-4:

Missile:

(a) Nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints;

(b) All propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) Instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(d) Front section, minus nuclear warhead device, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Stand:

Launch stand components shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size.

Missile Erector:

(a) Jib, missile erector leveling supports and missile erector mechanism shall be cut off missile erector at locations that are not assembly joints; and

(b) Jib and missile erector leveling supports shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

Mounting components for a missile and for a missile erector mechanism as well as supports for erecting a missile onto a launcher shall be cut off transporter vehicle at locations that are not assembly joints.

For the SS-5:

Missile:

(a) Nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints;

(b) All propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(c) Instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.

For the SSC-X-4:

Missile:

(a) Missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces;

(b) Wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joints; and

(c) Front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

Launch Canister:

Launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Launcher:

(a) Erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) All components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints from two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(d) Mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;

(e) Launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) The launcher chassis shall be severed at a location determined by measuring no more than 0.70 meters rearward from the rear axle.

For the SS-12:

Missile:

(a) Missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning missile stages;

(b) Solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) Front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile.

Launcher:

(a) Erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) All components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(d) Mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;

(e) Launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) A portion of the launcher chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

(a) All mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;

(b) All mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis;

(c) All components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(d) External instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;

(e) Transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) A portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

For the SS-23:

Missile:

(a) Missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning the missile stage;

(b) Solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) Front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile.

Launcher:

(a) Erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher body;

(b) All components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) Missile launch support equipment shall be removed from launcher body;

(d) Mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher body;

(e) Launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(f) Each environmental cover of the launcher body shall be removed and cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(g) A portion of the launcher body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

Missile Transporter Vehicle:

(a) All mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle body;

(b) All mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle body;

(c) All components of mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(d) Control equipment of the mechanism associated with missile loading shall be removed from transporter vehicle body;

(e) Transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle body and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) A portion of the transporter vehicle body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

11. The specific procedures for the elimination of the training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers indicated in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows:

Training Missile and Training Missile Stage:

Training missile and training missile stage shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Training Launch Canister:

Training launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

Training Launcher:

Training launcher chassis shall be cut at the same location designated in paragraph 10 of this Section for launcher of the same type of missile.

III. ELIMINATION OF MISSILES BY MEANS OF LAUNCHING

1. Elimination of missiles by means of launching pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. Immediately prior to each launch conducted for the purpose of elimination, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm by visual observation the type of missile to be launched.

2. All missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched from designated elimination facilities to existing impact areas for such missiles. No such missile shall be used as a target vehicle for a ballistic missile interceptor.

3. Missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched one at a time, and no less than six hours shall elapse between such launches.

4. Such launches shall involve ignition of all missile stages. Neither Party shall transmit or recover data from missiles being eliminated by means of launching except for unencrypted data used for range safety purposes.

5. The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, and the type and number of missiles for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and by the inspection team leader of the other Party.

6. A missile shall be considered to be eliminated by means of launching after completion of the procedures set forth in this Section and upon notification required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

IV. PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION IN SITU

1. *Support Structures:*

(a) Support structures listed in Section I of this Protocol shall be eliminated *in situ*.

(b) The initiation of the elimination of support structures shall be considered to be the commencement of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 1(d) of this Section.

(c) The elimination of support structures shall be subject to verification by on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(d) The specific elimination procedures for support structures shall be as follows:

(i) the superstructure of the fixed structure or shelter shall be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation;

(ii) the base or foundation of the fixed structure or shelter shall be destroyed by excavation or explosion;

(iii) the destroyed base or foundation of a fixed structure or shelter shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for six months or until completion of an on-site inspection conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty; and

(iv) upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination procedures shall be considered to have been completed.

2. *Propellant Tanks for SS-4 Missiles:*

Fixed and transportable propellant tanks for SS-4 missiles shall be removed from launch sites.

3. *Training Missiles, Training Missile Stages, Training Launch Canisters and Training Launchers:*

(a) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers not eliminated at elimination facilities shall be eliminated *in situ*.

(b) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers being eliminated *in situ* shall be eliminated in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Section II of this Protocol.

(c) Each Party shall have the right to conduct an on-site inspection to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers.

(d) The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the place-name and coordinates of the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 3(c) of this Section may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of that date.

(e) Elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon the completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and upon notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 3(d) of this Section.

V. OTHER TYPES OF ELIMINATION

1. *Loss or Accidental Destruction:*

(a) If an item listed in Section I of this Protocol is lost or destroyed as a result of an accident, the possessing Party shall notify the other Party within 48 hours, as required in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty, that the item has been eliminated.

(b) Such notification shall include the type of the eliminated item, its approximate or assumed location and the circumstances related to the loss or accidental destruction.

(c) In such a case, the other Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection of the specific point at which the accident occurred to provide confidence that the item has been eliminated.

2. *Static Display:*

(a) The Parties shall have the right to eliminate missiles, launch canisters and launchers, as well as training missiles, training launch canisters and training launchers, listed in Section I of this Protocol by placing them on static display. Each Party shall be limited to a total of 15 missiles, 15 launch canisters and 15 launchers on such static display.

(b) Prior to being placed on static display, a missile, launch canister or launcher shall be rendered unusable for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. Missile propellant shall be removed and erector-launcher mechanisms shall be rendered inoperative.

(c) The Party possessing a missile, launch canister or launcher, as well as a training missile, training launch canister or training launcher that is to be eliminated by placing it on static display shall provide the other Party with the place-name and coordinates of the location at which such a missile, launch canister or launcher is to be on static display, as well as the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 2(d) of this Section, may take place.


(d) Each Party shall have the right to conduct an on-site inspection of such a missile, launch canister or launcher within 60 days of receipt of the notification required in paragraph 2(c) of this Section.

(e) Elimination of a missile, launch canister or launcher, as well as training missile, training launch canister or training launcher, by placing it on static display shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in paragraph 1(b) of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed amendments to the Treaty.


DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:



President of the United States
of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:



General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU

PROTOCOL REGARDING INSPECTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the conduct of inspections provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

I. DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Protocol, the Treaty, the Memorandum of Understanding and the Protocol on Elimination:

1. The term "inspected Party" means the Party to the Treaty whose sites are subject to inspection as provided for by Article XI of the Treaty.

2. The term "inspecting Party" means the Party to the Treaty carrying out an inspection.

3. The term "inspector" means an individual designated by one of the Parties to carry out inspections and included on that Party's list of inspectors in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol.

4. The term "inspection team" means the group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection.

5. The term "inspection site" means an area, location or facility at which an inspection is carried out.

6. The term "period of inspection" means the period of time from arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on any pre- and post-inspection procedures.

7. The term "point of entry" means: Washington, D.C., or San Francisco, California, the United States of America; Brussels (National Airport), The Kingdom of Belgium; Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase), The Federal Republic of Germany; Rome (Ciampino), The Republic of Italy; Schiphol, The Kingdom of the Netherlands; RAF Greenham Common, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Moscow, or Irkutsk, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Schkeuditz Airport, the German Democratic Republic; and International Airport Ruzhyn, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

8. The term "in-country period" means the period from the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry until its departure from the country through the point of entry.

9. The term "in-country escort" means individuals specified by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members as necessary throughout the in-country period.

10. The term "aircrew member" means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on a Party's list of aircrew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol.

II. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall facilitate inspection by the other Party pursuant to this Protocol.

2. Each Party takes note of the assurances received from the other Party regarding understandings reached between the other Party and the basing countries to the effect that the basing countries have agreed to the conduct of inspections, in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, on their territories.

III. PRE-INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. Inspections to ensure verification of compliance by the Parties with the obligations assumed under the Treaty shall be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Section.

2. No later than one day after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall provide to the other Party: a list of its proposed inspectors who will carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty; and a list of its proposed inspectors who will carry out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. None of these lists shall contain at any time more than 200 individuals.

3. Each Party shall review the lists of inspectors and aircrew members proposed by the other Party. With respect to an individual included on the list of proposed inspectors who will carry out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, if such an individual is unacceptable to the Party reviewing the list, that Party shall, within 20 days, so inform the Party providing the list, and the individual shall be deemed not accepted and shall be deleted from the list. With respect to an individual on the list of proposed aircrew members or the list of proposed inspectors who will carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party, within 20 days after the receipt of such lists, shall inform the other Party of its agreement to the designation of each inspector and aircrew member proposed. Inspectors shall be citizens of the inspecting Party.

4. Each Party shall have the right to amend its lists of inspectors and aircrew members. New inspectors and aircrew members shall be designated in the same manner as set forth in paragraph 3 of this Section with respect to the initial lists.

5. Within 30 days of receipt of the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members, or of subsequent changes thereto, the Party receiving such information shall provide, or shall ensure the provision of, such visas and other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed as may be required to ensure that each inspector or aircrew member may enter and remain in the territory of the Party or basing country in which an inspection site is located throughout the in-country period for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol. Such visas and documents shall be valid for a period of at least 24 months.

6. To exercise their functions effectively, inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded, throughout the in-country period, privileges and immunities in the country of the inspection site as set forth in the Annex to this Protocol.

7. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, inspectors and aircrew members shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the State on whose territory an inspection is carried out and shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. In the event the inspected Party determines that an inspector or aircrew member of the other Party has violated the conditions governing inspection activities set forth in this Protocol, or has ever committed a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, or has ever been sentenced for committing a criminal offense or expelled by the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspected Party making such a determination shall so notify the inspecting Party, which shall immediately strike the individual from the lists of inspectors or the list of aircrew members. If, at that time, the individual is on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, the inspecting Party shall immediately remove that individual from the country.

8. Within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall inform the other Party of the standing diplomatic clearance number for airplanes of the party transporting inspectors and equipment necessary for inspection into and out of the territory of the Party or basing country in which an inspection site is located. Aircraft routings to and from the designated point of entry shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon by the Parties as the basis for such diplomatic clearance.

IV. NOTIFICATIONS

1. Notification of an intention to conduct an inspection shall be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. The receipt of this notification shall be acknowledged through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers by the inspected Party within one hour of its receipt.

(a) For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, such notifications shall be made no less than 16 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and shall include:

(i) the point of entry;

(ii) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;

(iii) the date and time when the specification of the inspection site will be provided; and

(iv) the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

(b) For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, such notifications shall be made no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and shall include:

(i) the point of entry;

(ii) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;

(iii) the site to be inspected and the type of inspection; and

(iv) the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

2. The date and time of the specification of the inspection site as notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of this Section shall fall within the following time intervals:

(a) for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, neither less than four hours nor more than 24 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry; and

(b) for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty, neither less than four hours nor more than 48 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry.

3. The inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party with a flight plan, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, for its flight from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection site is located to the point of entry, no less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The inspecting Party shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation: "Inspection aircraft. Priority clearance processing required."

4. No less than three hours prior to the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection is to take place, the inspected Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.

5. Either Party may change the point or points of entry to the territories of the countries within which its deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities are located, by giving notice of such change to the other Party. A change in a point of entry shall become effective five months after receipt of such notification by the other Party.

V. ACTIVITIES BEGINNING UPON ARRIVAL AT THE POINT OF ENTRY

1. The in-country escort and a diplomatic aircrew escort accredited to the Government of either the inspected Party or the basing country in which the inspection site is located shall meet the inspection team and aircrew members at the point of entry as soon as the airplane of the inspecting Party lands. The number of aircrew members for each airplane shall not exceed ten. The in-country escort shall expedite the entry of the inspection team and aircrew, their baggage, and equipment and supplies necessary for inspection, into the country in which the inspection site is located. A diplomatic aircrew escort shall have the right to accompany and assist aircrew members throughout the in-country period. In the case of an inspection taking place on the territory of a basing country, the in-country escort may include representatives of that basing country.

2. An inspector shall be considered to have assumed his duties upon arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, and shall be considered to have ceased performing those duties when he has left the territory of the inspected Party or basing country.

3. Each Party shall ensure that equipment and supplies are exempt from all customs duties.

4. Equipment and supplies which the inspecting Party brings into the country in which an inspection site is located shall be subject to examination at the point of entry each time they are brought into that country. This examination shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to conduct an inspection. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the in-country escort in the presence of the inspection team members to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment and supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it is established upon examination that the equipment or supplies are unconnected with these inspection requirements, then they shall not be cleared for use and shall be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the country where the inspection is conducted. Storage of the inspecting Party's equipment and supplies at each point of entry shall be within tamper-proof containers within a secure facility. Access to each secure facility shall be controlled by a "dual key" system requiring the presence of both Parties to gain access to the equipment and supplies.

5. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of, meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew of the inspecting Party. All the costs in connection with the stay of inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, on the territory of the inspected Party, including meals, services, lodging, work space, transportation and medical care shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

6. The inspected Party shall provide parking, security protection, servicing and fuel for the airplane of the inspecting Party at the

point of entry. The inspecting Party shall bear the cost of such fuel and servicing.

7. For inspections conducted on the territory of the Parties, the inspection team shall enter at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party that is closest to the inspection site. In the case of inspections carried out in accordance with paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader shall, at or before the time notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a)(iii) of Section IV of this Protocol, inform the inspected Party at the point of entry through the in-country escort of the type of inspection and the inspection site, by place-name and geographic coordinates.

VI. GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS

1. Inspectors shall discharge their functions in accordance with this Protocol.

2. Inspectors shall not disclose information received during inspections except with the express permission of the inspecting Party. They shall remain bound by this obligation after their assignment as inspectors has ended.

3. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not interfere directly with on-going activities at the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility or taking actions affecting its safe operation.

4. Inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the objectives set forth in Article XI of the Treaty as applicable for the type of inspection specified by the inspecting Party under paragraph 1(b) of Section IV or paragraph 7 of Section V of this Protocol.

5. The in-country escort shall have the right to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members as considered necessary by the inspected Party throughout the in-country period. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the movement and travel of inspectors and aircrew members shall be at the discretion of the in-country escort.

6. Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be allowed to travel within 50 kilometers from the inspection site with the permission of the in-country escort, and as considered necessary by the inspected Party, shall be accompanied by the in-country escort. Such travel shall be taken solely as a leisure activity.

7. Inspectors shall have the right throughout the period of inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party located within the territory of the country where the inspection is taking place using the telephone communications provided by the inspected Party.

8. At the inspection site, representatives of the inspected facility shall be included among the in-country escort.

9. The inspection team may bring onto the inspection site such documents as needed to conduct the inspection, as well as linear measurement devices; cameras; portable weighing devices; radiation detection devices; and other equipment, as agreed by the Parties. The characteristics and method of use of the equipment listed above, shall also be agreed upon within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. During inspections conducted pursuant to para-

graph 3, 4, 5(a), 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team may use any of the equipment listed above, except for cameras, which shall be for use only by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, all measurements shall be made by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. At the request of inspectors, the in-country escort shall take photographs of the inspected facilities using the inspecting Party's camera systems which are capable of producing duplicate, instant development photographic prints. Each Party shall receive one copy of every photograph.

10. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors shall permit the in-country escort to observe the equipment used during the inspection by the inspection team.

11. Measurements recorded during inspections shall be certified by the signature of a member of the inspection team and a member of the in-country escort when they are taken. Such certified data shall be included in the inspection report.

12. Inspectors shall have the right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that arise during an inspection. Such requests shall be made promptly through the in-country escort. The in-country escort shall provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with such clarifications as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity. In the event questions relating to an object or building located within the inspection site are not resolved, the inspected Party shall photograph the object or building as requested by the inspecting Party for the purpose of clarifying its nature and function. If the ambiguity cannot be removed during the inspection, then the question, relevant clarifications and a copy of any photographs taken shall be included in the inspection report.

13. In carrying out their activities, inspectors shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection site, including those for the protection of controlled environments within a facility and for personal safety. Individual protective clothing and equipment shall be provided by the inspected Party, as necessary.

14. For inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, pre-inspection procedures, including briefings and safety-related activities, shall begin upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site and shall be completed within one hour. The inspection team shall begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures. The period of inspection shall not exceed 24 hours, except for inspections pursuant to paragraph 6, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The period of inspection may be extended, by agreement with the in-country escort, by no more than eight hours. Post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of this Protocol, shall begin immediately upon completion of the inspection and shall be completed at the inspection site within four hours.

15. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty shall include no more than ten inspectors, except for an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of that Article, which shall include no more than

20 inspectors and an inspection team conducting inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of that Article, which shall include no more than 30 inspectors. At least two inspectors on each team must speak the language of the inspected Party. An inspection team shall operate under the direction of the team leader and deputy team leader. Upon arrival at the inspection site, the inspection team may divide itself into subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each. There shall be no more than one inspection team at an inspection site at any time.

16. Except in the case of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the inspection team shall return promptly to the point of entry from which it commenced inspection activities and shall then leave, within 24 hours, the territory of the country in which the inspection site is located, using its own airplane. In the case of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, if the inspection team intends to conduct another inspection it shall either:

(a) notify the inspected Party of its intent upon return to the point of entry; or

(b) notify the inspected Party of the type of inspection and the inspection site upon completion of the post-inspection procedures. In this case it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to ensure that the inspection team reaches the next inspection site without unjustified delay. The inspected Party shall determine the means of transportation and route involved in such travel.

With respect to subparagraph (a), the procedures set forth in paragraph 7 of Section V of this Protocol and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section VII of this Protocol shall apply.

VII. INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 3, 4 OR 5 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

1. Within one hour after the time for the specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection movement restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team arrives at the inspection site. During the period that pre-inspection movement restrictions are in effect, missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment subject to the Treaty shall not be removed from the inspection site.

2. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site so that the inspection team arrives at the inspection site no later than nine hours after the time for the specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this Protocol.

3. In the event that an inspection is conducted in a basing country, the aircrew of the inspected Party may include representatives of the basing country.

4. Neither Party shall conduct more than one inspection pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, more than one inspection pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI

of the Treaty at any one time, or more than 10 inspections pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time.

5. The boundaries of the inspection site at the facility to be inspected shall be the boundaries of that facility set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Except in the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment at the site that are subject to the Treaty and provide the inspection team leader with a diagram of the inspection site indicating the location of these missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment at the inspection site.

7. Subject to the procedures of paragraphs 8 through 14 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, including the interior of structures, containers or vehicles, or including covered objects, whose dimensions are equal to or greater than the dimensions specified in Section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding for the missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment of the inspected Party.

8. A missile, a stage of such a missile or a launcher subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher. A container that the inspected Party declares to contain a missile or stage of a missile subject to the Treaty, and which is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a container to confirm that it cannot contain more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. Except as provided for in paragraph 14 of this Section, a container that is sufficiently large to contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty that the inspected Party declares not to contain a missile or stage of such a missile subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by means of weighing or visual observation of the interior of the container, as necessary, to confirm that it does not, in fact, contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. If such a container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

9. A structure or container that is not sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a structure or container to confirm that it is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing a missile, stage of

such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty.

10. Within a structure, a space which is sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, but which is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the inspection team not to be accessible by the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall not be subject to further inspection. If the inspected Party demonstrates to the satisfaction of the inspection team by means of a visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrance that the enclosed space does not contain any missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, such an enclosed space shall not be subject to further inspection.

11. The inspection team shall be permitted to patrol the perimeter of the inspection site and station inspectors at the exits of the site for the duration of the inspection.

12. The inspection team shall be permitted to inspect any vehicle capable of carrying missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty at any time during the course of an inspection and no such vehicle shall leave the inspection site during the course of the inspection until inspected at site exits by the inspection team.

13. Prior to inspection of a building within the inspection site, the inspection team may station subgroups at the exits of the building that are large enough to permit passage of any missile, stage of such a missile, launcher or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. During the time that the building is being inspected, no vehicle or object capable of containing any missile, stage of such a missile, launcher or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be permitted to leave the building until inspected.

14. During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that a shrouded or environmentally protected object which is equal to or larger than the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty is not, in fact, a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. This may be accomplished by partial removal of the shroud or environmental protection cover, measuring, or weighing the covered object or by other methods. If the inspected Party satisfies the inspection team by its demonstration that the object is not a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, then there shall be no further inspection of that object. If the container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, then it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

VIII. INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS 7 OR 8 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

1. Inspections of the process of elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in this paragraph and the Protocol on Elimination.

(a) Upon arrival at the elimination facility, inspectors shall be provided with a schedule of elimination activities.

(b) Inspectors shall check the data which are specified in the notification provided by the inspected Party regarding the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated against the number and type of such items which are at the elimination facility prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures.

(c) Subject to paragraphs 3 and 11 of Section VI of this Protocol, inspectors shall observe the execution of the specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems as provided for in the Protocol on Elimination. If any deviations from the agreed elimination procedures are found, the inspectors shall have the right to call the attention of the in-country escort to the need for strict compliance with the above-mentioned procedures. The completion of such procedures shall be confirmed in accordance with the procedures specified in the Protocol on Elimination.

(d) During the elimination of missiles by means of launching, the inspectors shall have the right to ascertain by visual observation that a missile prepared for launch is a missile of the type subject to elimination. The inspectors shall also be allowed to observe such a missile from a safe location specified by the inspected Party until the completion of its launch. During the inspection of a series of launches for the elimination of missiles by means of launching, the inspected Party shall determine the means of transport and route for the transportation of inspectors between inspection sites.

2. Inspections of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in Sections II, IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise agreed by the Parties.

IX. INSPECTION ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

1. The inspected Party shall maintain an agreed perimeter around the periphery of the inspection site and shall designate a portal with not more than one rail line and one road which shall be within 50 meters of each other. All vehicles which can contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall exit only through this portal.

2. For the purposes of this Section, the provisions of paragraph 10 of Article VII of the Treaty shall be applied to intermediate-range GLBMs of the inspected Party and the longest stage of such GLBMs.

3. There shall not be more than two other exits from the inspection site. Such exits shall be monitored by appropriate sensors. The perimeter of and exits from the inspection site may be monitored as provided for by paragraph 11 of Section VII of this Protocol.

4. The inspecting Party shall have the right to establish continuous monitoring systems at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section and appropriate sensors at the exits specified in paragraph 3 of this Section and carry out necessary engineering surveys, construction, repair and replacement of monitoring systems.

5. The inspected Party shall, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, provide the following:

(a) all necessary utilities for the construction and operation of the monitoring systems, including electrical power, water, fuel, heating and sewage;

(b) basic construction materials including concrete and lumber;

(c) the site preparation necessary to accommodate the installation of continuously operating systems for monitoring the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, appropriate sensors for other exits specified in paragraph 3 of this Section and the center for collecting data obtained during inspections. Such preparation may include ground excavation, laying of concrete foundations, trenching between equipment locations and utility connections;

(d) transportation for necessary installation tools, materials and equipment from the point of entry to the inspection site; and

(e) a minimum of two telephone lines and, as necessary, high frequency radio equipment capable of allowing direct communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party in the country in which the site is located.

6. Outside the perimeter of the inspection site, the inspecting Party shall have the right to:

(a) build no more than three buildings with a total floor space of not more than 150 square meters for a data center and inspection team headquarters, and one additional building with floor space not to exceed 500 square meters for the storage of supplies and equipment;

(b) install systems to monitor the exits to include weight sensors, vehicle sensors, surveillance systems and vehicle dimensional measuring equipment;

(c) install at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section equipment for measuring the length and diameter of missile stages contained inside of launch canisters or shipping containers;

(d) install at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section non-damaging image producing equipment for imaging the contents of launch canisters or shipping containers declared to contain missiles or missile stages as provided for in paragraph 11 of this Section;

(e) install a primary and back-up power source and

(f) use, as necessary, data authentication devices.

7. During the installation or operation of the monitoring systems, the inspecting Party shall not deny the inspected Party access to

any existing structures or security systems. The inspecting Party shall not take any actions with respect to such structures without consent of the inspected Party. If the Parties agree that such structures are to be rebuilt or demolished, either partially or completely, the inspecting Party shall provide the necessary compensation.

8. The inspected Party shall not interfere with the installed equipment or restrict the access of the inspection team to such equipment.

9. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use its own two-way systems of radio communication between inspectors patrolling the perimeter and the data collection center. Such systems shall conform to power and frequency restrictions established on the territory of the inspected Party.

10. Aircraft shall not be permitted to land within the perimeter of the monitored site except for emergencies at the site and with prior notification to the inspection team.

11. Any shipment existing through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section which is large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be declared by the inspected Party to the inspection team before the shipment arrives at the portal. The declaration shall state whether such a shipment contains a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party.

12. The inspection team shall have the right to weight and measure the dimensions of any vehicle, including railcars, exiting the site to ascertain whether it is large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party. These measurements shall be performed so as to minimize the delay of vehicles exiting the site. Vehicles that are either not large enough or not heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall not be subject to further inspection.

13. Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party but that are declared not to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

(a) The inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect the interior of all such vehicles.

(b) If the inspecting Party can determine by visual observation or dimensional measurement that, inside a particular vehicle, there are no containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, then that vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.

(c) If inside a vehicle there are one or more containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected

Party to demonstrate that such containers or shrouded objects are not and do not contain intermediate-range GLBMs or the longest stages of such GLBMs of the inspected Party.

14. Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are declared to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

(a) The inspecting Party shall preserve the integrity of the inspected missile or stage of a missile.

(b) Measuring equipment shall be placed only outside of the launch canister or shipping container; all measurements shall be made by the inspecting Party using the equipment provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section. Such measurements shall be observed and certified by the in-country escort.

(c) The inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage and to image the contents of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage; it shall have the right to view such missiles or missile stages contained in launch canisters or shipping containers eight times per calendar year. The in-country escort shall be present during all phases of such viewing. During such interior viewing:

(i) the front end of the launch canister or the cover of the shipping container shall be opened;

(ii) the missile or missile stage shall not be removed from its launch canister or shipping container; and

(iii) the length and diameter of the stages of the missile shall be measured in accordance with the methods agreed by the Parties so as to ascertain that the missile or missile stage is not an intermediate-range GLBM of the inspected Party, or the longest stage of such a GLBM, and that the missile has no more than one stage which is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

(d) The inspecting Party shall also have the right to inspect any other containers or shrouded objects inside the vehicle containing such a missile or missile stage in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 13 of this Section.

X. CANCELLATION OF INSPECTION

An inspection shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, it cannot be carried out. In the case of a delay that prevents an inspection team performing an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, the inspecting Party may either cancel or carry out the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure* or delay, then the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

XI. INSPECTION REPORT

1. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, during post-inspection procedures, and no later than two hours after the inspection has been completed, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report in both the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the type of inspection carried out, the inspection site, the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers and items of support equipment subject to the Treaty observed during the period of inspection and any measurements recorded pursuant to paragraph 10 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures, as well as the inspection site diagram provided for by paragraph 6 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be attached to this report.

2. For inspection activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, within 3 days after the end of each month, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report both in the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the number of vehicles declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party that left the inspection site through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol during that month. The report shall also include any measurements of launch canisters or shipping containers contained in these vehicles recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. In the event the inspecting Party, under the provisions of paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of this Protocol, has viewed the interior of a launch canister or shipping container declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, the report shall also include the measurements of the length and diameter of missile stages obtained during the inspection and recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures shall be attached to this report.

3. The inspected Party shall have the right to include written comments in the report.


4. The Parties shall, when possible, resolve ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the inspection report. Relevant clarifications shall be recorded in the report. The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and by one of the members of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in paragraph 1(b) of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability

and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed amendments to the Treaty.


DONE at Washinton on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:



President of the United States
of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:



General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU

ANNEX—PROVISIONS ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INSPECTORS AND AIRCREW MEMBERS

In order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, the inspectors and aircrew members referred to in Section III of this Protocol shall be accorded the privileges and immunities contained in this Annex. Privileges and immunities shall be accorded for the entire in-country period in the country in which an inspection site is located, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or aircrew member.

1. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.

2. The living quarters and office premises occupied by an inspector carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations.

3. The papers and correspondence of inspectors and aircrew members shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the aircraft of the inspection team shall be inviolable.

4. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The immunity from jurisdiction of an inspector or an aircrew member may be waived by the inspecting Party in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Waiver must always be express.

5. Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be accorded the exemption

from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

6. Inspectors and aircrew members of a Party shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the other Party or a basing country in which an inspection site is located, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

7. An inspector or aircrew member shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected Party or that of the basing countries.

8. If the inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Annex, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.


Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment referred to in section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding

United States




Pershing II:
Fully Assembled Missile

"Першинг-2"
Полностью собранная ракета




"Першинг-2"
Первая ступень

Pershing II:
First Stage



"Першинг-2"
Вторая ступень

Pershing II:
Second Stage




"Першинг-2"
Пусковая установка

Pershing II:
Launcher


"Першинг-2"
Укрытие стартовой площадки


Pershing II:
Launch Pad Shelter



"Першинг-2"
Укрытие стартовой площадки
(вид сбоку)

Pershing II:
Launch Pad Shelter
(alternate view)





"BGM-109G"
Полностью собранная ракета

BGM-109G:
Fully Assembled Missile



"BGM-109G"
Контейнер

BGM-109G:
Canister




"BGM-109G"
Пусковая установка

BGM-109G:
Launcher




"Першинг-1А"
Полностью собранная ракета

Pershing IA:
Fully Assembled Missile



"Першинг-1А"
Первая ступень

Pershing IA:
First Stage



"Першинг-1А"
Вторая ступень

Pershing IA:
Second Stage



"Першинг-1А"
Пусковая установка

Pershing IA:
Launcher




"Першинг-ІВ"

Полностью собранная ракета

Pershing IB:
Fully Assembled Missile

Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment referred to in section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding


Soviet Union




РСД-10. РАКЕТА БЕЗ КОНТЕЙНЕРА.




РСД-10. Пусковой
контейнер




РСД-10. Пусковая установка



РСД-10. Транспортное средство
для ракеты



РСД-10. Стационарное
сооружение для
пусковой установки



P-I2. Парета




Р-12. Пусковой стол



Р-12. Тихоокеанское
среднее море, берег




Р-12. Емкость окислителя




Р-12. Емкость горючего




Р-12. Установщик ракеты




Р-14. Ракета.




OTP-22. Ракета




ОТР-22. Пусковая установка



ОТР-22. Транспортное
средство для
ракеты




ОТР-23. Ракета




ОТР-23. Транспортное
средство для
ракеты




ОТР-23. Пусковая установка



РК-55. Ракета.



PK-55. Пусковой
контейнер



РК-55. Пусковая
установка

**Missile Operating Base
Schwaebisch-Gmuend
48 48 54 N 009 48 29 E**

РАКЕТНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИОННАЯ БАЗА


ШВЕБИШ-ГМЮНД

48 48 54 с.ш. 009 48 29 в.д.



0 80 160

Scale in Meters



Site diagrams for agreed missile support
facilities referred to in section V of the
Memorandum of Understanding

United States

**Missile Operating Base
Neu Ulm**

48 22 40 N 010 00 45 E

РАКЕТНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИОННАЯ БАЗА


НОЙ-УЛЬМ

48 22 40 с.ш. 010 00 45 в.д.

0 65 130


Scale in Meters

N



Missile Operating Base
Waldheide-Neckarsulm
49 07 45 N 009 16 31 E


РАКЕТНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИОННАЯ БАЗА
ВАЛЬДХЕЙДЕ-НЕККАРЗУЛЬМ
49 07 45 с.ш. 009 16 31 в.д.



0 115
Scale in Meters


**Missile Operating Base
Greenham Common
51 22 35 N 001 18 12 W**

РАКЕТНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИОННАЯ БАЗА
ГРИНЭМ-КОММОН
51 22 35 с.ш. 001 18 12 з.д.



Missile Operating Base
Molesworth
52 23 00 N 000 25 35 W


РАКЕТНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИОННАЯ БАЗА
МОЛСУЭРТ
52 23 00 с.ш. 000 25 35 з.д.



(See Next Sheet)

Missile Storage Facility
Pueblo Depot Activity
Pueblo, Colorado
38 19 N 104 20 W

МЕСТО СКЛАДСКОГО
ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ,
СКЛАД ПУЭБЛО,
ПУЭБЛО, шт. КОЛОРАДО
38 19 с.ш. 104 20 з.д.




0 1455
Scale In Meters

N ← →

Missile Storage Facility
Pueblo Depot Activity
Pueblo, Colorado
38 19 N 104 20 W

МЕСТО СКЛАДСКОГО
ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ,
СКЛАД ПУЭБЛО,
Пуэбло, шт. КОЛОРАДО
38 19 с.ш. 104 20 з.д.



0 260
Scale In Meters

(See Next 3 Sheets)


Missile Storage Facility
Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama
34 38 N 088 33 W

МЕСТО СКЛАДСКОГО
ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ,
АРСЕНАЛ "РЕДСТОУН,"
ХАНТСВИЛЛ, шт. АЛАБАМА,
34 36 с.ш. 086 38 з.д.



**Missile Operating Base
Comiso**
36 59 44 N 014 36 34 E

РАКЕТНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИОННАЯ БАЗА
КОМИЗО
36 59 44 с.ш. 014 36 34 в.д.




**Missile Operating Base
Florennes**

50 13 35 N 004 39 00 E


РАКЕТНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИОННАЯ БАЗА
ФЛОРЕНН

50 13 35 с.ш. 004 39 00 в.д.




Missile Operating Base
Wueschheim
50 02 33 N 007 25 06 E

РАКЕТНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИОННАЯ БАЗА
ВЮШГЕЙМ
50 02 33 с.ш. 007 25 06 в.д.




**Missile Operating Base
Woensdrecht**
51 26 12 N 004 21 15 E

РАКЕТНАЯ ОПЕРАЦИОННАЯ БАЗА
ВУНСДРЕХТ
51 26 12 с.ш. 004 21 15 в.д.




Missile Storage Facility
Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama
34 36 N 086 37 W

МЕСТО СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ
АРСЕНАЛ "РЕДСТОУН"
ХАНТСВИЛЛ, шт. АЛАБАМА
34 36 с.ш. 086 37 з.д.



Missile Storage Facility
Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama
34 33 N 087 38 W

МЕСТО СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ
 АРСЕНАЛ "РЕДСТОУН", ХАНТСВИЛЛ,
 ШТ. АЛАБАМА
 34 33 с.ш. 087 38 з.д.




0 80
 Scale in Meters

(See Next Sheet)

Missile Repair Facility
Pueblo Depot Activity
Pueblo, Colorado
38 18 N 104 19 W

МЕСТО РЕМОНТА РАКЕТ
СКЛАД ПУЭБЛО,
ПУЭБЛО, шт. КОЛОРАДО
38 18 с.ш. 104 19 з.д.




0 1455
Scale in Meters

N ←

Missile Repair Facility
Pueblo Depot Activity
Pueblo, Colorado
38 18 N 104 19 W

МЕСТО РЕМОНТА РАКЕТ
СКЛАД ПУЭБЛО,
ПУЭБЛО, шт. КОЛОРАДО
38 18 с.ш. 104 19 з.




N

0 260
Scale in Meters


Missile Storage Facility
Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama
34 35 N 086 37 W

МЕСТО СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ
РАКЕТ
АРСЕНАЛ "РЕДСТОУН", ХАНТСВИЛЛ,
ШТ. АЛАБАМА
34 35 с.ш. 086 37 з.д.



Missile Storage Facility
Weilerbach, FRG
49 27 N 007 38 E


МЕСТО СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ
ВЕЙЛЕРБАХ, ФРГ
49 27 с.ш. 007 38 в.д.



0 100
Scale in Meters

Launcher Storage Facility
Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama
34 35 N 086 37 W


МЕСТО СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ ПУ
АРСЕНАЛ "РЕДСТОУН"
ХАНТСВИЛЛ, ШТ. АЛАБАМА
34 35 с.ш. 086 37 з.д.



Launcher Repair Facility
Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama
34 37 N 086 33 W

МЕСТО РЕМОНТА ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
АРСЕНАЛ РЕДСТОУН,
ХАНТСВИЛЛ, шт. АЛАБАМА
34 37 с.ш. 086 38 з.д.

(See Next Sheet)




0 240
Scale In Meters

(See Next Sheet)

Launcher Repair Facility
Pueblo Depot Activity
Pueblo, Colorado
38 19 N 104 20 W

МЕСТО РЕМОНТА
ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
СКЛАД ПУЭБЛО,
ПУЭБЛО, ШТ. КОЛОРАДО
38 19 с.ш. 104 20 з.




0 1455
Scale in Meters

N ←

Launcher Repair Facility
EMC Hausen Frankfort, FRG
50 08 N 008 38 E

МЕСТО РЕМОНТА ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
ЦЕНТР ПО РЕМОНТУ И
ТЕХНИЧЕСКОМУ ОБСЛУЖИ-
ВАНИЮ ХАУЗЕН,
ФРАНКФУРТ, ФРГ
50 08 с.ш. 008 38 в. д.




0 40
Scale in Meters

235

Launcher Repair Facility
Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama
34 37 N 086 38 W

МЕСТО РЕМОНТА ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
АРСЕНАЛ "РЕДСТОУН"
ХАНТСВИЛЛ, ШТ. АЛАБАМА
34 37 с.ш. 086 38 з.д.



0 20
Scale in Meters



237

(See Next 2 Sheets)

Launcher Repair Facility
Ft Sill, Oklahoma
34 40 N 098 24 W


МЕСТО РЕМОНТА ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
ФОРТ-СИЛЛ,
шт. ОКЛАХОМА,
34 40 с.ш. 098 24 з.д.



0 3000
Scale in Feet

Launcher Repair Facility
Ft. Sill, Oklahoma
34 39 N 098 24 W

МЕСТО РЕМОНТА ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
ФОРТ-СИЛЛ,
ШТ.ОКЛАХОМА
34 39 с.ш. 098 24 з.д.




20 meters

239

Launcher Repair Facility
Ft. Sill, Oklahoma
34 41 N 098 25 W

МЕСТО РЕМОНТА ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
ФОРТ-СИЛЛ,
шт. ОКЛАХОМА
34 41 с.ш. 098 25 з.д.




240

90 meters

Launcher Repair Facility
Pueblo Depot Activity
Pueblo, Colorado
38 19 N 104 20 W


МЕСТО РЕМОНТА
ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
СКЛАД ПУЭБЛО,
ПУЭБЛО, ГТ. КОЛОРАДО
38 19 с.ш. 104 20 з.д.



See Next 2 Sheets

Test Range
Complex 16, Cape Canaveral, Florida
28 29 N 080 34 W

ИСПЫТАТЕЛЬНЫЙ ПОЛИГОН
КОМПЛЕКС 16,
МЫС КАНАВЕРАЛ,
ШТ. ФЛОРИДА
28 29 с.ш. 080 34 з.д.




0 450
Scale in Meters

243

Test Range
Complex 16, Cape Canaveral, Florida
28 29 N 080 34 W


ИСПЫТАТЕЛЬНЫЙ ПОЛИГОН
КОМПЛЕКС 16,
МЫС КАНАВЕРАЛ,
ШТ. ФЛОРИДА
28 29 с.ш. 080 34 з.д.



0 310
Scale in Meters

Test Range
Complex 16, Cape Canaveral, Florida
28 28 N 080 35 W

ИСПЫТАТЕЛЬНЫЙ ПОЛИГОН
КОМПЛЕКС 16,
МЫС КАНАВЕРАЛ, ФЛ.ФЛОРИДА
28 28 с.ш. 080 35 з.д.




0 17
Scale in Meters

(See Next 2 Sheets)

Training Facility
Ft. Sill, OK
34 41 N 098 34 W

МЕСТО ОБУЧЕНИЯ
ФОРТ-СИЛЛ,
шт. ОКЛАХОМА
34 41 с.ш. 098 34 з.д.



0 5000
Scale in Meters

246

Training Facility
Ft. Sill, Oklahoma
34 40 N 098 23 W

МЕСТО ОБУЧЕНИЯ
ФОРТ-СИЛЛ,
шт. ОКЛАХОМА
34 40 с.ш. 098 23 з.д.




240 meters

247

Training Facility
Ft. Sill, Oklahoma
34 39 N 098 26 W


МЕСТО ОБУЧЕНИЯ
ФОРТ-СИЛЛ,
шт.ОКЛАХОМА
34 39 с.ш. 098 26 з.д.



248

Missile Repair Facility
SABCA, Gosselies, Belgium
50 27 N 004 27 E

МЕСТО РЕМОНТА РАКЕТ
ЦЕНТР ТЕХНИЧЕСКОГО
ОБСЛУЖИВАНИЯ, ГОССЕЛИ, БЕЛЬГИЯ
50 27 с.ш. 004 27 в.д.



Test Range
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah
40 22 N 113 04 W

ИСПЫТАТЕЛЬНЫЙ ПОЛИГОН
ДАГУЭЙ, шт. УТА
40 22 с.ш. 113 04 з.д.

40 25 N
113 07 W

40 25 N
113 00 W


40 20 N
113 07 W

40 20 N
113 00 W

0 1 2 3 4 5
Scale in Kilometers




250



Training Facility
Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arizona
32 11 N 110 53 W

МЕСТО ОБУЧЕНИЯ
АВИАБАЗА ДЕВИС-МОНТАН,
ТУСОН, ШТ. АРИЗОНА
32 II с.ш. IIО 53 з.д.



251

Training Facility
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona
31 29 N 110 19 W

МЕСТО ОБУЧЕНИЯ
ФОРТ-ХАУЧУКА, шт. АРИЗОНА
31 29 с.ш. 110 19 з.д.
31 31 N
110 17 W

31 31 N
110 22 W


31 26 30 N
110 22 W

0 1000 2000
Scale in Meters




Missile Production Facility
Hercules, Plant 1
 40 39 40N 112 03 14W

МЕСТО ПРОИЗВОДСТВА РАКЕТ
 ЗАВОД № I "ГЕРКУЛЕС"
 40 39 40 с.ш. 112 03 14 з.д.



**Launcher Production Facility
Air Force Plant 19
San Diego, California
32 45 N 117 12 W**


МЕСТО ПРОИЗВОДСТВА
ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
Завод ВРС № 19,
Сан-Диего, шт. Калифорния
32 45 с.ш. 117 12 з.д.



0 500 1000
Scale in Feet

Launcher Production Facility
Air Force Plant 19
San Diego, California
32 45 N 117 12 W

МЕСТО ПРОИЗВОДСТВА
ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
Завод ВВС № 19,
Сан-Диего, шт. Калифорния
32 45 с.ш. 117 12 з.д.




0 250 500
Scale in Feet

255

Launcher Production Facility
Martin Marietta, Middle River, Md
39 35 N 076 24 W

МЕСТО ПРОИЗВОДСТВА
ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
"МАРТИН МАРИЕТТА",
Мидл-Ривер, шт. Мэриленд,
39 35 с.ш. 076 24 з.д.



Launcher Production Facility
Martin Marietta, Middle River, Md
39 35 N 076 24 W

МЕСТО ПРОИЗВОДСТВА
ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
"МАРТИН МАРИЕТТА",
Мидл-Ривер, шт. Мэриленд
39 35 с.ш. 076 24 з.д.




257



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ПОСТАВЫ
(55 09 47 с.ш. 026 54 21 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
POSTAVY
55 09 47 N 026 54 21 E




1:5000

Site diagrams for agreed missile support
facilities referred to in section V of the
Memorandum of Understanding

Soviet Union

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ВЕТРИНО
(55 24 19 с.ш. 028 33 29 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
VETRINO
55 24 19 N 028 33 29 E




1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ПОЛОЦК

(55 22 34 с.ш. 028 44 17 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
POLOTSK
55 22 34 N 028 44 17 E



1:5000


ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
СМОРГОНЬ
(54 36 16 с.ш. 026 23 05 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
SMORGON'
54 36 16 N 026 23 05 E




ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
СМОРГОНЬ
(54 31 36 с.ш. 026 17 20 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
SMORGON'
54 31 36 N 026 17 20 E




ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ЛИДА
(53 47 39 с.ш. 025 20 27 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
LIDA
53 47 39 N 025 20 27 E



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ГЕЗГАЛЫ
(53 32 50 с.ш. 025 16 48 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
GEZGALY
53 32 50 N 025 16 48 E



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
СЛОНИМ

(52 55 54 с.ш. 025 21 59 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
SLONIM
52 55 54 N 025 21 59 E



I:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
РУЖАНЫ
(52 49 29 с.ш. 024 45 45 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
RUZHANY
52 49 29 N 024 45 45 E




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ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ЗАСИМОВИЧИ

(52 30 38 с.ш. 024 08 43 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
ZASIMOVICHI

52 30 38 N 024 08 43 E



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
МОЗЫРЬ
(52 02 27 с.ш. 029 11 15 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
MOZYR'
52 02 27 N 029 11 15 E



1:5000


ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ПЕТРИКОВ
(52 10 29 с.ш. 028 34 52 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
PETRIKOV
52 10 29 N 028 34 52 E



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ЖИТКОВИЧИ
(52 II 36 с.ш. 027 48 07 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
ZHITKOVICHI
52 11 36 N 027 48 07 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
РЕЧИЦА
(52 II 58 с.ш. 030 07 II в.д.)



MISSILE OPERATING BASE
RECHITSA
52 11 58 N 030 07 11 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
СЛУЦК
(53 14 20 с.ш. 027 42 15 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
SLUTSK
53 14 20 N 027 42 15 E




1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ЛУЦК

(50 56 07 с.ш. 025 36 26 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
LUTSK
50 56 07 N 025 36 26 E



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ЛУЦК

(50 50 06 с.ш. 025 04 02 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
LUTSK
50 50 06 N 025 04 02 E



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
БРОДЫ

(50 06 09 с.ш. 025 12 14 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
BRODY


50 06 09 N 025 12 14 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ЧЕРВОНОГРАД
(50 22 45 с.ш. 024 18 16 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
CHERVONOGRAД
50 22 45 N 024 18 16 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
СЛАВУТА
(50 17 05 с.ш. 026 41 31 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
SLAVUTA
50 17 05 N 026 41 31 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
БЕЛОКОРОВИЧИ
(51 10 45 с.ш. 028 03 20 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
BELOKOROVICHI
51 10 45 N 028 03 20 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ЛИПНИКИ
(51 12 22 с.ш. 028 26 37 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
LIPNIKI
51 12 22 N 028 26 37 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ВЫСОКАЯ ПЕЧЬ
(50 10 11 с.ш. 028 16 22 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
VYSOKAYA PECH'
50 10 11 N 028 16 22 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ВЫСОКАЯ ПЕЧЬ
(50 05 43 с.ш. 028 22 09 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
VYSOKAYA PECH'
50 05 43 N 028 22 09 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОПЕРАЦИОННОГО БАЗИ
КОРОСТЕНЬ
(50 52 22 с.ш. 028 31 17 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
KOROSTEN'
50 52 22 N 028 31 17 E



1:5000



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ЛЕБЕДИН
(50 33 06 с.ш. 034 26 02 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
LEBEDIN
50 33 06 N 034 26 02 E




ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ГЛУХОВ
(51 41 00 с.ш. 033 30 56 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
GLUKHOV
51 41 00 N 033 30 56 E




ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ГЛУХОВ
(51 36 44 с.ш. 033 29 17 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
GLUKHOV
51 36 44 N 033 29 17 E



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
АХТЫРКА
(50 16 01 с.ш. 034 49 53 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
AKHTYRKA
50 16 01 N 034 49 53 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
АХТЫРКА
(50 21 59 с.ш. 034 57 03 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
AKHTYRKA
50 21 59 N 034 57 03 E






ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
НОВОСИБИРСК
(55 22 05 с.ш. 083 13 52 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
NOVOSIBIRSK
55 22 05 N 083 13 52 E



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
НОВОСИБИРСК
(55 22 57 с.ш. 082 55 16 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
NOVOSIBIRSK
55 22 57 N 082 55 16 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
НОВОСИБИРСК
(55 19 32 с.ш. 082 56 18 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
NOVOSIBIRSK
55 19 32 N 082 56 18 E



1:5000


290

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
НОВОСИБИРСК
(55 18 44 с.ш. 083 01 38 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
NOVOSIBIRSK
55 18 44 N 083 01 38 E



1:5000




ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
НОВОСИБИРСК
(55 19 07 с.ш. 083 09 59 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
NOVOSIBIRSK
55 19 07 N 083 09 59 E




I:5000



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
(РОВЫНЛ)

(51. 27 20 с.ш. 113 03 42 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
DROVYANAYA
51 27 20 N 113 03 42 E



293




1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ДРОВЯНАЯ

(51 26 10 с.ш. 113 02 43 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
DROVYANAYA
51 26 10 N 113 02 43 E



294




1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ДРОВЬНАИ

(51.22 59 с.ш. 112 49 55 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
DROVYANAYA



51 22 59 N 112 49 55 E



295

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ДРОВЯНАЯ
(51 20 18 с.ш. 113 00 54 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
DROVYANAYA
51 20 18 N 113 00 54 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ДРОВЯНАЯ
(51 23 49 С.Ш. 112 52 13 В.Д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
DROVYANAYA
51 23 49 N 112 52 13 E



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОПЕРАЦИОННОГО БАЗЫ
БАРНАУЛ
(53 46 08 с.ш. 083 57 11 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
BARNAUL
53 46 08 N 083 57 11 E




1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
БАРНАУЛ
(53 18 21 с.ш. 084 08 47 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
BARNAUL
53 18 21 N 084 08 47 E

N ← → S




I:5000

299

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
БАРНАУЛ
(53 13 29 с.ш. 084 40 10 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
BARNAUL
53 13 29 N 084 40 10 E




300

1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
БАРНАУЛ
(53 18 47 с.ш. 084 30 27 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
BARNAUL
53 18 47 N 084 30 27 E



N ————— S

1:5000


ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОПЕРАЦИОННОГО БАЗИ
КАНСК

(56 22 31 с.ш. 095 28 35 в.д.).

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
KANSK
56 22 31 N 095 28 35 E



1:5000




302

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
КАНСК

(56 20 09 с.м. 095 16 34 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
KANSK
56 20 09 N 095 16 34 E




1:5000

ПЛАН РАЙОННОГО ОПЕРАТИВНОГО ЦЕНТРА
КАНСК

(56 11 19 с.ш. 096 03 13 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
KANSK
56 11 19 N 096 03 13 E




1:5000

81-428 0 - 88 - 11

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
КАНСК
(56 02 19 с.ш. 096 04 58 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
KANSK
56 02 19 N 096 04 58 E




1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНО-ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
СОВЕТСК


(54 59 07 с.ш. 021 36 36 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
SOVETSK
54 59 07 N 021 36 36 E



К листу № 49
(8,4 км на запад)

Ref. Sheet 49
(8.4 km W)



1:5000




307


ПЛАН РАКЕТНО-ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ГУСЕВ

(54 43 59 с.ш. 022 03 27 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
GUSEV
54 43 59 N 022 03 27 E



К листу № 51
(5,4 км на юго-восток)



1:5000

Ref. Sheet 51
(5.4 km SE)




309

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОПЕРАЦИОННОГО БАЗЫ
МАЛОРИТА


(51 51 47 с.ш. 024 01 55 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
MALORITA
51 51 47 N 024 01 55 E



К листу № 53
(4,2 км НЗ ЮГ)

Ref. Sheet 53
(4.2 km S)




311

ПЛАН РАКЕТНО-ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ПИНСК

(52 10 56 с.ш. 025 41 27 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
PINSK
52 10 56 N 025 41 27 E




К листу № 55
(4,6 км на северо-восток)

Ref. Sheet 55
(4.6 km NE)



1:5000




318

ПЛАН РАЙОНА ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ВВРУ

(57 45.47 с.ш. 026 47 13 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
VVRU
57 45 47 N 026 47 13 E



К листу № 57

(6,1 км на северо-восток)

Ref. Sheet 57
(6.1 km NE)




1:5000

ИЗЛАН РАКЕТНОМ ОПЕРАЦИОННОМ БАЗИ
АЛЕВИЧЕ


(67 25 04 с.м. 026 49 46 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
ALUKSNE
57 25 04 N 026 49 46 E



К листу № 59
(9,2 км на юго-запад)


Ref. Sheet 59
(9.2 km SW)



1:5000


ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ОСТРОВ
(57 31 53 с.ш. 028 12 19 в.д.).

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
OSTROV
57 31 53 N 028 12 19 E



К листу № 61
(9,6 км на северо-запад)

Ref. Sheet 61
(9.6 km NW)




1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
КАРМЕЛАВА

(55 00 51 с.ш. 024 14 16 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
KARMELAVA
55 00 51 N 024 14 16 E



К листу № 63

(10,6 км на юго-запад)

Ref. Sheet 63
(10.6 km SW)




1:5000

321

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОПЕРАЦИОННОГО БАЗИ
УКМЕРГЕ

(55 07 51 с.ш. 024 38 36 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
UKMERGE
55 07 51 N 024 38 36 E



К листу № 65

(8,8 км на северо-восток)

Ref. Sheet 65
(8.8 km NE)




I:5000

ИЗМАН ПАКЕТНОМ ОНЕРАЈОНОМ.1 ЕАЗИ
ТАУРАГЕ

(55 04 58 с.ш. 022 19 38 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
TAURAGE
55 04 58 N 022 19 38 E



К листу №67

(7,6 км на северо-восток)

Ref. Sheet 67
(7.6 km NE)



1:5000




325

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЇ ОПЕРАЦІЙНОЇ БАЗИ
КОЛОМІЯ

(48 39 32 с.ш. 024 48 04 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
KOLOMYIA
48 39 32 N 024 48 04 E



К листу № 69
(8,0 км на юго-запад)

Ref. Sheet 69
(8.0 km SW)


N ← ————— → S



1:5000


ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОПЕРАТИВНОГО БАЗИ
СТРИИ
(49 25 23 с.ш. 023 34 56 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
STRYY
49 25 23 N 023 34 56 E



К листу № 71
(14,1 км на юго-восток)


Ref. Sheet 71
(14.1 km SE)



1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
СКАЛА-ПОДОЛ'СКАЯ
(48 51 02 с.ш. 026 08 36 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
SKALA-PODOL'SKAYA
48 51 02 N 026 08 36 E



К листу №73

(7,2 км на северо-запад)

Ref. Sheet 73
(7.2 km NW)



1:5000

331

ПЛАН МЕСТА СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК


ПОСТАВЫ

(55 10 с.ш. 026 55 в.д.)

MISSILE/LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY

POSTAVY

55 10 N 026 55 E




1:5000

332

ПЛАН МЕСТА СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
ГЕЗГАЛИ


(53 36 с.ш. 025 28 в.д.) MISSILE/LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY
GEZGALY
53 36 N 025 28 E



ПЛАН МЕСТА СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
МОЗЫРЬ

(52 03 с.ш. 029 II в.д.) MISSILE/LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY
MOZYR'

52 03 N 029 11 E



1:5000

ПЛАН МЕСТА СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК


ЛУТСК

(50 53 с.ш. 025 30 в.д.)

MISSILE/LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY

LUTSK

50 53 N 025 30 E




1:5000

ПЛАН МЕСТА СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
БЕЛОКОРОВИЧИ


(51 09 с.ш. 028 00 в.д.)

MISSILE/LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY
BELOKOROVICHI
51 09 N 028 00 E



1:5000


ПЛАН МЕСТА СКАПОВОГО ХРАНИЛИЩА РАКЕТ/ИЗСТРЕЛИВНИХ УСТАНОВИЩ
ЛЕБЕДИН
MISSILE/LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY
LEBEDIN
(50 36 с.ш. 034 25 в.д.) 50 36 N 034 25 E



ПЛАН МЕСТА СІМІАДСКОГО ХРАНЕННЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВИХ УСТАНОВОК
НОВОСІБІРСК

(55 16 с.ш. 083 02 в.д.)

MISSILE/LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY
NOVOSIBIRSK
55 16 N 083 02 E



1:5000

338


ПЛАН МЕСТА СЮЛДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК

ДРОВЯНАЯ

(51 30 с.ш. 113 03 в.д.)

MISSILE/LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY
DROVYANAYA

51 30 N 113 03 E




339

ПЛАН МЕСТА СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
КАНСК

(56 16 с.ш. 095 39 в.д.)

MISSILE/LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY
KANSAK
56 16 N 095 39 E

N
↑
↓
S



1:5000

ПЛАН МЕСТА СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК

БАРНАУЛ

(53 34 с.ш. 083 48 в.д.)


MISSILE/LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY

BARNAUL

53 34 N 083 48 E




1:5000




341

ПЛАН МЕСТА СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
КОЛОСОВО
(58 31 с.ш. 026 55 в. д.)

Missile/Launcher Storage Facility
Kolosovo
53 31 N 026 55 E




1:12100



342

ПЛАН МЕСТА СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
ЖЕРЕБКОВО
(47 51 с.ш. 029 54 в.д.)




1:7500

Missile/Launcher Storage Facility
Zharebkovo
47 51 N 029 54 E

МЕТО ПЕМОХТА ПАКЕТ
БАТАЙСК
(47 08 с.ш. 039 47 в.д.)


MISSILE REPAIR FACILITY
BATAYSK
47 08 N 039 47 E



1:5000

ПЛАН ИСПЫТАТЕЛЬНОГО ПОЛИГОНА
КАПУСТИН ЯР
(48 37 с.ш. 046 18 в.д.)

TEST RANGE
KAPUSTIN YAR
48 37 N 046 18 E





ПЛАН МЕСТА ОБУЧЕНИЯ
СЕРПУХОВ
(54 54 с.ш. 037 28 в.д.)

TRAINING FACILITY
SERPUKHOV
54 54 N 037 28 E




1:5000

346

ПЛАН МЕСТА ОБУЧЕНИЯ
КРАСНОДАР
(45 03 с.ш. 038 58 в.д.)


TRAINING FACILITY
KRASNODAR
45 03 N 038 58 E



1:5000


ПЛАН МЕСТА ОБУЧЕНИЯ
КАПУСТИН ЯР
(48 38 с.ш. 046 10 в.д.)

TRAINING FACILITY
KAPUSTIN YAR
48 38 N 046 10 E



ИСПЫТАТЕЛЬНЫЙ ПОЛИГОН
КАПУСТИН ЯР
(48 35 с.ш. 046 18 в.д.)

TEST RANGE
KAPUSTIN YAR
48 35 N 046 18 E




1:5000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
КЕНИГСБРУЕК (ГДР)


(51 16 40 С.Ш. 013 53 20 В.Д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
KOENIGSBRUECK (GDR)
51 16 40 N 013 53 20 E



ВАНТ ГЕВ-3АР


1:1000



350

ИЛАН ПАКЕТНОЕ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЕ БАЗИ:
 БИШОФСВЕРДА (ГДР)
 (51 08 33 с.ш. 014 12 18 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
 BISCHOFSWERDA (GDR)
 51 08 33 N 014 12 18 E




1:1000



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ВАЛЕН (ГДР)
(53 32 40 с.ш. 012 37 30 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
WAREN (GDR)
53 32 40 N 012 37 30 E




1:1000

352



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ВОКУЛЬ (ГДР)
(53 16 20 с.ш. 013 15 50 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
WOKUHL (GDR)
53 16 20 N 013 15 50 E




1:1000



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ГРАНИЦЕ (ЧССР)
(49 33 00 с.ш. 017 45 00 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
HRANICE (CSR)
49 33 00 N 017 45 00 E




1:1800

354

К листу № 97
(25 км на запад)

Ref. Sheet 97
(25 km W)




1:3500

К листу № 97

(14 км на северо-запад)

Ref. Sheet 97
(14 km NW)




1:2500

356

К листу № 97
(25 км на северо-запад)

Ref. Sheet 97
(25 km NW)

N → S




1:3500

357

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОТЕЛЕНИЯ БАЗЫ
НАМИНО
(55 16 37 с.ш. 082 59 42 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
PASHINO
55 16 37 N 082 59 42 E



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ГОРНЫЙ

(51 33 10 с.ш. 113 01 30 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
GORNYY
51 33 10 N 113 01 30 E




1:1000

ПЛАН РАКЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ЛАПИЧИ

(53 25 30 с.ш. 028 30 00 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
LAPICHI
53 25 30 N 028 30 00 E




1:1000



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОПЕРАТИВНОГО БАЗЫ
КАТТАКУРГАН
(39 38 18 с.ш. 065 58 40 в.д.)


MISSILE OPERATING BASE
KATTAKURGAN
39 38 18 N 065 58 40 E



1:1000

ПЛАН РАЙОННОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
САРЬОЗЕК
(44 31 58 с.ш. 077 46.20 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
SARYOZEK
44 31 58 N 077 46 20 E




1:7000

362



ПУЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОПЕРАТИВНОГО БАЗИ
НОВОСЫСОЕВКА
(44 II 58 с.ш. 133 26 05 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
NOVOSYSOYEVKA
44 11 58 N 133 26 05 E



1:10000

363




ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОУПРАВЛЕНИЯ ГАРМ
ВЕЙСЕНФЕЛС (ГДР)

(51 11 50 с.ш. 011 59 50 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
WEISSENFELS (GDR)
51 11 50 N 011 59 50 E


1:1000



ПЛАН РАДЕТНОЙ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ БАЗЫ
ЖЕНА-ФОРСТ (ГДР)

($50^{\circ}54'55''$ с.ш. $011^{\circ}32'40''$ в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
JENA-FORST (GDR)
 $50^{\circ}54'55''$ N $011^{\circ}32'40''$ E




1:1000



ПЛАН РАЙОНОВ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ ЛАНИ
СТАВЬКО

(53 38 30 с.ш. 027 13 20 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
STAN'KOVO
53 38 30 N 027 13 20 E




1:1000



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОУТАЛЖИВНИКА
ЦЕЛЬ

(53 23 38 с.ш. 028 28 06 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
TSEL'
53 23 38 N 028 28 06 E




1:2000



ПЛАН РАДЕТНО-ОПЕРАЦИОННО-І НАСН
СЛОБУДКА
(52 30 30 с.ш. 024 31 30 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
SLOBUDKA
52 30 30 N 024 31 30 E



1:1000


368

81-428 0 - 88 - 13



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОПЕРАЦИОННОГО БАЗИ
БАЙРАМ-АЛИ
(37 36 18 с.ш. 062 10 40 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
BAYRAM-ALI
37 36 18 N 062 10 40 E




1:1000

369



ПЛАН РАКЕТНОГО ОПЕРАЦИОННОГО БАЗИ
СЕМПАЛАТИНСК
(50 23 00 с.ш. 080 09 30 в.д.)

MISSILE OPERATING BASE
SEMIPALATINSK
50 23 00 N 080 09 30 E




1:2000

ПЛАН МЕСТА СКОЛАДСКОГО СТРАНИЩА РАКЕТ
ЛОЗОВАЯ

(48 55 с.ш. 036 22 в.д.)

MISSILE STORAGE FACILITY
LOZOVAYA
48 55 N 036 22 E




1:10000

371

ПЛАН МЕСТА СКОЛАЧНОГО ЗАПАСНИКА РАКЕТ
ЛАДУШКИН

(54 35 с.ш. 020 12 в.д.)


MISSILE STORAGE FACILITY
LADUSHKIN
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БРОННАЯ ГОРА
(52 37 с.ш. 025 04 в.д.)

MISSILE STORAGE FACILITY
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
ПЛАН МЕСТА СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РА
БАЛХАШ

MISSILE STORAGE FACILITY
BALKHASH

(46 50 с.ш. 075 36 в.д.)

46 50 N 075 36 E

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374

ПЛАН МЕСТА СКЛАДСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК

БЕРЕЗОВКА

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
LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY

BEREZOVKA

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


375



ПЛАН МЕСТА ОБУЧЕНИЯ
САРАТОВ
(51 34 с.ш. 046 01 в.д.)

TRAINING FACILITY
SARATOV
51 34 N 046 01 E



1:500

376

ПЛАН МЕСТА ОБУЧЕНИЯ
КАЗАНЬ
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
TRAINING FACILITY
KAZAN'
55 58 N 049 11 E



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ПЛАН МЕСТА' ОБУЧЕНИЯ
КАМЕНКА
(53 II с.ш. 044 04 в.д.)

TRAINING FACILITY
KAMENKA
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


ПЛАН МЕСТА СКОПЯСКОГО ХРАНЕНИЯ РАКЕТ/ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК

ЕЛГАВА
(56 40 с.ш. 024 07 в.д.)

MISSILE/LAUNCHER STORAGE FACILITY
JELGAVA
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
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379

ПЛАН ОБЪЕКТА ПО ПРОИЗВОДСТВУ РАКЕТ
ВОТКИНСКИЙ МАШИНОСТРОИТЕЛЬНЫЙ ЗАВОД
(57 01 30 с.ш. 054 08 00 в.д.)



MISSILE PRODUCTION FACILITY
VOTKINSK MACHINE-BUILDING PLANT
57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E

I:5000

380



UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Geneva, Switzerland

December 7, 1987


Your Excellency,

The United States side acknowledges receipt of your letter of December 7, 1987, regarding inspections of former silos for SS-4 missiles, and accepts the provision set forth therein.

Sincerely,

Maynard W. Glitman
Ambassador

Alexei A. Obukhov
Ambassador-at-Large



K. L. A. S. -
Legal Advisor
INF Delegation
11 December 1987

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 123988
AO
Russian

Seal

USSR Delegation
to the Soviet-American Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

Geneva, December 7, 1987

Your Excellency:

As evidence of its good will, the Soviet side is prepared to give the U.S. side an opportunity for 13 years after entry into force of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, that is, while the on-site inspection regime with respect to this Treaty is in effect, to conduct a total of up to six on-site inspections of former silo launchers, selected by the U.S. side, for the R-12 missiles known to the United States as SS-4 missiles.

The organizational matters relating to such inspections, which are not included in the annual quotas established by the Treaty, will be arranged through the Special Verification Commission instituted under the Treaty.

If, as a result of such visits, the U.S. side should have any questions to the Soviet side, they could be examined within the framework of the Special Verification Commission.

Respectfully,

Alexei A. Oboukhov
Ambassador-at-Large

Ambassador
Maynard W. Glitman
U.S. Negotiator on
Intermediate-Range
and Shorter-Range
Missiles at the
Soviet-U.S. Negotiations
In Geneva

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION

I hereby certify that the above translation bearing LS No. 123988 was prepared by the Office of Language Services of the Department of State and that it is a correct translation to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated: December 22, 1987

for Chief, Translating Division

Handwritten signature

AGREEMENT AMONG THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND REGARDING INSPECTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

The United States of America, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, noting the terms agreed between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I—GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

1. Inspection activities related to Article XI of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington on December 8, 1987, may take place on the territory of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and shall be carried out in accordance with the requirements, procedures and arrangements set forth in the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and this Agreement.

2. The Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, hereinafter the Basing Countries, hereby agree to facilitate the implementation by the United States of America of its obligations under the Treaty, including the Inspection Protocol thereto, on their territories in accordance with the requirements, procedures and arrangements set forth in this Agreement.

3. Except as herein agreed by the United States of America and the Basing Countries, nothing shall affect the sovereign authority of each state to enforce its laws and regulations with respect to persons entering, and activities taking place within, its jurisdiction.

4. The Basing Countries do not by this Agreement assume any obligations or grant any rights deriving from the Treaty or the Inspection Protocol other than those expressly undertaken or granted in this Agreement or otherwise with their specific consent.

5. The United States of America:

a) Remains fully responsible towards the Soviet Union for the implementation of its obligations under the Treaty and the Inspection Protocol in respect of United States facilities located on the territories of the Basing Countries;

b) Undertakes on request at any time to take such action, in exercise of its rights under the Treaty, including the Inspection Protocol, as may be required to protect and preserve the rights of the Basing Countries under this Agreement.

ARTICLE II—DEFINITIONS

For purposes of the present Agreement:

1. The term "Treaty" means the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles;

2. The term "Inspection Protocol" means the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles;

3. The term "Inspected Party" means the United States of America;

4. The term "Inspecting Party" means the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

5. The term "inspection team" means those inspectors designated by the Inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection activity;

6. The term "inspector" means an individual proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to carry out inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty, and included on its list of inspectors in accordance with Section III of the Inspection Protocol;

7. The term "diplomatic aircrew escort" means that individual accredited to the government of the Basing Country in which the inspection site is located who is designated by the Inspecting Party to assist the aircrew of the Inspecting Party;

8. The term "inspection site" means the area, facility, or location in a Basing Country at which an inspection provided for in Article XI of the Treaty is carried out;

9. The term "period of inspection" mean the period from initiation of the inspection at the inspection site until completion of the inspection at the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on any pre- and post-inspection procedures;

10. The term "point of entry" means: in respect of Belgium, Brussels (National); in respect of the Federal Republic of Germany, Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase); in respect of Italy, Rome (Ciampino); in respect of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Schiphol; and in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, RAF Greenham Common;

11. The term "in-country period" means the period from the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry until departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to depart the country;

12. The term "in-country escort" means the official or officials specified by the Inspected Party, one or more of whom may be nominated by the Basing Country within whose territory the inspection site is located, who shall accompany an inspection team throughout the in-country period and provide appropriate assistance to an inspection team, in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol, throughout the in-country period;

13. The term "aircrew member" means an individual, other than the members of an inspection team, diplomatic aircrew escort and in-country escort, on the aircraft of the Inspecting Party. The number of aircrew members per aircraft shall not exceed ten.

ARTICLE III—NOTIFICATIONS

1. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the Inspected Party and each Basing Country shall establish channels which shall be available to receive and acknowledge receipt of notifications on a 24-hour continuous basis.

2. Immediately upon receipt of notice from the Inspecting Party of its intention to conduct an inspection in a Basing Country, the Inspected Party shall notify the Basing Country concerned thereof and of the date and estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, the date and estimated time of departure from the point of entry to the inspection site, the names of the aircrew and inspection team members, the flight plan (including the type of aircraft as specified therein) filed by the Inspecting Party in accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization, hereinafter ICAO, procedures applicable to civil aircraft, and any other information relevant to the inspection provided by the Inspecting Party.

3. No less than one hour prior to the estimated time of departure of the inspection team from the point of entry for the inspection site, or in the case of successive inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 of 8 of Article XI of the Treaty no less than one hour prior to the inspection team's departure from an inspection site for another inspection site, the Inspected Party shall inform the Basing Country of the inspection site, described by place name and geographic coordinates, at which the inspection will be carried out.

ARTICLE IV—PRE-INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS

1. The Inspected Party shall provide the Basing Countries with the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members, or any modification thereto, proposed by the Inspecting Party immediately upon receipt thereof. Within 15 days of receipt of the initial lists or proposed additions thereto, each Basing Country shall notify the Inspected Party if it objects to the inclusion of any inspector or aircrew member on the basis that such individual had ever committed a criminal offense on the territory of the Inspected Party or the Basing Country, or been sentenced for committing a criminal offense or expelled by the Inspected Party or the Basing Country. The Inspected Party shall thereupon exercise its right under the Inspection Protocol to prevent the named individual from serving as an inspector or aircrew member.

2. Within 25 days of receipt of the initial lists of inspectors or aircrew members, or of any subsequent change thereto, each Basing Country shall provide such visas and related documentation as may be necessary to ensure that each inspector or aircrew member may enter its territory for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Inspection Protocol. Such visas and documentation shall be

valid for a period of at least 24 months. The Inspected Party shall immediately notify the Basing Countries of the removal of any individual from the Inspecting Party's lists of inspectors or aircrew members, and the Basing Countries may thereupon cancel forthwith any visas and related documentation issued to such person pursuant to this paragraph.

3. Within 25 days after entry into force of this Agreement, each Basing Country shall inform the Inspected Party of the standing diplomatic clearance number for the aircraft of the Inspecting Party which will transport inspectors and equipment into its territory. At the same time each Basing Country shall inform the Inspected Party of the established international airways along which aircraft of the Inspecting Party shall enter the airspace of the Basing Country for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities under the Treaty.

4. Each Basing Country shall accord inspectors and aircrew members of the Inspecting Party entering its territory for the purpose of conducting inspection activities pursuant to the Treaty, including the Inspection Protocol, the privileges and immunities set forth in the Privileges and Immunities Annex to this Agreement. In the event the Inspecting Party refuses or fails to carry out its obligation under Section III, paragraph 7 of the Inspection Protocol to remove an inspector or aircrew member who has violated the conditions governing inspections, the inspector or aircrew member may be refused continued recognition as being entitled to such privileges and immunities.

5. Each Basing Country shall issue, at the point of entry, appropriate authorizations waiving customs duties and expediting customs processing requirements in respect of all equipment relating to inspection activities.

6. Each Basing Country shall provide, if requested, facilities at the point of entry for lodging and the provision of food for inspectors and aircrew members.

7. The Basing Country in which the inspection is to take place shall have the right to examine jointly with the Inspected Party each item of equipment brought in by the Inspecting Party to ascertain that the equipment cannot be used to perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it is established upon examination that a piece of equipment is unconnected with these inspection requirements, it shall not be cleared for use and shall be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the country.

ARTICLE V—CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS

1. Within 90 minutes of receipt from the Inspected Party of notification that a flight plan for an aircraft of the Inspecting Party has been filed in accordance with ICAO procedures applicable to civil aircraft, the Basing Country in whose territory the inspection site is located shall provide the Inspected Party with its approval for the aircraft of the Inspecting Party to proceed to the point of entry via the filed routing, or an amended routing if necessary.

2. The Basing Country in whose territory the inspection site is located shall facilitate the entry of inspectors and aircrew into the

country, and shall take the steps necessary to ensure that the baggage and equipment of the inspection team is identified and transported expeditiously through customs.

3. Upon notification by the Inspected Party, in accordance with Article III above, of the inspection site, the Basing Country in whose territory the inspection is to take place shall take the steps necessary to ensure that the inspection team is granted all clearances and assistance necessary to enable it to proceed expeditiously to the inspection site and to arrive at the inspection site within nine hours of the Inspecting Party's notification of the site to be inspected. The Inspected Party and the Basing Country in which the inspection site is located shall consult with respect to the mode of transport to be utilized, and the Basing Country shall have the right to designate the routing between the point of entry and the inspection site.

4. Each Basing Country shall assist the inspected Party, as necessary, in providing two-way voice communication capability for an inspector team between an inspection site within its territory and the embassy of the Inspecting Party.

5. The Inspected Party and the Basing Country within whose territory an inspection site is located shall consult with respect to aircraft servicing and the provision of meals, lodging, and services for inspectors and aircrew members at the point of entry and inspection site. The cost of the foregoing requested by the Inspected Party and provided by the Basing Country shall be borne by the Inspected Party.

6. In the event the Inspecting Party requests an extension, which shall not exceed eight hours beyond the original 24-hour period of inspection as provided for in Section VI, paragraph 14 of the Inspection Protocol, the Inspected Party shall immediately notify the Basing Country in whose territory the inspection site is located of the extension.

ARTICLE VI—CONSULTATIONS

1. Within five days after entry into force of this Agreement, the Inspected Party and the Basing Countries shall meet to coordinate implementation of the inspection activities provided for by Article XI of the Treaty, the Inspection Protocol and this Agreement.

2. A meeting between the Inspected Party and any Basing Country to discuss implementation of this Agreement shall be held within five days of a request for such a meeting by the Inspected Party of a Basing Country.

3. Should any question arise which in the opinion of a Basing Country requires immediate attention, the Basing Country may contact the inspection notification authority of the Inspected Party. The Inspected Party will immediately acknowledge receipt of the inquiry or question and give urgent attention to the question or problem.

4. In the event that a Basing Country determines that an inspector or aircrew member has violated the conditions governing inspection within its territory, the Basing Country may notify the Inspected Party which shall inform the Inspecting Party of the disqualification of the inspector or aircrew member. The name of the

individual will be removed from the list of inspectors or aircrew members.

5. A Basing Country may change the point of entry for its territory by giving six months' notice of such change to the Inspected Party.

6. Upon completion of an inspection, the Inspected Party shall advise the Basing Country within whose territory the inspection took place that the inspection has been completed, and upon request of the Basing Country provide a briefing for the Basing Country on the inspection.

7. The United States of America shall not, without the express agreement of se the Basing Countries, propose or accept any amendment to Article XI of the treaty or to the Inspection Protocol that directly affects the rights, interests or obligations of the Basing Countries.


ARTICLE VII—ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION

This Agreement shall be subject to approval in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party, which approval shall be notified by each Party to each of the other Parties. Following such notification by all Parties, the Agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force for a period of thirteen years.

DONE at Brussels, on the eleventh of December, 1987, in a single original which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, which shall transmit a duly certified copy thereof to each of the other signatory Governments.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

ПЛАН ОБЪЕКТА ПО ПРОИЗВОДСТВУ ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
ОПЫТНЫЙ ЗАВОД ПРОИЗВОДСТВЕННОГО ОБЪЕДИНЕНИЯ
"МАШИНОСТРОИТЕЛЬНЫЙ ЗАВОД ИМ.М.И.КАЛИНИНА"
СВЕРДЛОВСК
(56 47 24 с.ш. 060 47 03 в.д.)



LAUNCHER PRODUCTION FACILITY
Experimental Plant of the Amalgamated Production Works "M. I. Kalinin Machine-Building Plant"
Sverdlovsk
56 47 24 N 060 47 03 E

ПЛАН ОБЪЕКТА ПО ПРОИЗВОДСТВУ
ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК ЗАВОД "БАРРИКАДЫ"
ВОЛГОГРАД
(48 46 с.ш., 44.35 в.д.)




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
LAUNCHER PRODUCTION FACILITY
Barrikady Plant
Volgograd
48 46 N 44.35 E

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ПЛАН ОБЪЕКТА ПО ПРОИЗВОДСТВУ
ПУСКОВЫХ УСТАНОВОК
ПЕТРОПАВЛОВСКИЙ ЗАВОД ТЯЖЕЛОГО
МАШИНОСТРОЕНИЯ ИМЕНИ В.И.ЛЕНИНА
ПЕТРОПАВЛОВСК
(54 54 с.ш., 69 11 в.д.)



383



LAUNCHER PRODUCTION FACILITY
V.I. Lenin Petropavlovsk
Heavy Machine-building Plant,
Petropavlovsk
54 54 N 69 11 E

1: 10 000

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

ANNEX—PROVISIONS ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INSPECTORS AND AIRCREW MEMBERS

In order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the privileges and immunities contained herein. Privileges and immunities shall be accorded for the entire in-country period in the country in which an inspection site is located, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or aircrew member.

1. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.

2. The papers and correspondence of inspectors and aircrew members shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the aircraft of the inspection team shall be inviolable.

3. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The immunity from jurisdiction of an inspector or an aircrew member may be waived by the Inspecting Party in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Waiver must always be express.

4. Inspectors and aircrew members of the Inspecting Party shall be permitted to bring into the territory of a Basing Country in which an inspection site is located, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

5. An inspector or aircrew member shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the Basing Countries.

No. 1056

NOTE OF THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Ministry's note of December 23, 1987, as follows:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to state the following.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic has been informed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the arrangements agreed by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the verification of their mutual obligations provided for in Article XI of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and in the Protocol on Inspection thereto.

As a strong supporter of balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament, the Government of the German Democratic Republic wholeheartedly endorses the said Treaty and Protocol on Inspection and has agreed to the application on its territory of inspections in accordance with that Treaty and the Protocol thereto.

The Ministry has the honor to inform you, therefore, that the Government of the German Democratic Republic is willing to accord to the Government of the United States of America and its inspectors and aircrew members the inspection rights provided for in the Protocol on Inspection upon receipt of an undertaking that the Government of the United States of America and its officials will, in relation to all activities to be carried out thereunder on the

territory of the German Democratic Republic and in its airspace, strictly comply with the terms of that Protocol. It is understood in this connection that nothing therein affects, except as specifically provided, the enforcement of the laws and regulations of the German Democratic Republic.

The Ministry has the honor further to propose that the present note and the Embassy's note of reply to that effect shall be regarded as constituting an Agreement between the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the United States of America. This Agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force until thirteen years following the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The present Agreement shall not, however, in any way affect the exclusive obligations of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertaken with regard to each other under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection.

The Ministry takes this opportunity to reassure the Embassy of its highest consideration."

In reply, the Embassy, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, takes note of the willingness of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to facilitate the application to its territory of the inspections provided for in the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection thereto.

The Embassy has the honor further, in consideration thereof, to inform the Ministry that the Government of the United States of America gives the Government of the German Democratic Republic the formal undertaking requested in the aforesaid note and has agreed that the note of the Ministry of December 23, 1987, and the present note of the Embassy be regarded as constituting an Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the German Democratic Republic regarding inspection on the territory of the German Democratic Republic provided for by the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and conducted in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection thereto. This Agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force until thirteen years following the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The present Agreement shall not, however, in any way affect the exclusive obligations of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertaken with regard to each other under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection.

The Embassy takes this opportunity to reassure the Ministry of its highest consideration.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *Berlin, December 23, 1987.*

TEXT OF NOTE FROM THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-

slovak Socialist Republic and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the ministry's note of December 18, 1987, as follows:

"The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to state the following.

"The Governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has been informed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the arrangements agreed by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the verification of their mutual obligations provided for in Article XI of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and in the Protocol on Inspection thereto.

"As a strong supporter of balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament, the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic wholeheartedly endorses the said Treaty and Protocol on Inspection and has agreed to the application on its territory of inspections in accordance with that Treaty and the Protocol thereto.

"The Ministry has the honor to inform you, therefore, that the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is willing to accord to the Government of the United States of America and its inspectors and aircrew members the inspection rights provided for in the Protocol on Inspection upon receipt of an undertaking that the United States of America and its officials will, in relation to all activities to be carried out thereunder on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and in its airspace, strictly comply with the terms of that Protocol. It is understood in this connection that nothing therein affects, except as specifically provided, the enforcement of the laws and regulations of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic within its territory.

"The Ministry has the honor further to propose that the present note and the Embassy's note of reply to that effect shall be regarded as constituting an agreement between the Governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and of the United States of America. This agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with the entry into force of the treaty and shall remain in force until thirteen years following the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

"The present agreement shall not, however, in any way affect the exclusive obligations of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertaken with regard to each other under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection.

"The Ministry takes this opportunity to reassure the Embassy of its highest consideration."

In reply, the Embassy, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America takes note of the willingness of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to facilitate the application to its territory of the inspections provided for in the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection thereto.

The Embassy has the honor further, in consideration thereof, to inform the Ministry that the Government of the United States of America gives the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic the formal undertaking requested in the aforesaid note and

has agreed that the note of the Ministry of December 18, 1987, and the present note of the Embassy be regarded as constituting an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic regarding inspections on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic provided for by the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and conducted in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection thereto. This agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force until thirteen years following the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The present agreement shall not, however, in any way affect the exclusive obligations of the United States of America and the Union of Socialist Republics undertaken with regard to each other under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection.

The Embassy takes this opportunity to reassure the Ministry of its highest consideration.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *Prague, January 4, 1988.*

